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ABSTRACT 
Zackary P. Rider: Caelum Ascendit Ratio: The Divinizing Role of Knowledge in Didactic Poetry 
from Hesiod to Manilius 
(Under the direction of James J. O’Hara) 
 
In this dissertation, I seek to refine our understanding of the genre of didactic poetry in 
antiquity through examination of the relationship between knowledge and divinity as it is 
presented by Greek and Latin didactic poets.  Focusing on the poetic portrayal of the didactic 
student, I argue for a continuity in the didactic poetic discourse based on a conception of the 
divinizing power of knowledge, and show the (quasi-)deification of the student to be a recurrent 
generic feature.  This “deification” can take different forms, ranging from a qualified return to 
the mythological Golden Age where humans “lived like the gods,” as seen in Hesiod’s Just City, 
to the philosophical conception of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, in which the promotion of the rational part of 
the soul brings humanity closer to divinity.  Despite this diversity of forms, each poet can be 
seen self-consciously working within a shared tradition, portraying new articulations on this 
divinizing role in ways meant to recall poetic predecessors and offer students the potential for “a 
life like the gods.” 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of this divinization or return to a state like that of the 
Golden Age as it is portrayed by the Greek didactic poets Hesiod, Empedocles, and Aratus.  
Chapter 2 looks at Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, examining how Lucretius combines poetic and 
philosophical models to argue for the deification of the Epicurean student and especially
 iv 
Epicurus himself.  Chapter 3 turns to Vergil’s Georgics to show the ways in which Vergil’s 
polyvalent text plays with its readers’ expectations to assert and reject simultaneously the 
possibility for his student to achieve a “life like the gods.”  Chapter 4 concludes the dissertation 
with a study of Manilius’ Astronomica, showing how the poet exploits contradictions in his 
predecessors for his own ends while arguing for the inherent divinity of humanity. 
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Introduction 
The Didactic Question 
 The problem of identifying the genre now known as “didactic” in its ancient 
framework is well-known.1  After all, there is little ancient evidence for any clear 
demarcation of the genre.  Indeed, the “didactic” poets themselves do not seem to recognize 
the genre as such, instead identifying their works by the standard criterion of metrical choice. 
As such, given these poets’ proclivity for hexameter and the meter’s long-standing 
associations with the epic tradition, the grand majority of “didactic” poems are represented in 
self-consciously epic terms.  Thus Lucretius in the proem to his De Rerum Natura presents 
his poetic predecessors on “the nature of things” as Ennius and before him Homer (DRN 
1.117-126), while Vergil includes his own tribute to Homeric verse near the end of his poem 
on agricultural instruction.  This emphasis on form over content in the self-representation of 
genre may be seen most clearly in the opening to the second book of Manilius’ Astronomica, 
wherein the astrological poet gives a catalogue of his antecedent tradition comprising 
material today seen as markedly divergent, but united by its hexameter form: the epics of 
Homer (Astr. 2.1-11); the instructional poetry of Hesiod (2.12-24), astronomical poets such 
as Aratus (2.25-35), and Nicander (2.44-45); bucolic poetry (2.39-42); and even magical 
texts (2.46-48).
                                                          
1For systematic attempts to define the genre, see esp. Effe 1977; Volk 2002, esp. 25-68. Cf. 
Dalzell 1996, 8-34; Harder 2007, esp. 23-30. 
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Yet despite this apparent unanimity on the part of the poets, these works would seem 
to contain certain shared features that distinguish them from other genres such as epic, as 
indeed their modern classification as “didactic” suggests.  Unease at their epic designation 
may already be detected in antiquity.  Most famous, perhaps, is Aristotle’s assessment that 
such poetry was not actually worthy of the term at all; comparing Homer and Empedocles, 
Aristotle argued that the latter should be called not a poet, but a natural philosopher (οὐδὲν δὲ 
κοινόν ἐστιν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, 
τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν, Arist. Poet. 1447b.17-20).2  Closer to modern 
sensibilities (in issues of terminology, if not taste for didactic poetry) was the grammarian 
Servius, who, introducing his commentary on Vergil’s Georgics, classifies the work as 
“didactic” (didascalici).  Servius even gives defining criteria for the genre, focusing on the 
relationship between instructor-poet and student-addressee, and uses these criteria to form a 
corpus of “didactic” works, including Hesiod and Lucretius (Serv. Auct. Comm. in Verg. 
Georg. proem): et hi libri didascalici sunt, unde necesse est, ut ad aliquem scribantur; nam 
praeceptum et doctoris et discipuli personam requirit: unde ad Maecenatem scribit, sicut 
Hesiodus ad Persen, Lucretius ad Memmium.  Certainly one may take issue with adopting 
either of these judgments in their entirety, but both point to an understanding already to be 
found in antiquity of the uniqueness of “didactic” poems. 
 The present work is not concerned to resolve this broader dilemma surrounding the 
classification of didactic poetry as a genre.  Much work has been done on this front 
                                                          
2It is worth noting that Aristotle acknowledges the same metric similarity as the later Latin 
poets who would identify themselves as “epic,” and yet views this similarity as entirely 
insufficient in his own classification. 
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elsewhere; in particular, the classificatory efforts of Effe and, more recently, Volk’s work on 
the consistent metapoetic features of didactic poems have contributed greatly to our 
understanding of this genre qua genre.  Here I take a somewhat more targeted approach.  In a 
strategy similar to Volk’s, I take a group of poems regularly identified as “didactic” and seek 
to extrapolate conclusions about the genre based on features recurrent in these works. Unlike 
Volk, however, I attempt no larger definition of the genre as such, but instead identify a 
single generic constant—the “deification” of the poetic student—and trace the development 
of that constant over the course of our “didactic” corpus. In so doing, I contribute an 
argument for the continuity of the genre while at the same time arguing for the importance of 
a conception of divinity based in epistemology found throughout this corpus.3 
 
Divine Options 
It will be useful here to explain more clearly what is meant by the “deification” of the 
student.  In its primary meaning, of course, the term refers to the actual apotheosis of the 
individual, a literal transition of status from human to god.  I also use the term to describe 
something that may be thought of as “divine assimilation,” a metaphorical comparison of 
human to god in a manner that suggests equivalence.  In this latter articulation may be 
included such conceptions as a “life like the gods,” already extant in our earliest Greek 
                                                          
3Schiesaro 1997, 63, discusses how “[t]he nature and boundaries of knowledge naturally 
represent a significant theoretical concern of the didactic poet and, by extension, the reader 
and the critic: thus the ideological connotations of knowledge—as well as its limits, dangers, 
and hopes—inevitably impact the themes that such poetry deals with, and should form an 
integral part of our overall interpretation of didactic texts.”  Such ideological connotation is 
precisely what I am interested in in this dissertation, as I seek to set out what the depiction of 
the student vis-a-vis the gods can tell us about the ultimate significance of knowledge as it is 
presented by these poets. 
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didactic poem, the Works and Days. Here Hesiod tells of a golden race of human beings said 
to live like the gods, free from worry and labor (ὥστε θεοὶ δ’ ἔζωον, ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες, / 
νόσφιν ἄτερ τε πόνου καὶ ὀιζύος, WD 112-113). There is no question here of literal godhood, 
as Hesiod describes the deaths of these individuals soon after (though they are subsequently 
made δαίμονες by Zeus).  Instead, Hesiod makes the connection between the golden race and 
gods on an ideological basis.  Assuming certain characteristics, such as freedom from toil or 
trouble, as essential to the gods’ state, Hesiod argues that other individuals who possess these 
characteristics are suitably described as “god-like.” 
This similitude between the ideal condition and divinity soon found currency among 
the philosophers, who saw certain divine characteristics as befitting the wise man.  Thus in 
his Theaetetus Plato presents similitude to the gods as the final aim of a philosophical life, 
describing the process as ὁμοίωσις θεῷ (176b).4  Aristotle makes a similar point in his 
Nicomachean Ethics, claiming the contemplative life to be more divine than human (ὁ δὲ 
τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, 
ἀλλ’ ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, 1177b). Ultimately, such similitude would become a 
common goal for the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period, so that the philosopher 
Epicurus could tell his student Menoeceus that, should he follow Epicurean teachings, he 
would live as a god among men (ζήσεις δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, D.L. 10.135).  As may be 
expected, this philosophical development often made the “life of the gods” into a more 
introspective affair, moving from the idealized physical conditions of Hesiod’s golden race to 
a state based on mental and emotional tranquillity. Yet the same process can still be detected: 
                                                          
4Cf. Erler 2002, 159-160; Volk 2009, 242; Gale 2013, 282-283 (with further bib.). Of course, 
the concept was not original to Plato, who would have found the notion already expounded 
by thinkers such as the Pythagoreans and Empedocles, among others. 
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the identification of specific qualities as “divine” and the subsequent recognition of their 
possessors as “god-like.” 
It is important to note how hazy a line divides this metaphorical form of deification 
from what could be considered an “actual” state of apotheosis, particularly for our 
philosophical sources.5  If one defines divinity by specific characteristics, and encourages 
students to possess these characteristics as fully as possible, is it then still just a metaphor to 
say the successful philosopher is “living a life like the gods,” or can a form of transcendence 
be implied?  This development may be detected in our quotation from Aristotle, who 
expressly distances the philosophical life from “human” life (κρείττων ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον· οὐ 
γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, 1177b); the Epicureans would be criticized frequently 
for taking the implications of this view to their logical conclusion by conducting sacrifices to 
Epicurus on his birthday. 
 In addition to this “divine assimilation,” of course, there is the practice in ritual and 
cult of deifying specific individuals.  In the Roman context that will be the focus of this 
dissertation, the most pertinent example is the deification of Augustus Caesar and his 
adoptive father Julius, and the concomitant development of imperial cult—a development 
with which we will see two of our poets, Vergil and Manilius, interact at some length.6  Yet 
the deification of the Caesars may be seen as the final step in a much lengthier process of 
defining divine status in Rome. 
                                                          
5Of course, what is meant by “actual” apotheosis will differ as well, depending on the 
discourse in which one is operating—cultic, mythological, philosophical, or otherwise. 
 
6On the deification of the Caesars and the establishment of the imperial cult, see, e.g., 
Weinstock 1971; Price 1984; Fishwick 1987; Gradel 2002; Koortbojian 2013. 
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The initial stages of this process can be set some two centuries prior to the rule of 
Augustus.  The first divine honors to a Roman were those awarded to M. Marcellus by the 
Syracusans in 211 BCE, upon his defeat of the Carthaginians for control of the city.7  Around 
the same time, Ennius is supposed to have translated into Latin the Hiera Anagraphe of 
Euhemerus, in which that Hellenistic philosopher had claimed that the traditional gods were 
originally illustrious human beings, granted immortality for the services they provided to 
humanity.8  Over the course of the subsequent 200 years, the topic of deification would 
undergo considerable debate and development.9  Recent work by Cole, for example, has 
described the trajectory of Cicero’s personal ideology concerning divinization over the 
course of his career, and the ways in which he sought to influence public discourse 
concerning the practice.10  Cicero himself in his De Natura Deorum shows the potential 
difficulties that could arise as the nature of deification was contested, describing how the tax-
exempt status of land consecrated to Amphiaraus was called into question by Roman tax 
collectors, who argued that anyone who had once been human could not now be immortal 
(DND 3.49):11 
an Amphiaraus erit deus et Trophonius? nostri quidem 
publicani, cum essent agri in Boeotia deorum inmortalium 
excepti lege censoria, negabant immortalis esse ullos qui  
                                                          
7See Fishwick 1987, 46; cf. Rives 1993.  These honors in turn were part of a larger 
Hellenistic tradition of ruler cult. 
 
8For discussions of Euhemerus and the Hiera Anagraphe in the Roman context, see Gale 
1994, 75-84; Bosworth 1999, 10-12. 
 
9For a brief synopsis of humans being worshipped as gods in the Republican period, see 
Gradel 2002, 32-53. 
 
10Cole 2013. 
 
11Cf. Cole 2013, 18-19. 
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aliquando homines fuissent.  
 Poets too could take part in shaping this discourse.  Thus Catullus could borrow from 
Sappho to describe godhood in terms of proximity to Lesbia (Catull. 51.1-5): 
 Ille mi par esse deo videtur, 
 ille, si fas est, superare divos, 
 qui sedens adversus identidem te 
  spectat et audit 
 dulce ridentem... 5 
A generation later, Vergil portrays his shepherd Tityrus instead defining divine status in 
terms of beneficence and power relations, as he offers sacrifice to the iuvenis who allowed 
him to retain his pastoral existence (Verg. Ecl. 1.6-10): 
 O Meliboee, deus nobis haec otia fecit. 
 namque erit ille mihi semper deus, illius aram 
 saepe tener nostris ab ovilibus imbuet agnus. 
 ille meas errare boves, ut cernis, et ipsum 
 ludere quae vellem calamo permisit agresti. 10 
Under Augustus, the poetics of deification became especially charged, as the poets of the 
regime sought to contribute their own articulations to the princeps’ policy.12  Vergil would 
again play an immense role, aspects of which will be discussed in chapter three; so too would 
Horace in his Roman Odes and the opening to his second book of Epistles, where he 
compares Augustus favorably to other deified figures such as Romulus and Liber, as the 
princeps is worshipped even while alive (praesenti tibi maturos largimur honores / 
iurandasque tuum per numen ponimus aras, Hor. Epist. 2.1.15-16).  While examining the 
uses of deification in the poetry that follows, then, it is important to keep in mind this 
                                                          
12Cole 2001, 68-69, discusses how “[p]oetic texts such as the Georgics and Odes 1-3 
interacted with...other sets of discourses in ways that had cumulative, constitutive effects in 
defining Augustus’ divine status.” 
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evolving discourse on the status of deification.  Each poet will be seen to grapple with this 
status in his own way, portraying his own view on how a human may become a god. 
 
The Present Study 
 This study begins with a chapter on the Greek didactic poets before turning to a trio 
of Latin didactic poems written during the late Republican and Augustan periods: Lucretius’ 
De Rerum Natura, Vergil’s Georgics, and Manilius’ Astronomica.  Two dominant factors 
make these works particularly apt for the study proposed.  First is the diversity of ideology 
represented by these works.  Writing on, respectively, Epicurean natural science, the 
agricultural existence, and astrology of a (supposedly) Stoicizing nature, these poets cleave to 
no single philosophical tradition.  As such, any potential ideological similarity in their works 
must be explained by other means, such as a shared poetic tradition.  The second factor 
making these poems favorable for the present endeavor is their shared cultural milieu.  
Writing within the span of a little over a half-century, these poets would likely have shared 
certain assumptions concerning their undertaken genre.  Moreover, the influence each of 
these poets exerted over the next is clear and far-reaching; as each responds to the work of 
his predecessors, one may observe the development of the genre and its features.13  Before 
                                                          
13It may be reasonably objected that this dissertation omits Ovid’s Ars Amatoria, a poem that 
certainly fits into the didactic tradition under investigation, interacting especially with the 
works of Lucretius and Vergil and acknowledging Hesiod as a predecessor through 
ostentatious rejection of Hesiodic inspiration (AA 1.27-28).  It also touches on issues of 
apotheosis, particularly in the treatment of Caesar’s eventual deification (e.g., 1.203-204).  
Yet I save discussion of Ovid’s poem for future study for two reasons.  First, the extent to 
which the teachings of Ovid’s didactic praeceptor are undercut and shown to be inept 
throughout the poem complicates analysis by forcing the reader to juggle (at the least) two 
potentially conflicting levels of the text: a “straight” reading of the poem in which the 
teachings of the praeceptor are taken at face value, and a more nuanced reading taking into 
account the contradictions and impossibilities inscribed in the text (cf., among others, 
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discussing this trio, I begin with a study of their Greek predecessors, focusing on those with 
the most lasting influence on Latin didactic: Hesiod, Empedocles, and Aratus.  In these poets, 
the genre’s close connection between knowledge and divinity is established and developed, 
laying the foundations for our Latin poets’ endeavors. 
 As will be seen, the (quasi-)deification I identify in these poems can take many forms, 
and serves as a rhetorical strategy employed to provide encouragement for the student, to 
demonstrate the immense rewards for success in the didactic endeavor, and, ultimately, to 
argue for the divine nature of human reason.  Thus use of the trope can vary greatly in scale, 
from the relatively straightfoward life of Hesiod’s Just City, wherein the successful student 
can reach only an approximation of the golden race’s “life like the gods,” to the full-blown 
apotheosis offered by Empedocles’ purificatory instruction.  More often, particularly in the 
case of the Latin poets that will be the focus of this dissertation, the successful student falls 
somewhere between these two extremes, becoming “like a god” within an altered context of 
what that concept may mean. 
 In the first chapter, I provide an overview of this deification as it is portrayed by the 
Greek didactic poets Hesiod, Empedocles, and Aratus.  Already in Hesiod’s Works and Days, 
                                                          
Watson 2007 and James 2008).  Second, the poem’s dual generic affiliations with both the 
didactic and elegiac tradition problematize a reading of it as a didactic text; especially given 
the longstanding presence of erotodidactic elements in elegy (see Wheeler 1910-1911), one 
may question whether any particular feature of Ovid’s instruction can be clearly identified as 
a development of the “hexameter” didactic that is the focus of this study rather than of the 
elegiac erotodidactic tradition.  (The relation between these two strands of didaxis is outside 
the scope of this dissertation).  Both complications hinder investigation of essentially didactic 
generic features: how can the critic be assured that the features analyzed are to be identified 
as didactic markers, rather than elegiac or parodic?  While recognizing the difficulty of 
isolating uncomplicated examples of any genre’s features, it seems better to forego analysis 
of the Ars for the present and to seek to identify recurrent features in Lucretius, Vergil, and 
Manilius. 
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the germs of the association between knowledge and divinity can be seen in the poet’s Myth 
of the Ages.  Seeking to persuade his student by extolling the rewards for didactic success, 
Hesiod presents the successful student’s life in the Just City as comparable to that of the 
golden race, who “lived like the gods.”  This idea will be transformed by Hesiod’s 
successors, who will alter his claims to suit their own ideologies.  For Empedocles, espousing 
a philosophy rooted in the continuity and transmigration of the soul, Hesiod’s metaphorical 
deification will be made literal, as the later poet argues for divine reincarnation founded on 
the purity offered by his teachings.  In Aratus’ Phaenomena, these two systems are blended, 
as Aratus combines elements of his predecessors’ portrayals to argue for his own unique take 
on the divine life obtainable by the discerning student. 
 In the second chapter, I turn to Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura.  While the poet’s most 
explicit evocation of deification does not occur until the poem’s fifth book, in which his 
master Epicurus is referred to as a deus, Lucretius lays the groundwork for the deification of 
the successful Epicurean from the opening lines of his poem, as can be seen in his invocation 
to Venus and his subsequent depiction of Epicurus’ assault against religio.  After an 
examination of these passages and the philosophical background for Lucretius’ portrayal of 
the gods, I study Lucretius’ engagement with his poetic predecessors to show how Lucretius 
manipulates poetic models such as Golden Age imagery and earlier portrayals of the gods to 
reinforce his philosophical aims.  From here, I move to Lucretius’ combination of 
philosophical and poetic models in his depiction of the deified wise man Epicurus before 
ending with a study of the corollary to this elevation of the student: the anthropomorphization 
of the gods of religio. 
 11 
In chapter 3, I examine possibilities for deification as they are presented in Vergil’s 
Georgics.  Looking first at the opening invocation to Octavian, I study the ways in which 
Vergil negotiates the princeps’ potential deification as he composes in the politically 
transitional period after the battle at Actium, and reasserts the Euhemeristic notion of 
divinization as a reward for benefaction used previously by Lucretius.  I then turn to two 
potential “Golden Ages” described in the poem, the rustic setting of the laus ruris that closes 
book 2 and the plague of Noricum that closes book 3, to examine the ways in which Vergil 
plays with his readers’ expectations to assert and reject simultaneously the possibility for his 
student to achieve a “life like the gods.”  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
Aristaeus epyllion that ends the poem, and an examination of Aristaeus’ potential role as a 
proxy for the agricultural student. 
The study ends with the discussion of Manilius’ Astronomica in chapter 4.  Just as 
Vergil does in his Georgics, Manilius opens his poem with the figure of a deified Caesar.  
Yet whereas Vergil focuses on the differing divine possibilities available for the deified 
princeps, Manilius, writing near the end of Augustus’ reign almost 40 years later, reflects the 
established reality of Augustan cult.  Following an examination of this Manilian portrayal of 
Caesar, I proceed to discussion of Manilius’ cultural history, showing how the poet exploits 
contradictions already present in the rhetoric of his poetic predecessors to his own ends.  I 
conclude with a discussion of the more esoteric features of Manilian thought, and his 
argument for the inherent divinity of humanity.
 12 
Chapter 1: The Greek Didactic Background in Hesiod, Empedocles, and Aratus 
 
 In this chapter, I examine the development of the relationship between gods and 
humanity as it is presented in the three Greek didactic poets with arguably the greatest 
influence on the later Latin tradition: Hesiod, Empedocles, and Aratus.  As will be shown, all 
three poets point to ways in which knowledge can allow humanity to approach parity with 
the gods.  I start with Hesiod’s Works and Days, the foundation text of the genre. Here 
Hesiod portrays the divide between humanity and gods as an essential feature of 
contemporary life, and the condition that makes his didaxis necessary.  Focusing on his 
account of humanity’s descent in the Myth of the Ages, I explore the ways in which Hesiod 
uses his instruction to bridge this divide and lead humanity to an approximation of their 
original “golden” state.  From here, I turn to Empedocles’ philosophical poetry, which deals 
more explicitly with issues of transcendence, portraying the ascent to godhood as a legitimate 
possibility.  Although Empedocles’ cosmological and eschatological views lead him to 
radically different conclusions about the nature of the gods and their relation to humanity, I 
argue that the poet’s rhetoric retains an Hesiodic element, portraying the instruction afforded 
by the poet as a means to unity with the divine. The chapter ends with a discussion of Aratus’ 
Phaenomena, which blends features of Hesiodic and Empedoclean didactic to present the 
possibility of a literal return to the golden age in place of Hesiod’s approximation. 
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Hesiod 
 In this section, I first look at the rhetoric of Hesiod’s Works and Days and his 
depiction of humanity’s status in relation to the gods, paying particular attention to the Myth 
of the Ages, the Hesiodic passage most frequently imitated or referred to by his Latin 
successors.  This myth, and much of Hesiod’s instruction, is best understood in terms of the 
discussion of the two Strifes with which Hesiod begins his poem proper14 and characterizes 
contemporary humanity (WD 11-26):15 
 Οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν 
 εἰσὶ δύω· τὴν μέν κεν ἐπαινήσειε νοήσας, 
 ἡ δ’ ἐπιμωμητή· διὰ δ’ ἄνδιχα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν. 
 ἡ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλει, 
 σχετλίη· οὔ τις τήν γε φιλεῖ βροτός, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης 15 
 ἀθανάτων βουλῇσιν Ἔριν τιμῶσι βαρεῖαν. 
 τὴν δ’ ἑτέρην προτέρην μὲν ἐγείνατο Νὺξ ἐρεβεννή, 
 θῆκε δέ μιν Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος αἰθέρι ναίων 
 γαίης τ’ ἐν ῥίζῃσι καὶ ἀνδράσι πολλὸν ἀμείνω· 
 ἥ τε καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὅμως ἐπὶ ἔργον ἔγειρεν. 20 
 εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἰδὼν ἔργοιο χατίζων 
 πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρώμεναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν 
 οἶκόν τ’ εὖ θέσθαι, ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων 
 εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ’· ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν. 
 καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, 25 
 καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ. 
Correcting the earlier genealogical claims of his Theogony, Hesiod here explains that there 
are two types of Strife to be found among humanity.  One is responsible for war and conflict 
(14), and is thoroughly denounced by the poet; no one honors this Strife willingly, but only 
                                                          
14Some ancient editors went so far as to athetize the first ten lines, making our line 11 the 
first of the poem; see West 1978 ad 1-10. 
 
15For the distinction between Strifes as essential for the rest of this part of the poem, see 
Rosenmeyer 1957, 262; Heath 1985, 246-247. 
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under compulsion from the gods (15-16).  In contrast, the other Strife is “much better for 
men” (19) and is responsible for a sense of emulative competition, rousing individuals to 
work out of envy at another’s prosperity (20-26).  Both are closely related to the two 
subsequent stories about Pandora and the Myth of the Ages that account for the present state 
of mankind.16  By explaining the scarcity of resources in the contemporary world (κρύψαντες 
γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν, 42), the story of Prometheus and Pandora gives a cause 
for the inequality and envy that fuel the “good” Strife and the work to which it incites 
humanity, while the Myth of the Ages documents the rise of the “bad” Strife and the 
subsequent need for justice to counter it.  As I argue, over the course of the Works and Days 
Hesiod suggests that his precepts offer a way to reverse the state of humanity described in 
these tales, countering the effects of the bad Strife while encouraging the effects of the 
“good.”  Although humanity may no longer reach the same god-like state as the men of the 
Golden Age, it can, through the knowledge of justice and farming imparted by Hesiod (and 
the will of the gods), reach a modern approximation. 
According to Hesiod’s Myth of the Ages, men and the gods have similar origins 
(ὁμόθεν γεγάασι θεοὶ θνητοί τ’ ἄνθρωποι, 108)17 and in the time of Kronos, the golden race 
of men lived like gods (ὥστε θεοὶ δ’ ἔζωον, 112).  Certainly, this is not to say that gods and 
men were identical—while the golden race was free from old age and disease (οὐδέ τι δειλόν 
/ γῆρας ἐπῆν, αἰεὶ δὲ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὁμοῖοι / τέρποντ’ ἐν θαλίῃσι κακῶν ἔκτοσθεν 
ἁπάντων, 113-115), its members nevertheless died, unlike their immortal counterparts 
(θνῆσκον δ’ ὥσθ’ ὕπνῳ δεδμημένοι, 116).  Rather the golden race’s similarity to the gods is 
                                                          
16Cf., e.g., Querbach 1985, 6-7; Clay 2003, 37-38. 
 
17For a discussion of the exact force of ὁμόθεν here, see West 1978 ad loc. 
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to be seen in the ease of their lifestyle. They are at peace (ἥσυχοι, 119), free from toil and 
grief (νόσφιν ἄτερ τε πόνου καὶ ὀιζύος, 113), and they are exempt from the necessity of 
cultivation; the earth bears for them unstintingly and of its own accord (καρπὸν δ’ ἔφερε 
ζείδωρος ἄρουρα / αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον, 117-118).  Subject neither to violence 
nor scarcity, they are without the two forms of Strife which are so central to life in the Iron 
Age. 
That this is so becomes apparent when the golden race is compared to subsequent 
races.  Following the removal of the golden race from the earth, Hesiod introduces the silver 
race, “like to the golden race in neither stature nor thought” (χρυσέῳ οὔτε φυὴν ἐναλίγκιον 
οὔτε νόημα, 129).  The humans of this age are said to suffer distress owing to two factors—
their incapacity to refrain from committing acts of hybris against one another and their 
neglect of the gods (133-136): 
 παυρίδιον ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χρόνον, ἄλγε’ ἔχοντες 
 ἀφραδίῃς· ὕβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδύναντο 
 ἀλλήλων ἀπέχειν, οὐδ’ ἀθανάτους θεραπεύειν 135 
 ἤθελον οὐδ’ ἔρδειν μακάρων ἱεροῖς ἐπὶ βωμοῖς... 
 
In the latter characteristic, Hesiod shows that a disconnect has emerged between gods and 
humans.  Whereas the golden race has a close relationship to the gods, indicated by the 
honored position they receive from Zeus after death (121-126), the silver race fail to tend to 
the gods or their sacrifices.18  At the same time, the focus on hybris as the fundamental 
                                                          
18It is in fact unclear whether the men of the golden race were required to sacrifice to the 
gods at all.  Should one seek to reconcile this account with the events of the Theogony, the 
golden race may be identified with the human race prior to the division at Mekone, where 
humans and gods were ultimately separated and sacrifice was established (Th. 535ff.).  
Reference to the golden race as “delighting in feasts” (τέρποντ’ ἐν θαλίῃσι, WD 115) proves 
little either way; while a mention of such feasting may refer to that feasting associated with 
sacrifice, the same phrase is used in the Odyssey to describe Heracles’ divine state as he 
delights in festivities with the immortal gods (αὐτὸς δὲ μετ’ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι / τέρπεται ἐν 
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activity of the silver race points to the introduction of the blameworthy Strife, which will 
afflict each subsequent race of humans.  Indeed, for the subsequent bronze race it is their 
primary feature; interested solely in acts of hybris and the “works of Ares” (οἷσιν Ἄρηος / 
ἔργ’ ἔμελε στονόεντα καὶ ὕβριες, 145-146), this race takes no part in the consumption of 
bread (perhaps indicating a disregard for the agricultural cultivation motivated by the better 
Strife) and ultimately destroys itself through its violence. 
 Even in the heroic age, which is presented by Hesiod as an improvement over the 
previous bronze age and as directly descended from the gods (δικαιότερον καὶ ἄρειον / 
ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος, οἳ καλέονται / ἡμίθεοι, 158-160), this destructive Strife is still 
omnipresent.  Again, the age is characterized entirely by war, which wiped out the heroes at 
Thebes and Troy (161-165): 
 καὶ τοὺς μὲν πόλεμός τε κακὸς καὶ φύλοπις αἰνή 
 τοὺς μὲν ὑφ’ ἑπταπύλῳ Θήβῃ, Καδμηίδι γαίῃ, 
 ὤλεσε μαρναμένους μήλων ἕνεκ’ Οἰδιπόδαο, 
 τοὺς δὲ καὶ ἐν νήεσσιν ὑπὲρ μέγα λαῖτμα θαλάσσης 
 ἐς Τροίην ἀγαγὼν Ἑλένης ἕνεκ’ ἠυκόμοιο. 165 
Yet there is also a notable difference between this age and the silver and bronze ages which 
preceded it, for while some of the heroes do die like their predecessors, others are instead 
placed by Zeus in the Isles of the Blessed (166-173):19  
                                                          
θαλίῃς, Od. 11.602-603), a parallel which may illustrate further the divine state of the golden 
race.  As will be discussed below, later poets such as Empedocles and Aratus certainly saw a 
connection between the golden race and the absence of animal sacrifice.  In either case, the 
disconnect remains; either the need for sacrifice itself is a new development for the silver 
race or their neglect of that sacrifice is. 
 
19Currie 2007, 169-170, sees an ethical contrast here between those heroes that simply die 
(like the bronze race) and those that are rewarded by the gods with a life reminiscent of the 
golden race.  While such an argument is tempting, it cannot be supported by the text, as there 
is no distinction made between the actions in life of these two groups; both engage in some 
form of destructive Strife while still living.  The distinction seems instead to be left to the 
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 ἔνθ’ ἦ τοι τοὺς μὲν θανάτου τέλος ἀμφεκάλυψεν, 
 τοῖς δὲ δίχ’ ἀνθρώπων βίοτον καὶ ἤθε’ ὀπάσσας 
 Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κατένασσε πατὴρ ἐν πείρασι γαίης, 168 
 καὶ τοὶ μὲν ναίουσιν ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες 170 
 ἐν μακάρων νήσοισι παρ’ Ὠκεανὸν βαθυδίνην· 
 ὄλβιοι ἥρωες, τοῖσιν μελιηδέα καρπόν 
 τρὶς ἔτεος θάλλοντα φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα. 
 
Here they dwell in a condition separate from the rest of humanity that is reminiscent of the 
life enjoyed by the golden race.20  Just like the golden race, they enjoy hearts free from care 
(170; cf. ὥστε θεοὶ δ’ ἔζωον ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες, 112)21 and their lands are granted an 
unnatural fertility, flourishing three times a year (172-173).  As such, it would seem that 
neither group suffers from resource scarcity or the resulting need for the “good” Strife placed 
in the soil.  Further, this life is again presented as a quasi-divine state as it is granted only to 
members of this semi-divine race by the special dispensation of Zeus (168).  In Hesiod’s 
presentation of the first four ages, then, one can see the development, and incomplete 
resolution, of a divide between the gods and humanity.  For the god-like golden race and 
those select heroes granted a place on the Isles of the Blessed in place of death, Strife of 
either kind is non-existent. For the humans of the silver and bronze races, however, as well as 
the heroes before their death or removal to the Isles of the Blessed, life is defined by Strife. 
                                                          
discretion of Zeus; cf. Pind. Ol. 2.78-80, where Achilles is admitted to the Isles of the 
Blessed through his mother Thetis’ persuasion of Zeus. 
 
20This connection between the golden race and the heroic afterlife on the Isles of the Blessed 
was eventually made more explicit by an interpolation (τηλοῦ ἀπ’ ἀθανάτων· τοῖσιν Κρόνος 
ἐμβασιλευει, labeled line 173a in West 1978) that assigned rule of the Isles to Kronos, ruler 
of the gods in the Golden Age.  By the mid-5th century BCE, Kronos’ place in the Isles was 
an accepted part of the tradition (see West 1978 ad 173a, who cites Pindar O. 2.70ff.).  Vergil 
would later conflate this trope and the Roman tradition concerning Saturn’s rule over early 
Italy to portray that land in Golden Age terms; cf. Geo. 2.173, Aen. 6.792-794 and passim. 
 
21Cf. Th. 61, where the Muses are described with the same phrase: ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἐχούσαις. 
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After this tableau of the first four ages, Hesiod finishes his account with a description 
of the present iron race, worse than any of the preceding races, and an apocalyptic prediction 
of its end, when Aidos and Nemesis will leave the earth and humanity will be defenseless 
against evil.  Yet all would not seem to be lost, for the poet moves from here to a protreptic 
towards justice, which is portrayed as a possible remedy to mankind’s current debased 
condition.  Exhorting Perses to embrace justice and reject hybris, Hesiod describes two cities, 
one just and the other unjust (225-247).  In the image of the Just City, humanity comes as 
close as it now can to the life of the golden race.22  Blameworthy Strife is entirely absent; 
peace is to be found throughout the land, as Zeus keeps war away from the citizens (229-
230).  Gone too are Hunger and Ruin (οὐδέ ποτ’ ἰθυδίκῃσι μετ’ ἀνδράσι Λιμὸς ὀπηδεῖ / οὐδ’ 
Ἄτη, 230-231), listed as children of Strife in the Theogony (Th. 226-230).  Instead, there is 
agricultural abundance.  Even the city and its people are said to bloom (τοῖσι τέθηλε πόλις, 
λαοὶ δ’ ἀνθέουσιν ἐν αὐτῇ, WD 227), and twice we are told that the land provides food for 
the people, once in lines that echo the description of the Golden Age and the Isles of the 
Blessed (καρπὸν δὲ φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα, 237; cf. καρπὸν δ’ ἔφερε ζείδωρος ἄρουρα, 117; 
καρπόν / τρὶς ἔτεος θάλλοντα φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα, 172-173).23   
                                                          
22This resemblance has been repeatedly noted by scholars, who nevertheless emphasize the 
ultimate distinction between the Just City and the Golden Age.  Cf. Benardete 1967, 156: 
“Hesiod seems to be all but suggesting that the iron age, if it were just, would thereby 
reestablish the heroic; for his description of the just city reads like that of the golden age, the 
only difference being that, as in the heroic age, women now bear children, and hence work is 
necessary.”  Querbach 1985, 6, focuses on the other half of the work/justice combination: 
“Even if a complete return to the Golden age is impossible, a good approximation of it, as 
described in lines 225-237, can be achieved through practicing dike.”  Clay 2003, 40, sees the 
comparison as ultimately empty: “Or are we to think that mankind will survive on acorns and 
honey and renounce agriculture?” 
 
23A reminder of the Golden Age can also be detected in the references to distribution of 
goods and the enjoyment of feasts (231; cf. 119, 115). Later poets would indicate their 
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 There is, however, an important difference between the life of the golden race and 
that of the Just City which is not emphasized, but is, I think, suggested.  That is the latter’s 
necessity for cultivation, and so, by implication, the presence of “good” Strife.24  In the 
Golden Age, the land produces of its own accord and unstintingly (αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ 
ἄφθονον, 118), while in the Isles of the Blessed, the harvest comes three times a year (173).  
In the Just City, on the other hand, while there is a clear sense of abundance, there is little 
indication of “supernatural” production—the earth may provide πολὺν βίον (232), but it is 
not unstinting, and for the most part is not said to come of its own accord.25  As such, the 
productivity of the Just City would seem to require farming and cultivation, the labor 
motivated by “good” Strife.  In this sense, the life of the Just City can only approximate the 
“god-like” life of the golden race or Isles of the Blessed. 
 In his Myth of the Ages and description of the Just and Unjust Cities, then, Hesiod 
presents his student with two requirements for a life that is as near to divine as the humans of 
our day can achieve: justice and farming.  It is no accident that these are the two chief 
didactic subjects of Hesiod’s poem.  Exhorting Perses to a just livelihood centered on 
                                                          
awareness of this connection between the Golden Age and the Just City, for despite the fact 
that lack of sea-faring would become a commonplace of Golden Age imagery, this lack is not 
mentioned in Hesiod’s depiction of the golden race, but in his description of the Just City 
(236-237) instead. 
 
24There may be vague lexical hints of cultivation in the Golden Age in the reference to ἔργα 
(119) but the focus is on the spontaneous nature (αὐτομάτη, 118) of the growth. 
 
25There is a suggestion of some spontaneous growth, but this is limited to products that 
would normally require little or no active cultivation: acorns and honey (οὔρεσι δὲ δρῦς / 
ἄκρη μέν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέσση δὲ μελίσσας, 232-233).  Cf. West 1978 ad loc., who sees 
in the passage another connection to and rationalization of traditional Golden Age motifs. 
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agricultural production, Hesiod intimates that this is the best life that may be lived, and the 
one that comes nearest to that of the gods.   
It should be emphasized that in the case of Hesiod, this “divine assimilation” of the 
student is entirely metaphorical; no actual apotheosis of the student is implied.  Hesiod 
makes sure to keep the gulf between humanity and gods visible from the beginning of his 
poem.  In the opening lines of the Works and Days, Zeus’ absolute power over men is shown 
(Hes. WD 3-8): 
 ὅν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε 
 ῥητοί τ’ ἄρρητοί τε Διὸς μεγάλοιο ἕκητι. 
 ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει, 5 
 ῥεῖα δ’ ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει, 
 ῥεῖα δέ τ’ ἰθύνει σκολιὸν καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει 
 Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει. 
Here the poet’s emphasis is on the god’s complete control over human affairs; the repeated 
antitheses highlight Zeus’ all-encompassing capacity for both good and ill, while the 
anaphora of ῥέα...ῥέα...ῥεῖα...ῥεῖα indicates the god’s facility in every action.  Immediately 
after this passage Hesiod introduces his discussion of the two Strifes, and the extent of the 
gods’ control over humanity is again made clear.  Both Strifes—depicted as inherent to 
contemporary life and as the central concerns that Hesiod’s instruction is meant to address—
are god-given; blameworthy Strife is said to be honored “out of necessity, by the will of the 
immortals” (ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης / ἀθανάτων βουλῇσιν Ἔριν τιμῶσι βαρεῖαν, WD 15-16), while 
Zeus himself is said to have placed the better Strife in the roots of the earth (θῆκε δέ μιν 
Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος, 18).  Thus the very circumstances of human life that require Hesiod’s 
instruction would seem to be brought about by the gods.  
 Indeed, the gods’ responsibility for these circumstances and the Hesiodic instruction 
they necessitate is indicated repeatedly over the course of the Works and Days.  This is 
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especially pronounced in the narrative of Prometheus and Pandora (42-105). Here Hesiod 
explains that the conditions his instruction is meant to address, the need for toil and the 
presence of hardship, were brought about through concealment and deception on the part of 
the gods—toil being a result of the gods’ concealment of livelihood (κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι 
θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν, 42), and the presence of hardship being the ultimate result of Zeus’ 
deceptive gift, Pandora.  In providing the information necessary to counter this deception, 
particularly in a manner that would liken human life to a divine state, Hesiod may appear 
similar to Prometheus, who also sought to counter the gods’ deception through the theft of 
fire.  Yet crucially Hesiod’s instruction is in keeping with the will of the gods; after all, 
Hesiod’s ability to “speak forth the will of Zeus” was granted to him by the Muses (ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ὧς ἐρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο· / Μοῦσαι γάρ μ’ ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον ἀείδειν, 661-
662).  Unlike Prometheus, who sought to alter the very conditions imposed by the gods 
through his theft of fire, Hesiod teaches how to live best within those conditions.  Ultimately, 
the gods are shown as responsible both for the human condition and for Hesiod’s attempts to 
ameliorate that condition; Hesiod’s “god-like” life of the Just City is the life that most closely 
conforms to the gods’ will. 
 Not only do the gods impose the conditions that require Hesiod’s instruction, they 
also determine its efficacy.  As the poem progresses, Hesiod increasingly emphasizes the 
unsure and contingent nature of his didaxis, and the student learns that Hesiod’s lessons are 
not sufficient by themselves.26  Thus in his discussion of sailing, Hesiod claims that his 
                                                          
26See Clay 2003, 46: “[T]he role of chance in human life—or is it the gods?—increases 
toward the end of the poem.”  Cf. Benardete 1967, 166; Clay 1993, 32.  For more on 
ambiguity and ambivalence in the poem, see Gagarin 1990. 
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teachings will lead to success, provided that Zeus or Poseidon not choose to cause shipwreck 
(665-669): 
  ...οὔτέ κε νῆα 665 
 καυάξαις οὔτ’ ἄνδρας ἀποφθείσειε θάλασσα, 
 εἰ δὴ μὴ πρόφρων γε Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων 
 ἢ Ζεὺς ἀθανάτων βασιλεὺς ἐθέλησιν ὀλέσσαι· 
 ἐν τοῖς γὰρ τέλος ἐστὶν ὁμῶς ἀγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε. 
Likewise, agricultural knowledge will not provide sure success; though Hesiod expects his 
instruction to be effective (καί σε ἔολπα / γηθήσειν βιότου αἱρεόμενον ἔνδον ἐόντος, 475-
476), he concedes that the mind of Zeus is changeable and difficult for mortals to 
comprehend (ἄλλοτε δ’ ἀλλοῖος Ζηνὸς νόος αἰγιόχοιο, / ἀργαλέος δ’ ἄνδρεσσι καταθνητοῖσι 
νοῆσαι, 483-484).  Even knowledge of justice is not sufficient on its own.  Instead, the just 
man will be rewarded by the gods, provided that the rest of the community is also just, for a 
community is often punished for the wrongs of one member (πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις 
κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπηύρα, / ὅστις ἀλιτραίνει καὶ ἀτάσθαλα μηχανάαται, 240-241).27  Here we 
see the most important qualification to the rhetoric of divinization used by Hesiod.  While the 
knowledge granted by the poet—that of justice and farming—is necessary for the agricultural 
life of the Just City, it is not sufficient for that life.  As the poet stresses, this requires in 
addition communal action and the goodwill of the gods.28 
 
 
                                                          
27Cf. WD 258-262, where the people are punished for the wickedness of their kings.  The fate 
of humanity in the Prometheus tale may also be compared, where the entire species is 
punished because of the actions of Prometheus. 
 
28See Benardete 1967, 158: “To be fully human and yet be perfectly just seems impossible.... 
Something else is necessary if men are to live up to their heroic ancestors.  That something 
is, as the fourth section [of B.’s division of the poem] reveals, the city.” 
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Empedocles 
 In examining Empedocles’ depiction of the gods and humanity, sure conclusions are 
harder to reach, given the fragmentary nature of his text as we have it.  It is clear from the 
extant fragments, however, that he saw giving an account of the gods as a primary concern,29 
and that his espousal of the transmigration of souls led to a radical stance on the relationship 
between men and gods.  In one fragment, Empedocles even claims that he himself is “an 
immortal god, no longer mortal” (ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός / πωλεῦμαι, μετὰ 
πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικεν, DK 102.4-5), breaking down the division between gods and 
mortals that Hesiod saw as essential to the condition of contemporary humanity.30  The 
tension between these two poets’ worldviews would help shape the later didactic tradition—
as will be seen, both Aratus and Vergil attempt to reconcile aspects of Hesiodic and 
Empedoclean thought.  Taken independently as well, Empedocles can be seen to have a 
tremendous influence on subsequent poets.  As Hardie has shown, Empedoclean thought—
particularly as mediated through Ennius—is recurrent in the Latin epic tradition,31 and 
references to the poet often emphasize his own claims of divinity; Lucretius speaks of 
Empedocles as “divine” and his teachings as seeming to come from an inhuman source 
(carmina quin etiam divini pectoris eius / vociferantur et exponunt praeclara reperta, / ut vix 
humana videatur stirpe creatus, DRN 1.731-733), while Horace near the end of his Ars 
Poetica gives an account of Empedocles’ death, brought about by his desire to appear a god 
                                                          
29See, e.g., DK 131.3-4: εὐχομένῳ νῦν αὖτε παρίστασο, Καλλιόπεια, / ἀμφὶ θεῶν μακάρων 
ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐμφαίνοντι. 
 
30As Koning 2010, 165-169 argues, this element of Empedoclean thought may be indebted 
partially to Hesiod’s description of the golden race, who become δαίμονες after their death. 
 
31See Hardie 1995, 207-212; cf. Toohey 1996, 40-41. 
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(deus inmortalis haberi / dum cupit Empedocles..., AP 464-465).  Insight into Empedocles’ 
portrayal of gods and men will thus aid greatly in our understanding of later poets. 
It is all the more unfortunate, then, that scholars are in disagreement about many 
aspects of Empedocles’ work.  Even the number of poems to which his fragments are 
assigned has become subject to debate.  Traditionally fragments have been assigned to one of 
two poems: the “scientific” On Nature, focusing on cosmogony and a description of the 
natural world, and the more esoteric Katharmoi (“Purifications”), to which are assigned the 
more religious fragments including those alluding to Empedocles’ doctrine of transmigration.  
Recently, this division has come under some attack, most notably by Osborne and Inwood,32 
who argue that there is no compelling reason to view our fragments as necessarily coming 
from two separate poems, and prefer to hypothesize instead a single Empedoclean work from 
which all (or almost all) our extant fragments derive.  For the purposes of the present 
argument, neither side need be accepted entirely, though a unity of Empedoclean thought is 
assumed that, in practice, shares much common ground with the one-poem hypothesis.  
Certainly, a certain unity is suggested by the extant fragments; even those fragments which 
seem heavily involved with Empedocles’ “religious” arguments of Pythagorean 
transmigration, such as Empedocles’ self-description as a fallen daimon, are nevertheless 
permeated with concepts (such as the role of Love and Strife as cosmic forces) which are 
intrinsic to his “physical” theories.33  Further, as this chapter is meant to provide a basis for 
                                                          
32Osborne 1987, Inwood 2001.  For a strong opposition to this view, see O’Brien 1995. 
 
33See esp. Kahn 1960.  Cf., e.g., Wright 1981, 57-76; Abrosano 2011.  Solmsen 1975, 135 
n.32, could already claim that “[w]e have had occasions to emphasize the large area of 
common ground between the two poems.  Awareness of it has in the last decades increased.”  
Trépanier 2007, 247-249 discusses how the Strasbourg papyrus, published in 1999, shows an 
undeniable combination of physical and religious argument by Empedocles. 
 25 
discussion of the later Latin didactic poets, it may be useful to attempt to isolate a single line 
of thought which those authors would have found particularly “Empedoclean.” 
 There is further difficulty, however, in determining exactly what Empedocles defined 
as a god.  Our sources state that he viewed the elements—fire, water, earth, and air—as 
“gods,” along with Love and Strife, the motive forces of his cosmology that blend and 
separate the elements in an eternally recurring cycle.34  In this case, then, a “god” is any of 
the fundamental entities of Empedocles’ physical system, eternal entities which are neither 
created nor destroyed.35  At those periods in the cycle when Love’s influence is at its 
greatest, all the elements (and thus the universe as a whole) are blended and united in a 
sphere, the Sphairos, which is likewise considered a god.36  Yet this would be a god with 
little effect on humans as such; after all, it only exists at a time when we, as human beings, 
do not.  Here humans may be said to become a “part of god” (as would the rest of the 
                                                          
34Hippolytus in his early 2nd-century CE Refutatio omnium haeresium claims that 
Empedocles regarded the four elements as “mortal gods” and Love and Strife as “immortal 
gods” (θεοὺς δέ, ὡς ἔφην, τέσσαρας μὲν θνητούς, πῦρ, ὕδωρ, γῆν, ἀέρα, δύο δὲ ἀθανάτους, 
ἀγεννήτους, πολεμίους ἑαυτοῖς διὰ παντός, τὸ νεῖκος καὶ τὴν φιλίαν, 7.29.23).  It should be 
noted that Empedocles nowhere in our extant fragments explicitly refers to the elements as 
θεοί, though such a designation is suggested by their identification with various divinities (as 
at DK 6, where the elements are referred to as Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis; cf. the 
frequent association between Love and Aphrodite). 
 
35For the eternal nature of the entities as a response to Parmenides’ critique of the concepts of 
creation and destruction, see, e.g., Inwood 2001, 24-29.  Paradoxically, Empedocles makes a 
distinction between the eternal nature of Love and Strife and that of the elements; although 
both are considered “eternal,” since the elements can blend with one another, they are, or can 
become, “mortal”, while the eternally unmixed Love and Strife are “immortal” in contrast; 
cf. Inwood 2001, 31-32. 
 
36There is significant disagreement over the “lifespan” of the Sphairos.  To note extremes: 
Solmsen 1975, 139-141, assumes it exists for only an instant in the course of the cosmic 
cycle, while O’Brien 1995, 425, argues that this period of unity lasts for half of the entire 
cycle. 
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universe), but this is a natural and invariable occurrence; the Empedoclean student does not 
become divine in this fashion because of anything he or she does, or anything the poet 
teaches.  In either case, then, following the traditional reading of the “physical” poem as a 
mechanistic description of the cosmos, we are left with entirely impersonal “gods” that are 
nevertheless immanent in every aspect of human existence, inasmuch as it is they as elements 
that constitute the world and every human in it.  Yet, unlike Hesiod’s discourse on work and 
justice, which gives his student practical advice and strategies for improving one’s lot, 
Empedocles’ teaching on physics would do nothing to alter the student’s situation; in the 
physical cosmology of Empedocles, the student would be made of divine substance with or 
without knowledge of Empedocles’ doctrine. 
Empedocles does not, however, present the gods only as impersonal features of his 
physical system.  Although he often uses impersonal terms to identify the four elements, 
Love, and Strife as the essential building blocks of that system and the Sphairos as a 
particular configuration of that system, he also regularly identifies these entities with the 
Olympian deities, as for example at DK 6, where the elements are identified with Zeus, Hera, 
Aidoneus, and Nestis (τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε· / Ζεὺς ἀργὴς Ἥρη τε 
φερέσβιος ἠδ’ Ἀιδωνεύς, / Νῆστις θ’ ἣ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον).37  To a certain 
extent, this can be explained as a straightforward case of metonymy, with the gods’ names 
standing in for the elements which they represent.  Yet such usage cannot be explained solely 
as metonymy, particularly in the case of Love, which Empedocles regularly conflates with 
                                                          
37The identification of these four divinities with their corresponding elements is the subject 
of much debate.  For one interpretation with background, see Kingsley 1995, esp. 13-48.  
Such allegorical interpretation, particularly of Homer, was common among Empedocles’ 
contemporaries; see esp. Buffiere 1956, 81-122. 
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the goddess Aphrodite,38 portraying the force as a craftswoman creating the various aspects 
of nature.39  More importantly for the topic at hand, the poet often gives a moralizing force to 
his depiction of the goddess, as is illustrated at DK 128, a passage traditionally assigned to 
the Katharmoi, where Empedocles, criticizing the present practice of animal sacrifice, depicts 
an idyllic past where “there was no god Ares or...Zeus as king, but Kypris as queen,” whom 
the people worshipped with proper vegetal sacrifices and libations instead of impious animal 
sacrifice (DK 128): 
 οὐδέ τις ἦν κείνοισιν Ἄρης θεὸς οὐδὲ Κυδοιμός 
 οὐδὲ Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς οὐδὲ Κρόνος οὐδὲ Ποσειδῶν 
 ἀλλὰ Κύπρις βασίλεια... 
 τὴν οἵ γ’ εὐσεβέεσσιν ἀγάλμασιν ἱλάσκοντο 
 γραπτοῖς τε ζῴοισι μύροισί τε δαιδαλεόδμοις 
 σμύρνης τ’ ἀκρήτου θυσίαις λιβάνου τε θυώδους, 
 ξανθῶν τε σπονδὰς μελίτων ῥίπτοντες ἐς οὖδας· 
 ταύρων δ’ ἀκρήτοισι φόνοις οὐ δεύετο βωμός, 
 ἀλλὰ μύσος τοῦτ’ ἔσκεν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστον, 
 θυμὸν ἀπορραίσαντας ἐέδμεναι ἠέα γυῖα. 
Here Empedocles presents a much more immediate divine influence on the actions of 
humans, who, through their privileging of the goddess, act in a properly moral way.  
Crucially, this proper behavior is exactly that espoused by the poet’s didaxis; through 
adherence to the poet’s moral precepts, the student may live in accord with the goddess 
Kypris. 
As one final divine category, Empedocles regularly refers to “long-lived gods” (θεοὶ  
                                                          
38Cf. DK 17.20, 23-24: καὶ φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκός τε πλάτος τε...τῇ τε φίλα φρονέουσι 
καὶ ἄρθμια ἔργα τελοῦσι, / Γηθοσύνην καλέοντες ἐπώνυμον ἠδ’ Ἀφροδίτην. 
 
39As at DK 86: ἐξ ὧν ὄμματ’ ἔπηξεν ἀτειρέα δῖ’ Ἀφροδίτη. Сf. DK 87, 71, 73. 
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δολιχαίωνες), beings distinct from the fundamental cosmic entities discussed above.40  It 
would seem that these gods are, like everything else in Empedocles’ system, formed by 
elemental combination, part of a spectrum of living things that includes animals and 
humans.41  The fact of their elemental constitution would explain why these are described not 
as immortal, but rather as “long-lived”; like everything else, they are subject to the separating 
and unifying actions of Strife and Love.42  It would also suggest that there is no absolute 
qualitative difference between humans and these gods; both are elemental compositions. 
This potential for fluidity between humans and gods helps to explain Empedocles’ 
claim that he himself is “an immortal god, no longer mortal” (θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός, 
DK 102.4), and is corroborated by another fragment traditionally assigned to the 
Katharmoi.43  In fragment DK 115, the poet refers to an “ancient decree of the gods” (θεῶν 
ψήφισμα παλαιόν, 115.1) that compels “daimones who have obtained long-lasting life” 
(δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο, 115.5), whenever they have transgressed in some 
fashion,44 to wander apart from the gods and take on the forms of various mortal creatures 
                                                          
40Pace Primavesi 2007 who seeks to identify these gods with the elements and the Sphairos. 
 
41See esp. DK 21. 
 
42This is argued by Trépanier 2007, 249ff.  Cf. Wright 1981, 60-61. 
 
43Certainly there is a tension between Empedocles’ claim to immortality here and his 
reference to the gods only as “long-lived” elsewhere, but this tension may be one of 
perspective.  As compound bodies, these gods are “long-lived” but the elements that 
compose them are immortal; elsewhere, Empedocles notes the problems of such linguistic 
conventions, explaining that “birth” and “death” are no more than incorrect terms for 
elemental mixture and dissolution, and do not in fact exist (DK 8, 9). 
 
44The lines describing the exact nature of this transgression (DK 115.3-4) are corrupt, though 
reference to a perjured oath is reasonably secure: ἐπίορκον ἁμαρτήσας ἐπομώσει, 115.4.  The 
other transgression is usually taken to be an act of violence, based on Stephanus’ emendation 
of 115.3 describing the daimon “polluting his limbs with blood” (εὖτέ τις ἀμπλακίῃσι φόνῳ 
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(τρίς μιν μυρίας ὧρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι / φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα 
θνητῶν, 115.6-7)—including that of the poet, an exile from the gods himself (τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ 
νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, 115.13).  Here, as in the fragment describing life under 
the goddess Kypris, there is an indication that divine status is related in some way to moral 
status; the fallen state of the daimones is a direct result of improper conduct.  From this it 
may be posited that proper moral conduct could lead to the restoration of divine status. 
 This is not a condition unique to the poet, but common to all humanity (and indeed all 
living things).  Empedocles readily lists the various forms he has taken in past lives, both 
animal and human (DK 117), and suggests that prominent humans with the proper wisdom 
can themselves acquire a divine state.45  This would then make sense of the numerous moral 
precepts given by the poet, as it is through such purification that individuals can be reborn 
into higher forms.  Indeed, it seems that this is exactly the way that the author of the 
Pythagorean so-called “Golden Verses” took Empedocles’ claims; giving a poetic set of 
moral prescriptions, that poet ends with an explicit reference to Empedocles, claiming that 
the student who follows the stated injunctions will become “an immortal god, no longer 
mortal” (ἢν δ’ ἀπολείψας σῶμα ἐς αἰθέρ’ ἐλεύθερον ἔλθῃς, / ἔσσεαι ἀθάνατος, θεὸς 
ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός, GV 70-71).46  
                                                          
φίλα γυῖα μιήνῃ).  The reading in all our mss., however, makes no reference to blood or 
pollution (εὖτέ τις ἀμπλακίῃσι φόβῳ φίλα γυῖα †μιν†) and Wright 1981 ad loc. is perhaps 
correct in rejecting the standard emendation. 
 
45See DK 146: εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντεις τε καὶ ὑμνόπολοι καὶ ἰητροί / καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν 
ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται· / ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῇσι φέριστοι.  Cf. DK 147. 
 
46For more on the Golden Verses, see Thom 1995.  Dates attributed to the work range widely, 
from the 6th century BCE to the 4th century CE; for a detailed discussion, see esp. Thom 
1995, 35-58, who ultimately settles on a date of 350-300 BCE. 
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This also lends import to the “physical” teachings of the poem, with their emphasis 
on the eternal, unperishable nature of the elements; in learning how nature truly works—that 
humans are made of eternal elements which constantly take new forms—the student is able 
to acquire a proper moral behavior based on the true nature of things.47  To take the most 
obvious example: by learning of the daimon’s eternal nature and the subsequent role of 
metempsychosis, the student learns of the impiety of animal sacrifice and can avoid the 
pollution it would cause.48  Indeed, along with purity, knowledge seems to be an essential 
part of divinity in Empedocles’ worldview: as the Christian author Hippolytus explains, the 
poet describes the god Apollo as pure intellect, a holy phren darting through the cosmos 
(ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον, / φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα 
θοῇσιν, DK 134.4-5). 
An overall pattern similar to that in Hesiod’s poem may thus be detected: the 
knowledge granted by the poet leads his students to a divine state.49  Yet eschatological 
divergences between Hesiod and Empedocles lead to different conceptions of this state.  
Presupposing a finite view of human life, Hesiod can offer only the Just City’s 
approximation of the “life like the gods” enjoyed by the golden race (or postmortem 
                                                          
47Cf. Toohey 1996, 42: “In a sense the material in the so-called Purifications represents a 
microscopic application of the macroscopic themes of the cosmogonical material, the so-
called On Nature.” 
 
48For Empedocles’ explicit connection between wisdom and an understanding of 
transmigration, see DK 129, wherein the poet praises a man, traditionally assumed to be 
Pythagoras, who “had obtained the greatest wealth of mind” (ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων 
ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον, 129.2) and “saw each of the things that are, even in ten and twenty lives 
of men” (ῥεῖ’ ὅ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον, / καί τε δέκ’ ἀνθρώπων καί τ’ 
εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν, 129.4-5). 
 
49Cf. Trépanier 2007, 259. 
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existence on the Isles of the Blessed).  Empedocles, expounding a system of cyclical 
reincarnation, allows for the possibility of actual transcendence—an apotheosis which will 
happen not in this life, but the next (or maybe the one after that). 
One other difference that may be noted is the seemingly individualized nature that 
deification takes in Empedocles’ poem; focused on the purity of the individual student, 
Empedocles’ instruction appears not to need that collective effort required for the Just City.  
Yet this reading of the poem may be only partly correct.  In arguing for the unity of 
Empedocles’ extant fragments, Catherine Osborne has sought to reconcile the apparent 
discrepancies between the physical system, with its divinity envisioned in the ultimate unity 
of the Sphairos, and the travails of the individual daimon that Empedocles describes.50  In so 
doing, she has suggested that the initial wrong leading to the daimon’s expulsion from the 
gods may be identified with the fragmentation of the Sphairos into the universe as we know 
it; by “trusting to Strife,” the daimon itself has caused division in the unity of the Sphairos. 
On this reading, the reunion with the gods that the daimon seeks (and that is the reward of the 
successful student) would be equivalent to the reunion of all matter under the reconstruction 
of the Sphairos.  In this case, a certain amount of communal effort may still be required in 
Empedocles’ system, for while the student may attain the status of “long-lived god” through 
individual purity, the reunion of the cosmos into the Sphairos would only occur when all 
individuals (and thus all the daimones) do so.   
This is certainly a minority reading of the text, however.  It may ultimately be safer in 
this case to take a slightly more cautious approach to Empedocles’ work, seeing two cycles 
which may be identified with the two poems to which the fragments have traditionally been 
                                                          
50See Osborne 1987, esp. 35-49. 
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assigned.  In this case Empedocles would expound a physical system in which all the 
universe may be identified with “god” but that requires no effort or knowledge on the part of 
any human agent, and a religious system in which the knowledge provided by the poet 
contributes to the purity and eventual deification of the student.  
 
Aratus 
In discussing the Hellenistic poet Aratus, it will be most productive to read his 
Phaenomena against the work of his primary poetic model, Hesiod.  Such a strategy was 
taken by at least one of Aratus’ contemporaries, as Callimachus claims in an epigram that 
both “the song and the manner are Hesiod’s” (Ἡσιόδου τό τ’ ἄεισμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος, Callim. 
Ep. 27 = AP 9.507.1). Callimachus is quick to qualify this claim, however, noting that Aratus 
did not follow the earlier poet to excess, but only made use of the sweetest part of his verse 
(οὐ τὸν ἀοιδὸν / ἔσχατον, ἀλλ’ ὀκνέω μὴ τὸ μελιχρότατον / τῶν ἐπέων ὁ Σολεὺς ἀπεμάξατο, 
9.507.1-3).  This distinction, followed as it is by a description of Aratus’ poetry as λεπταὶ 
ῥήσιες (9.507.3-4), has been viewed by scholars chiefly as one of style; the refined aesthetic 
of the Hellenistic poet is set in contrast to Hesiod’s rougher verse.51  While this contrast is 
certainly apt, a similar comparison may be made between these poets in terms of subject 
matter as well.52  Again Aratus may be seen to borrow extensively from Hesiod while at the 
same time adapting the earlier poet’s material and suiting it to contemporary taste.  Both 
poets operate within the same basic framework, portraying the world and the humans who 
                                                          
51See, e.g., Volk 2010, 199; Klooster 2011, 157-159.  Tsantsanoglou 2009 argues that the 
epigram is discreetly critical of Aratus, but such an interpretation seems unlikely. 
 
52For extensive analysis of Aratus’ adaptation of Hesiod, see esp. Fakas 2001. 
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inhabit it as entirely under the control of Zeus.  Yet Aratus carefully adapts his Hesiodic 
model to “modernize” his divinity and portray an overwhelmingly benevolent conception of 
the divine.53  As will be shown, a primary feature of this adaptation is Aratus’ incorporation 
of Empedoclean ideas within his Hesiodic framework; through a selective merging of the two 
earlier poets’ accounts, Aratus suggests mankind’s ability to return to a Golden Age in 
harmony with the gods.54 
Aratus, following his generic predecessor Hesiod, begins with a hymn to Zeus (Arat. 
Ph. 1-16): 
 Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτ’ ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν 
 ἄρρητον· μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί, 
 πᾶσαι δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα 
 καὶ λιμένες· πάντη δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες. 
 τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος εἰμέν. ὁ δ’ ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισι 5 
 δεξιὰ σημαίνει, λαοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει 
 μιμνήσκων βιότοιο· λέγει δ’ ὅτε δεξιαὶ ὧραι 
 καὶ φυτὰ γυρῶσαι καὶ σπέρματα πάντα βαλέσθαι. 
 αὐτὸς γὰρ τά γε σήματ’ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν 10 
 ἄστρα διακρίνας, ἐσκέψατο δ’ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν 
 ἀστέρας οἵ κε μάλιστα τετυγμένα σημαίνοιεν 
 ἀνδράσιν ὡράων, ὄφρ’ ἔμπεδα πάντα φύωνται. 
 τῷ μιν ἀεὶ πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον ἱλάσκονται. 
 χαῖρε, πάτερ, μέγα θαῦμα, μέγ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ, 
                                                          
53There is a tendency among scholars, prevalent already in antiquity, to see this Aratean 
“modernity” in predominantly Stoic terms; see esp. Effe 1977, 40-56.  While one may 
productively assume a certain similarity of outlook between Aratus’ poem and early Stoic 
thought (as do, e.g., James 1972 and Kidd 1997, 10-12), I refrain from seeing any specific 
doctrinal bent in the Phaenomena.  Cf. Hunter 2008, 158-159, who, though ultimately taking 
a Stoicizing reading, notes that “[w]e can hardly speak of a firm body of ‘Stoic dogma’ at a 
date as early as that normally supposed for the Phainomena...,” and Cusset 2011, who finds 
only tenuous support for Aratean Stoicism. 
 
54This is not to say that Aratus accepts the belief systems of Empedocles or Hesiod; certainly, 
there is no suggestion of Empedoclean eschatological views in the Phaenomena and, as 
discussed in the previous fn., Aratus’ philosophical outlook is closer to that of the Stoics than 
to either of his poetic predecessors.  I speak here solely of poetic borrowing. 
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 αὐτὸς καὶ προτέρη γενεή... 15 
In contrast to the ambivalent Zeus of Hesiod’s poem, however, Aratus’ Zeus is portrayed in 
the proem as entirely beneficent.55  This beneficence is first hinted at through an omission in 
Aratus’ claim that men never leave Zeus unmentioned (τὸν οὐδέποτ’ ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν / 
ἄρρητον, 1-2).  The phrase recalls Hesiod’s earlier claim that Zeus causes men to be famous 
or unmentioned (ὅν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε / ῥητοί τ’ ἄρρητοί τε Διὸς 
μεγάλοιο ἕκητι, Hes. WD 3-4), but in making Zeus himself the object of speech, Aratus 
removes half of the Hesiodic dichotomy.  Through litotes, only the positive element of this 
dichotomy is retained, while the problematic aspect of Zeus in Hesiod’s proem, his capacity 
to render individuals utterly unknown, is suppressed.  Such suppression recurs throughout 
Aratus’ proem; whereas Hesiod balances the beneficial and harmful aspects of Zeus’ power, 
Aratus removes all such ambivalence.  Everything Zeus is said to accomplish in the proem of 
the Phaenomena—the presentation of favorable signs (5-6), the rousing of men to work (6), 
the indication of agricultural timeframes through the positioning of stars (7-14)—has the 
ultimate aim of providing for man’s livelihood and ensuring that all things grow continually 
(ὄφρ’ ἔμπεδα πάντα φύωνται, 13).   
Such a role is suggested further through Aratus’ description of Zeus as ἤπιος (5).  The 
term is regularly used in Homeric poetry to describe beneficent figures, particularly paternal 
ones; Telemachus uses it in the Odyssey to describe his absent father Odysseus (τὸ μὲν 
πατέρ’ ἐσθλὸν ἀπώλεσα, ὅς ποτ’ ἐν ὑμῖν / τοίσδεσσιν βασίλευε, πατὴρ δ’ ὣς ἤπιος ἦεν, Od. 
                                                          
55It should be noted that this beneficence is not fixed over the course of the poem, as there 
are three instances (Arat. Ph. 293, 886, 936) where bad weather is said to be caused by Zeus.  
Yet, as Kidd 1997, 12, notes, these passages and all references to Zeus after line 777 “are 
expressed in traditional weather phrases,” i.e., when Zeus is identified with the actual sky. 
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2.46-47; cf. 2.234), while Helen describes Priam with the same term while contrasting his 
kindness with the cruelty of the other Trojans (ἑκυρὸς δὲ πατὴρ ὣς ἤπιος αἰεί, Il. 24.770).56  
By using this descriptor in his invocation of Zeus, and doing so immediately after 
announcing humanity’s descent from the god (τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος εἰμέν, Arat. Ph. 5),57 Aratus 
emphasizes the role of benevolent caretaker that Zeus assumes throughout the poem. 
Finally, the Zeus of Aratus’ proem is contrasted with that of the Works and Days 
through discussion of the god’s proximity to mortals.  In Hesiod’s proem, Zeus is portrayed 
in his traditional role as sky-god, dwelling in the “loftiest abodes” (Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης ὃς 
ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει, Hes. WD 8).  While Aratus regularly makes this association between 
Zeus and the heavens in his poem, even using the god’s name metonymically to refer to the 
sky, the poet avoids this connection in his initial positioning of Zeus.  Instead, the god is said 
to fill the roads, marketplaces, sea, and harbors (μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί, / πᾶσαι δ’ 
ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα / καὶ λιμένες, Arat. Ph. 4-6).58  This omnipresence of 
Zeus is often taken as an indication of the Stoicizing nature of Aratus’ poem, wherein Zeus 
would here be identified with the life-giving pneuma which permeates the universe.59  While 
this may be the case, Volk rightly points out that such an interpretation need not be read into  
                                                          
56Cf. Kidd 1997, ad Ph. 5. 
 
57The phrase provides another reference to Hesiod, recalling as it does the earlier poet’s 
claim that gods and men have the same origin (ὁμόθεν γεγάασι θεοὶ θνητοί τ’ ἄνθρωποι, WD 
108). 
 
58A suggestion of the traditional threefold division of the world into earth, sea, and sky can 
be seen here.  Should such be the case, Aratus’ omission of the third element, sky, would be 
all the more emphatic. 
 
59Cf. e.g. James 1972, 36; Kidd 1997, ad 2. 
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these lines.60  The focus here is rather on Zeus’ involvement in human affairs, as all four 
areas mentioned are key locations for human activity.61  Thus Aratus moves Zeus from the 
distant heavens to the centers of human society; ultimately it is we humans who all have need 
of Zeus (πάντη δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες, 6). 
In the proem of his Phaenomena, then, Aratus can be seen repeatedly referring back 
to the proem of Hesiod’s Works and Days, correcting some passages and suppressing others 
to create a very different portrayal of Zeus.  Such reworking of Hesiod recurs throughout the 
Phaenomena, though its manifestations are not always as straightforward as Aratus’ 
reconstruction of Hesiod’s opening hymn.  Aratus takes a more nuanced approach in 
handling the discussion of Strife which follows Hesiod’s hymn to Zeus in the Works and 
Days (Hes. WD 11-41).  Aratus makes no mention of either Strife, yet he does incorporate 
the functions of both into his poem.  Further emphasizing the benevolence of Zeus, Aratus 
transfers the function of the good Strife, who rouses men to work, to Zeus himself, who 
performs the same action (λαοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει, 6) through the display of his 
astronomical signs.  To be sure, in Hesiod’s account, Zeus may be considered ultimately 
responsible for this, as it is he who placed the good Strife within the earth, yet Aratus 
underscores Zeus’ role by removing the intermediary Strife.  Aratus performs a similar 
transference with the blameworthy Strife.  Whereas in the Works and Days war and conflict 
are brought about by wicked Strife and the gods, Aratus presents these as activities created 
                                                          
60Volk 2010, 201. 
 
61See ibid.: “The places enumerated are not features of the natural world as much as areas of 
human activity.  This is true even for the sea, which was no doubt chosen qua locus of 
navigation and forms a pair with the harbors: the sea leads to the harbors as the roads lead to 
the squares.” 
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and perpetuated by mortals; in her threats to the men of the Silver Age, the maiden Dike 
warns that humanity’s degeneration will lead to war and bloodshed (καὶ δή που πόλεμοι, καὶ 
δὴ καὶ ἀνάρσιον αἷμα / ἔσσεται ἀνθρώποισι, Arat. Ph. 125-126).  Again, Aratus alters the 
Hesiodic account to underscore the fundamental benevolence of Zeus, while also transferring 
the responsibility for evils from gods to men.  In this way, Aratus creates a dialogue with the 
Hesiodic passage, correcting and suppressing problematic elements to provide a 
fundamentally different account of Zeus and divinity. 
Aratus also suppresses the Hesiodic passages that immediately follow Hesiod’s 
discussion of Strife.  Explaining the necessity for labor in acquiring the means for survival, 
Hesiod claims that the gods hid this means from mortals, purposefully making life difficult 
for them (κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν, Hes. WD 43).  Going on to describe 
the forms that this difficulty took, Hesiod narrates how Zeus first hid fire from mortals (42-
52) and then gave them Pandora and her jar of evils (53-105).  In both cases, the chief 
motivation assigned to Zeus is anger (ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε χολωσάμενος φρεσὶν ᾗσιν, 47; cf. 
τὸν δὲ χολωσάμενος προσέφη νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς, 53), and in both cases Zeus’ actions are 
completed primarily through concealment and deception.62  Underscoring this point, Hesiod 
uses the verb κρύπτω three times in nine lines while describing Zeus’ concealment of fire 
(κρύψε δὲ πῦρ, 50; cf. κρύψαντες, 42; Ζεὺς ἔκρυψε, 47).63  The delivery of Pandora to 
mortals is likewise accomplished through concealment.  Hesiod gives two extended 
                                                          
62Cf. Hunter 2008, 157-158. 
 
63Deception is an essential feature of the entire episode, as it is also used by Prometheus, 
whose initial trickery of Zeus (itself completed through the concealment of sacrificial 
portions) is said to be the impetus for the god’s angry actions (ὅττί μιν ἐξαπάτησε 
Προμηθεὺς ἀγκυλομήτης, 48).  See Vernant 1981, esp. 48-50. 
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descriptions of Pandora, first when recounting Zeus’ instructions to the other gods (60-68), 
then when portraying her actual creation (69-82).  Each time, the initial focus is on the 
woman’s attractive external appearance; only at the end of each description does Hesiod tell 
of Hermes’ contributions to the new creation, which include deceit and the character of a 
thief (ψεύδεά θ’ αἱμυλίους τε λόγους καὶ ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος, 78; cf. ἐν δὲ θέμεν κύνεόν τε νόον 
καὶ ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος, 67).  In effect, Pandora is a faulty sign, whose external beauty belies her 
inner nature—an evil which men misrecognize and in which they thus take delight (δώσω 
κακόν, ᾧ κεν ἅπαντες / τέρπωνται κατὰ θυμόν, ἑὸν κακὸν ἀμφαγαπῶντες, 56-57). 
As should be expected, Aratus removes these tales, with their focus on Zeus’ hostility 
towards humanity, from his account.64  In contrast to the Hesiodic Zeus, Aratus’ Zeus is 
above all a source of revelation—an appropriate god for a poem on visible signs.  His first 
action in the poem is the granting of favorable signs to humanity (δεξιὰ σημαίνει, Arat. Ph. 
6), and words with this σημ- root recur throughout the proem; Aratus explains that it was 
Zeus who fixed the signs in the sky (αὐτὸς γὰρ τά γε σήματ’ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν, 10) and 
ensured that the stars would give proper signs to mortals (ἐσκέψατο δ’ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν / ἀστέρας 
οἵ κε μάλιστα τετυγμένα σημαίνοιεν / ἀνδράσιν ὡράων, 11-13).  Later on in the poem, at the 
opening of the so-called Diosemiai, Aratus returns to this theme of revelation, announcing 
that all the year’s signs have been made visible by Zeus (ἐκ Διὸς ἤδη πάντα πεφασμένα 
πάντοθι κεῖται, 743).  Shortly afterward, Aratus does seem to alter this view somewhat, 
forced by the irregular occurrence of sea-storms to admit that Zeus has kept some knowledge 
hidden from humans (πάντα γὰρ οὔπω / ἐκ Διὸς ἄνθρωποι γινώσκομεν, ἀλλ’ ἔτι πολλὰ / 
                                                          
64Indeed, the description of civilization’s beginnings given in the Phaenomena would seem 
incompatible with the tale of Pandora given in the Works and Days, as women are already 
present in Aratus’ Golden Age (Arat. Ph. 103). 
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κέκρυπται, 768-770).65  Yet the poet qualifies this statement, claiming that Zeus may yet 
reveal to humanity even those things which he has kept hidden (τῶν αἴ κε θέλῃ καὶ ἐσαυτίκα 
δώσει / Ζεύς, 770-771; cf. οὔπω, 768; ἔτι, 769), and reiterating that Zeus constantly benefits 
humanity through the signs which he does show (ὁ γὰρ οὖν γενεὴν ἀνδρῶν ἀναφανδὸν 
ὀφέλλει, / πάντοθεν εἰδόμενος, πάντη δ’ ὅ γε σήματα φαίνων, 771-772).  Thus even where he 
must put a limit on the aid provided by Zeus, Aratus’ focus remains on the god’s inherently 
beneficent nature. 
In addition to this refutation of the concealment theme in the tales of Pandora and the 
theft of fire, refutations of specific lines from these passages can also be detected in the 
Phaenomena.  Thus, whereas in the Works and Days Hesiod claims that the gods hid the 
means of subsistence from humanity (κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώποισιν, Hes. 
WD 43), Aratus explains that it is actually Zeus who through his signs reminds men of their 
livelihood (μιμνῄσκων βιότοιο, Arat. Ph. 7).  At the end of the Pandora narrative, Hesiod 
states that Epimetheus’ acceptance of Pandora ultimately led to the spread of evils 
throughout the world; both the land and sea were filled with ills (πλείη μὲν γὰρ γαῖα κακῶν, 
πλείη δὲ θάλασσα, Hes. WD 101).  Here too, Aratus provides an alternate account, claiming 
that the land and sea are filled (μεσταί) not with ills, but with Zeus himself (Arat. Ph. 2-4, 
quoted above).  As in his adaptation of Hesiod’s discussion of Strife, Aratus suppresses the 
narrative of these passages while altering their message to his own ends. 
                                                          
65In telling contrast to Hesiod’s repeated use of the verb (three times in WD 42-50 alone, as 
noted above), this is one of only two occurrences of the verb κρύπτω in the poem (the other 
is the participle κεκρύμμεναι at line 564, in reference to the concealment of the constellations 
by a mountain range).  Kidd 1997 ad 770 refers to the usage here as “[a] partial concession to 
Hesiod...” but Aratus’ overall claim here is actually opposed to that of Hesiod. 
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Aratus’ most extensive dialogue with Hesiod occurs in his discussion of the 
constellation known as the Maiden (Arat. Ph. 96-136), wherein he sets that poet’s worldview 
in juxtaposition with that of Empedocles.66  Unlike his adaptation of other Hesiodic passages, 
here Aratus retains much of the narrative framework of Hesiod’s account, though he does 
conflate two distinct passages: Hesiod’s Myth of the Ages (Hes. WD 106-201) and discussion 
of Dike (213-285).  At the same time, however, he incorporates elements of Empedocles’ 
theology: the early rule of a benevolent goddess and a critique of meat-eating.67  According 
to this tale, Aratus relates, the Maiden once dwelt among men, who knew her as Dike.  This 
was the Golden Age, when no conflict existed, and humanity obtained its livelihood solely 
from agriculture and Dike herself, in ignorance of seafaring (Arat. Ph. 101-114).  With the 
advent of the Silver Age, Dike removed herself from human affairs, dwelling in the hills and 
threatening humanity that violence would result should it not change its ways (115-128).  
Finally, the Bronze Age saw the development of banditry and meat-eating, and Dike departed 
in disgust to the heavens, where she can be seen even now (115-136). 
In addition to the overall sequence of ages that frames the account, Aratus alludes to 
Hesiod at several points in this tale.  In the initial description of the Maiden there may 
already be reference to the Works and Days, as she is associated closely with agricultural 
imagery; located at the feet of the plowman Bootes (96), she is said to carry an ear of grain in 
her hands (97).  This reminiscence is encouraged by Aratus’ claims concerning her lineage.  
                                                          
66For a thorough discussion of Aratus’ use of these poets in this passage, see Gee 2013, ch. 1. 
 
67As Gee 2013, 29, notes, these two elements frame the Aratean tale, thus lending the whole 
an Empedoclean character.  There is some debate as to whether Aratus’ denouncement of the 
consumption of beef is a wholesale denouncement of meat-eating or a rebuke against the 
improper use of animals that aid man’s agricultural work, though the Empedoclean context 
may suggest the former. 
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Although the poet states that she may be the child of Astraeus, the reputed father of the stars 
(98-99), her paternity is left uncertain, as she may also be the daughter of another (εἴτε τευ 
ἄλλου, 99).  This could be viewed as the ambiguity typical of addresses to divinities, yet the 
eventual identification of the Maiden with Dike (105) suggests a learned allusion instead.68  
In the Hesiodic account, after all, Dike’s father is Zeus himself (ἡ δέ τε παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη, 
Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα, Hes. WD 256; cf. Th. 902).  By referring to an alternate lineage without 
explicitly naming Zeus, Aratus is able to suggest the connection while avoiding the 
attribution of impropriety to Zeus.69  Aratus’ most prominent allusion to the earlier poet, of 
course, is his similar division of human civilization into periods designated by metals.  
Keeping Hesiod’s account prominent throughout this passage while framing it with allusions 
to Empedocles, Aratus invites comparison between his version and the earlier poets’ and 
encourages us to notice divergences. 
One such divergence can be detected early in Aratus’ passage, in his description of 
the Golden Age (Arat. Ph. 101-114).  Certainly, his depiction bears much similarity to 
Hesiod’s.  In particular, both focus on the easy subsistence and abundance of the Golden 
Age.  Yet for Hesiod, such abundance is due solely to the fertility of the earth, which is said 
to produce of its own accord (καρπὸν δ’ ἔφερε ζείδωρος ἄρουρα / αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ 
ἄφθονον, Hes. WD 117-118).  While the humans of Aratus’ Golden Age may have an easy 
existence, it is not quite so easy as that; for them, agriculture is already a necessity, and it is 
                                                          
68See Schiesaro 1996, 14; Kidd 1997, ad 99. 
 
69A more blatant example of this can be seen at Ph. 30-35, where Aratus explains the 
catasterism of the Bears by claiming that they reared the infant Zeus, thus avoiding the 
troublesome story of Zeus’ rape of Callisto given by Hesiod fr. 163 M-W and alluded to by 
Aratus’ contemporary Callimachus in his Hymn to Zeus (40-41). 
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their own labor and Dike which supply them with subsistence (ἀλλὰ βόες καὶ ἄροτρα καὶ 
αὐτή, πότνια λαῶν, / μυρία πάντα παρεῖχε Δίκη, δώτειρα δικαίων, Arat. Ph. 112-113).70  This 
distinction is crucial for an understanding of the worldview portrayed in Aratus’ poem, and 
should be taken closely with another feature which sets Aratus’ account apart—the continuity 
of the races of man.  In Hesiod’s account, the ages are almost entirely distinct from one 
another, and repeated emphasis is placed on this dissimilarity (e.g. Hes. WD 129, 144, 159).  
Each transition between ages, save that between heroes and Iron Age, is marked by a 
complete break; the earth covers over one race (121, 140, 156) and the gods collectively or 
Zeus himself make a new one (128, 144, 158).  Even humanity’s physiology varies from age 
to age.  The men of the Golden Age are different in stature and experienced no aging (113-
114), while those of the Silver Age are said to have a century-long infancy (130-132)—both 
features alien to the humans of the Iron Age.71  In contrast, Aratus’ ages of man are only 
chronologically, not physiologically, distinct, as Dike makes clear when threatening the 
people of the Silver Age, calling them worse than their golden parents and their offspring 
worse in turn (οἵην χρύσειοι πατέρες γενεὴν ἐλίποντο / χειροτέρην· ὑμεῖς δὲ κακώτερα 
τεξείεσθε, Arat. Ph. 123-124).  In a fundamental sense, and utterly unlike Hesiod’s account, 
there is no difference between Aratus’ Golden Age and the present day.72  The necessity of 
                                                          
70The conditions of Aratus’ Golden Age are strikingly similar to those of Hesiod’s Just City; 
cf. Solmsen 1966, 125-127; Gee 2013, 25. 
 
71Cf. Most 1997, 109-110. 
 
72Gee 2013, 24, seems to notice this as well, claiming that “Aratus makes Hesiod’s open-
ended narrative of decline into a closed loop in which the notion of cyclicality replaces the 
Hesiodic timeline.”  For Gee, this too is an incorporation of Empedoclean themes into 
Aratus’ Golden Age myth, melding Empedocles’ cyclic cosmology with Hesiod’s diachronic 
account. 
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agriculture for survival is no modern ill brought about as a punishment by Zeus or through 
the introduction of Strife into the soil, but a feature of human life which has always been 
present.  Any difference in human life has come about as a result of changes not in nature or 
physiology, but in mankind’s character.   
Aratus’ emphasis on mankind’s moral failure as the cause, not the symptom, of his 
altered state recalls Empedocles and his tale of the daimon’s exile, as well as his emphasis on 
moral purity as a means to reunion with the gods.  Such an intertextual relationship is 
supported by the contrast between the constant natural conditions of Aratus’ account and the 
fundamental alterations to human nature present in Hesiod’s tale; in emphasizing the physical 
continuity of the ages, Aratus suggests that humanity truly can return to a “life like the gods,” 
as he presents a return to the conditions of the Golden Age as something possible in truth, not 
the approximation that is the life of the Just City in Hesiod’s account.  Yet it must be stated 
that in Aratus’ account there is no actual connection between his Golden Age and anything 
approaching a divine state, other than the presence of the goddess Dike.  Any association is 
on a purely poetic level, recalled solely by allusion to Hesiod’s golden race; unlike in 
Hesiod’s myth, there has always been a fundamental separation between humans and gods in 
Aratus’ version of history.  Whether this should be taken as optimistic or pessimistic may be 
left open: while we have never been like the gods, neither are we fundamentally degenerate 
from a more divine original state.  In either case, Hesiodic or Aratean, the end-point is the 
same; the student is left distinct from and subservient to the gods but capable of returning to 
a life in accord with them, either in the Golden Age-like Just City of Hesiod or in a return to 
the Aratean Golden Age. 
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This intertwining of Hesiodic and Empedoclean elements can be seen as well in the 
figure of Aratus’ Dike herself.  In keeping with the attitude towards divinity he takes in his 
proem, here Aratus suppresses the retributive aspect of Dike so prominent in Hesiod’s 
version; in the Phaenomena, Dike, like Zeus, is responsible for no evils.  Whereas Hesiod’s 
Dike and Zeus are quick to destroy the armies of the unjust (Hes. WD 246-247), Aratus’ Dike 
is presented as entirely averse to any hostile action.  Instead, she is portrayed as akin to 
Empedocles’ Kypris; under her reign, humanity is said to have been entirely ignorant of strife 
or battle (οὔπω λευγαλέου τότε νείκεος ἠπίσταντο / οὐδὲ διακρίσιος πολυμεμφέος οὐδὲ 
κυδοιμοῦ, Arat. Ph. 108-109), and it is in large part mankind’s developing inclination for 
bloodshed which causes her departure (131-133; cf. 125-126).73  This departure has been 
noted to have Hesiodic precedent as well, as it recalls the prophesied departure of Aidos and 
Nemesis in WD 197-200.74  Again, Aratus’ alterations are telling.  Whereas Hesiod’s 
departure scene is a warning of things to come at the end of the Iron Age, Aratus describes an 
event that has already occurred.  Threat has become fact.  
Yet despite this departure, mankind has not been completely abandoned by Dike, as 
she is still visible to mortals (ἔτι φαίνεται ἀνθρώποισιν, 135).  Indeed, this visibility is 
repeatedly stressed by Aratus.  In contrast to Hesiod’s Dike, who is hidden from view (ἠέρα 
ἑσσαμένη, Hes. WD 223) even while on earth, the Aratean Maiden is explicitly described as 
visible to men in every age, even when she has withdrawn from contact with mortals (cf. 
ἤρχετο δ’ ἀνθρώπων κατεναντίη, Arat. Ph. 102; εἰς αὐτὴν...παπταίνοντας, 128).  With the 
departure of Hesiod’s Aidos and Nemesis, woes will be left for mankind and there will be no 
                                                          
73See Emp. fr. DK 128; cf. Kidd 1997 ad 108; Nelis 2004, 17; Gee 2013, 29-30. 
 
74Cf. Kidd 1997 ad 134. 
 45 
defense against evil (τὰ δὲ λείψεται ἄλγεα λυγρά / θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι, κακοῦ δ’ οὐκ ἔσσεται 
ἀλκή, Hes. WD 200-201).  Upon the departure of Aratus’ Dike, however, even Dike herself is 
not entirely absent from humanity; in this poem about seeking signs from the constellations, 
she too is visible to all as a constellation, once more confirming the essential optimism of 
Aratus’ account.  In the constellation of the Maiden, humanity has an ever-present protreptic 
to justice, and so to the character and life of the Golden Age. 
It is in this respect that the relationship between Aratus’ didaxis and the “life of the 
gods” suggested by his description of the Golden Age diverges from that of his predecessors.  
In Hesiod and Empedocles (or at least in Empedocles’ Katharmoi), the poet’s teachings may 
be said to affect directly the “divinity” (in this life or the next) of the student.  For Hesiod, a 
knowledge of justice and the farming it requires is directly responsible for bringing about the 
life of the Just City, just as the purificatory rites of Empedocles’ Katharmoi can lead directly 
to an improved reincarnation.  In Aratus’ poem, however, it cannot be argued that knowledge 
of the stars qua stars leads to a “divine life” for the student; instead, it is the knowledge 
signified by the stars that does.75  Knowing where the Maiden is located in the sky does 
nothing to lead to a “life like the gods” or the Golden Age.  Knowledge of what the Maiden 
represents and the exhortation to justice she embodies, however, can.  Whereas the inconstant 
nature of Hesiod’s gods required him to reveal information that had been hidden, Aratus’ 
benevolent gods have already taken care of this aspect for us.  The signs are already visible, 
and it is Aratus’ role to help us to interpret them aright.  Thus, in appropriately Hellenistic 
                                                          
75In this respect, the knowledge offered by Aratus is akin to that in Empedocles’ “physical 
poem” (if such there was); by describing the true nature of the universe, Empedocles 
provides a framework that provides the rationale and explains the necessity for his moral 
precepts. 
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fashion, Aratus allusively teaches a more essential truth; showing the constant nature of the 
stars and their significance for mortals, Aratus clarifies Zeus’ order to his readers and exhorts 
them to that morality lost since the Golden Age.   
 
Conclusion 
 From a survey of these poets, some preliminary observations can be made.  Most 
importantly, we should note the self-conscious engagement with poetic predecessors that 
each poet undertakes.  This is of course most pronounced in the Hellenistic Aratus, who 
combines elements of both Hesiodic and Empedoclean ideology for his own purposes, but 
can be detected already in Empedocles’ quasi-Golden-Age depiction of an earlier life of 
peace under Kypris.  This self-conscious reflection will be developed further in the Latin 
didactic poets, who will deftly combine and critique strands of their predecessors’ thought to 
portray their own ways of viewing the relationship between gods and humanity.  Alongside 
this progression is the growing influence of “philosophical” thought, particularly in the case 
of Empedocles but also in the Stoicizing depiction of Zeus given by Aratus.  As will be seen, 
this development will likewise be expanded upon by the Latin poets, who will exploit 
advances in philosophical thought in radical ways to present new ideas of what it means to be 
divine (or to push back against such ideas).  Indeed, this increased influence of philosophy 
will become a prominent feature of the genre already in our first extant Latin didactic poem, 
and the subject of the next chapter, Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura.  
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Chapter 2: Lucretius 
In the third book of his De Rerum Natura, Lucretius gives an account of the 
composition of the soul (3.231-322), explaining that the soul is composed of four elements: 
wind (aura), heat (vapor or calor), air (aer), and an unnamed fourth component required for 
consciousness.  Differing ratios in the combination of these elements lead to different 
character traits; as Lucretius explains, a disposition prone to anger is caused by excessive 
heat, while timidity is due to surplus wind and passivity to a predominance of air.  To a 
certain extent, these traits are permanent; while training can mitigate this elemental 
imbalance, such a disposition of the soul will remain nevertheless (3.307-313): 
 sic hominum genus est: quamvis doctrina politos 
 constituat pariter quosdam, tamen illa relinquit 
 naturae cuiusque animi vestigia prima. 
 nec radicitus evelli mala posse putandumst, 310 
 quin proclivius hic iras decurrat ad acris, 
 ille metu citius paulo temptetur, at ille 
 tertius accipiat quaedam clementius aequo. 
Yet despite this potential limitation, Lucretius claims, reason can ultimately overcome the 
greater part of these imbalances, so that nothing prevents us from living lives worthy of the 
gods (3.319-322): 
 illud in his rebus video firmare potesse, 
 usque adeo naturarum vestigia linqui 
 parvola quae nequeat ratio depellere nobis, 
 ut nil inpediat dignam dis degere vitam.
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Lucretius’ claim here is largely a restatement of Epicurean doctrine.76  The thought is 
expressed most clearly in Epicurus’ Letter to Menoeceus (= D.L. 10.122-135) where the 
philosopher ends an explication of his ethical system by exhorting Menoeceus to practice 
these tenets day and night so that he may never be disturbed and live “as a god among men” 
(D.L. 10.135): 
ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ μελέτα πρὸς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας 
καὶ νυκτὸς πρός τε τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὔθ’ 
ὕπαρ οὔτ’ ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσεις δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν 
ἀνθρώποις. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν 
ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς. 
 
This concept of likening oneself to a god is not, however, peculiarly Epicurean.  As discussed 
in the introduction to this study, similar claims had already been put forth by earlier 
philosophers, such as Plato in his Theatetus and Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, leading 
to a common emphasis in Hellenistic philosophical systems on the similarity between the 
wise man and god.  By making such a claim to his student, Lucretius can be seen operating 
within a broadly established philosophic tradition. 
What has received comparatively little attention is that this passage has antecedents 
not only in Lucretius’ philosophic tradition, but, as my previous chapter’s discussion shows, 
in his poetic tradition as well.77  This claim that we can live a “life worthy of the gods” can 
be compared to the rhetoric of earlier Greek didactic.  Indeed, the claim is already suggested 
in Hesiod’s description of the golden race that lived as gods (ὥστε θεοὶ δ’ ἔζωον, WD 112).  
                                                          
76Though it is worth noting that the generality of Lucretius’ stance here conflicts with certain 
Epicurean claims regarding the wise man, which apparently denied that humans of every 
physical state or nation could become wise (οὐδὲ μὴν ἐκ πάσης σώματος ἕξεως σοφὸν 
γενέσθαι ἂν οὐδ’ ἐν παντὶ ἔθνει, D.L. 10.117). 
 
77Though see now Trépanier 2007, who sees Lucretius modelling the “plot” of his poem on 
that of Empedocles, particularly as regards the divinization of the student. 
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Yet whereas the ensuing comparison between the gods and the Hesiodic student is only 
implicit, founded on the similarities between the golden race and the life of the Just City, 
Lucretius’ claim is much more explicit; through the power of ratio, we (nobis, DRN 3.321) 
may live a life worthy of the gods.  As has been noted by Trépanier, this explicitness has 
more in common with another didactic predecessor and known influence on Lucretius—
Empedocles.78 
In this chapter, I examine this blending of poetic and philosophical models as it 
occurs in Lucretius’ portrayal of the “divinization” of his student as Epicurean wise man.  As 
I will show, this portrayal is one based as much on poetic precedent as it is on Epicurean 
doctrine.  Accordingly, the first section is focused on examining the various forms this 
“divinization” takes, starting with the more philosophical arguments made by Lucretius and 
moving to “poetic” arguments based on allusion to earlier poets.  From here I turn to a focus 
on the most explicit case of divinization in the poem, the apotheosis of Epicurus.  Here too 
Lucretius presents an argument grounded in Epicurean doctrine that nevertheless diverges in 
various ways from the orthodox position.  Again Lucretius will be shown to blend 
philosophical and poetic elements for his own rhetorical purposes, emphasizing the 
benefactions of the deus Epicurus to appeal to his Roman audience and reinforce the divinity 
accessible through the philosopher’s teachings.  I conclude with a discussion of Lucretius’ 
portrayal of the adherents of religio and their own confused attempts at a “life like the gods.” 
 
 
                                                          
78See esp. Trépanier 2007, 264: “The narrative of instruction is the strongest single point of 
resemblance between the two works.  In both, the goal put before the student is the quest for 
divinisation, although the contours are not the same.”   
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First Beginnings 
 The Hymn to Venus 
 Though the passage from Book 3 discussed above is Lucretius’ most explicit 
comparison of the successful Epicurean to the gods, this is by no means the only such 
comparison made in the DRN.  In fact, Lucretius already lays a groundwork for establishing 
similarity between the Epicurean student and the gods in the poem’s opening, during the 
famous Hymn to Venus (1.1-49).  The passage has raised considerable consternation with 
critics, who would argue that the Hymn to Venus—in which the goddess is described as 
present in the world and able to effect change in it—is incompatible with the Epicurean 
philosophy of the rest of the poem.79  Adding to the hymn’s perceived difficulty are the 
closing lines 1.44-49, which describe the ataractic nature of the Epicurean gods.  Though 
these lines are appropriately Epicurean, they have been seen as incompatible with the 
preceding hymn; if the gods truly are uninvolved with human affairs and affected by neither 
good works nor anger, it would seem to make no sense for Lucretius to ask the goddess to be 
his ally in composing or to provide peace to the beleaguered Roman state.80  Taken to an 
extreme, this argument has led to the deletion of lines 44-49 from some editions as an 
                                                          
79Cf. Bailey 1963, 589: “This invocation has caused difficulty from early times...”; Sedley 
1998, 16: “The most enigmatic feature of the proem lies in the first three subdivisions, 1-43.  
How can Lucretius, as an Epicurean, praise Venus as a controlling force in nature, and even 
beg her to intervene in human affairs?”; Gale 1994, 208: “The most obvious problem with 
the lines is their apparent inconsistency with the Epicurean doctrine which the poet preaches 
in the rest of the poem.”  Friedländer 1939, 370, notes the discrepancy but credits it to “the 
fundamental discrepancy in the philosopher-poet himself.”  For a more balanced take on this 
apparent conflict, see now Trépanier 2004, 75ff., who argues that such an “indirect opening” 
is characteristic of the didactic poetry of Parmenides, Empedocles, and Lucretius. 
 
80On the literary pedigree of the invocation of Venus as “ally,” see O’Hara 1998. 
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interpolation from 2.646-651 by an early reader remarking upon the contradiction between 
the opening hymn and the rest of the poem.81 
Here I do not intend to lay out lengthy arguments for the philosophical compatibility 
of the Venus hymn with the rest of the poem; much work has already been done on this front, 
arguing for a reading of the lines variously as Epicurean protreptic, polemic, or allegory.82  
Certainly, such readings do little to aid a first-time reader of the poem, as yet unaware that 
the work is on Epicurean philosophy and thus likely to accept the hymn at face value.  Yet I 
would assert that the poet himself indicates one proper way to read the hymn in lines 44-49—
lines that I do intend to defend, as even those critics favorable to allegorical interpretation of 
the opening hymn have expressed concern over the sudden reversal of the poet in these 
lines.83 
As already mentioned, the main problem found with lines 1.44-49 is their 
inconsistency with the preceding hymn to Venus: how can a prayer to the goddess for peace 
end in a claim that prayer has no effect on the gods?  Yet such an argument fails to take into 
account certain aspects of the passage in question as well as Epicurean theology.  For despite 
their views on the disinterested nature of the gods, orthodox Epicureans did not deny the role 
                                                          
81See Gale 1994, 215-217; Courtney 2001, 205: “I do not propose here to waste time on 
proving something so obvious as the interpolation of these lines...” Cf. Bailey 1940, 287-288, 
who changed his earlier position to argue for the preservation of the lines, basing his 
argument on a “suspension” of Lucretius’ thought.  Bailey 1963 ad loc. provides a history of 
the issue. 
 
82See, e.g., Friedländer 1939; Elder 1954; Asmis 1982; Gale 1994, 208-223; Courtney 2001, 
207-211.  O’Hara 2007, 57-64, situates the proem within a larger trend of initial 
“misdirection” in Latin poetry used for rhetorical purposes.  Gale 1994, 208 n.2 provides a 
useful bibliographic overview of earlier scholarship. 
 
83See esp. Gale 1994, 215-217; Courtney 2001, 205. 
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of prayer and other aspects of ritual as a boon to the worshipper.84  As Philodemus informs 
us in his De Pietate, Epicurus instructed his pupils to sacrifice to the gods because 
contemplation of the divine state as it truly is would bring the pupils nearer to that state 
themselves.85  In this case, Lucretius’ request to the goddess for peace would be perfectly in 
keeping with his philosophy as it is presented throughout the DRN; prayer to a goddess 
described as living in perfect tranquillity would in fact bring peace to the members of the 
Roman state by offering them a model to emulate.86 
It is this very point that I argue Lucretius makes in the closing lines of the hymn and 
1.44-49.  Entreating the goddess to bring an end to warfare (effice ut interea fera moenia 
militiai / per maria ac terras omnis sopita quiescant, 1.29-30), the poet claims that Venus 
alone can bring this about (nam tu sola potes tranquilla pace iuvare / mortalis, 1.31-3).  
Certainly, this is first presented as a result of the goddess’ mythological associations; owing 
to her relationship with Mars, the goddess has a unique ability to subdue war (1.32-40).  
After his vivid depiction of the entwined gods, however, Lucretius puts forth another more 
philosophically consistent line of reasoning.  Reiterating his request for peace (suavis ex ore 
loquellas / funde petens placidam Romanis, incluta, pacem, 1.39-40), Lucretius explains his 
                                                          
84Certainly Lucretius takes a harsh stance on aspects of religious ceremony over the course of 
the DRN, especially at 5.1198-1203.  Yet the focus here is that empty ritual without the 
proper understanding of nature (placata posse omnia mente tueri, 1203) is worthless. 
 
85Philod. De Piet. 879-896 Obbink: «ἡμεῖς θεοῖς θύωμέν» φησιν «ὁσίως καὶ καλῶς οὗ 
καθήκει καὶ καλῶς πάντα πράττωμεν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, μηθὲν ταῖς δόξαις αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς 
περὶ τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ σεμνοτάτων διαταράττοντες· ἔτι δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι θύωμεν ἀφ’ ἧς ἔλεγον 
δόξης· οὕτω γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φύσιν θνητὴν ὁμοίως τῷ Δίϊ νὴ Δία διάγειν, ὡς φαίνεται.»  With 
this may be compared Lucretius’ claim that true pietas is the tranquil contemplation of all 
things (5.1203). 
 
86Cf. Sedley 1998, 27, who ultimately argues for a similar reading, positing the lines to be 
Lucretius’ Epicurean corrective of an Empedoclean passage. 
 53 
choice of both the object and the recipient of this entreaty.  He prays for peace because while 
the state is in turmoil, neither he nor Memmius can give their full attention to the poem and 
the philosophy it contains (1.41-43):87 
 nam neque nos agere hoc patriai tempore iniquo 
 possumus aequo animo nec Memmi clara propago 
 talibus in rebus communi desse saluti. 
He prays to Venus because the gods themselves enjoy the highest peace (omnis enim per se 
divom natura necessest / inmortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur, 1.44-45).  This is exactly 
in keeping with the Epicurean theology discussed; as the poet himself states, he prays to 
Venus because she is the example that must be followed.88 
 Venus’ role as an object of emulation is indicated further by the specific contrast 
between her divine state as described in 1.44-49 and the turmoil experienced by Memmius 
and Lucretius.  Lucretius’ inability to maintain ataraxia (aequo animo, 41) in the 
contemporary political climate is set against the gods’ unaffected calm (1.47-49): 
 nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis, 
 ipsa suis pollens opibus, nil indiga nostri, 
 nec bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira. 
At the same time, Memmius’ need to act on behalf of the state in its difficulties (talibus in 
rebus communi...saluti, 43) is contrasted with the gods’ removed indifference (semota ab 
nostris rebus seiunctaque longe, 46).  Even if the poet’s larger prayer for peace does not meet 
with success, then, the purpose behind his prayer for peace—his wish that he and Memmius 
be able to concentrate on the philosophical poem—may still be accomplished, should he and 
                                                          
87Thus “peace” in this context may stand for both the absence of war and the mental 
tranquillity it would allow. 
 
88Cf. Friedländer 1939, 373; Elder 1954, 97; Clay 1983, 95 (with n.39); Campbell 2014, 46. 
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Memmius follow the example of the goddess and abandon their concern for external affairs.89  
Indeed, such self-distancing from the troubles of others will become a central characteristic 
of the successful philosopher over the course of the poem (cf. esp. 2.7-13)90 and is demanded 
of Lucretius’ student soon after the description of the divine state (vacuas auris animumque 
sagacem / semotum a curis adhibe veram ad rationem, 1.50-51).91 
Such a connection between awareness of the goddess and the achievement of a “god-
like” state is presented more allusively in the first section of the proem, as Lucretius depicts 
Venus’ springtime arrival (1.6-9): 
 te, dea, te fugiunt venti, te nubila caeli 
 adventumque tuum, tibi suavis daedala tellus 
 summittit flores, tibi rident aequora ponti 
 placatumque nitet diffuso lumine caelum. 
                                                          
89I am not arguing that at this early point in the poem Lucretius is openly advocating for 
Memmius’ withdrawal from public life, but the implication is there, and becomes much more 
pronounced in light of the rest of the poem, particularly given Lucretius’ other descriptions 
of public life.  In this we may compare the passage to the Venus proem more broadly, where 
an initial surface reading must be later supplemented with Epicurean thought.  Cf. Gale 1994, 
214-215: “The prayer for peace also takes on rather different connotations in the light of the 
Epicurean ethical code preached elsewhere in the poem.  While physical security is a 
necessary precondition for the attainment of ataraxia, and Epicurus seems to have allowed 
participation in public life in exceptional circumstances, there are suggestions elsewhere in 
the poem that Memmius might serve the communis salus better by heeding the teachings of 
Epicurus.” 
 
90As I discuss below, the detachment expressed in these lines is similarly a marker of divine 
status. Such distancing from societal concerns was one of the primary critiques brought 
against the Epicureans in antiquity.  While I don’t necessarily want to argue that Lucretius is 
advocating wholesale political withdrawal for Memmius, the other portrayals of political life 
in the poem present such an undertaking in a negative light. 
 
91Though perhaps not immediately after, as Bailey 1963, ad 50, among others, posits a lacuna 
between lines 49 and 50. 
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The description will be recalled in the introduction to book 3, where the poet presents the 
abode of the gods as revealed to him by Epicurus’ teachings (3.18-24):92 
 apparet divum numen sedesque quietae 
 quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubila nimbis 
 aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina 20 
 cana cadens violat semperque innubilus aether 
 integit, et large diffuso lumine ridet. 
 omnia suppeditat porro natura neque ulla 
 res animi pacem delibat tempore in ullo. 
Descriptively, both scenes are marked by the same serene setting, most specifically by the 
absence of wind and clouds.93  The scenes are connected lexically too, sharing the use of the 
verb rideo with a topographical subject (aequora, 1.8; aether, 3.21) as well as the ablative 
absolute diffuso lumine, which occurs in the poem only in these two passages. Yet whereas 
such serenity is a constant for the gods’ dwelling, it occurs in the mortal world only on the 
arrival of Venus; it is she for whom the clouds and wind depart (te fugiunt, 1.6) and at whom 
the sea “smiles” (tibi, 1.8; cf. 1.7).  By depicting the conditions of the goddess’ advent as 
essentially similar to the divine state, Lucretius presents metaphorically that which he will 
soon argue in a more philosophic mode: adherence to the Epicurean goddess can give a life 
like the gods to all. 
In presenting such a relationship between the goddess and mortals in his proem, 
Lucretius makes an important shift in the hymnic opening form inherited from his didactic  
                                                          
92This passage is itself based on a Homeric description of Olympus at Odyssey 6.42-46; cf. 
Kenney 1971, ad 18-22. On the similarity between this passage and the Venus proem, cf. 
Elder 1954, 110. 
 
93Though the spring scene is not entirely without breeze, see 1.11. 
 56 
predecessors.94  Though Hesiod and Aratus had likewise begun their didactic works with 
invocations to the gods—to Zeus and the Muses in particular—their invocations serve much 
different purposes.  For these Greek poets, Zeus and the Muses serve above all as symbols of 
authority: Zeus’ authority explains and validates the condition of the world as it is presented, 
while the Muses’ authority vouches for the poet’s truth.  Lucretius’ Venus, in contrast, serves 
as a model to emulate.95  (To get a sense of how different this is, we may imagine Hesiod’s 
reaction to the implication that his student should live like Zeus!) 
This different utilization of the divine may help explain why Lucretius deviates from 
these earlier poets in choosing Venus as his patron goddess.  Lucretius’ Venus owes a debt to 
Empedocles’ Aphrodite, and in this respect another layer of allusion can be detected, for in 
that poet’s work one of the goddess’ roles is as Kypris, ruler of a quasi-Golden Age when 
war was absent and men lived in peace performing bloodless sacrifices to the goddess.96  
Here, as in Lucretius’ passage, the choice of god worshipped can be seen to influence the 
worshippers’ character and lead them to a divine state. 
 
 
 
                                                          
94Cf. Clay 1983, 109: “Lucretius does not treat this goddess as other poets treat their muses.  
He asks not for inspiration but for charm and peace.” 
 
95Though the Muses do find a surrogate in the DRN, it is not Venus; see below. 
 
96Although no specific reference to the Golden Age is made in the extant fragment, allusions 
to the passage made by later Latin poets show that they made the connection.  Thus at the 
end of the second Georgic Vergil depicts a Golden-Age Italy “before an impious race fed on 
slaughtered cattle” (Verg. Geo. 2.536-538) referring back to Aratus and ultimately 
Empedocles; cf. Nelis 2004. 
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The Opposition to Religio 
 After a brief interlude to preview the content of the incipient poem (1.50-61), 
Lucretius turns to a passage that initially seems incompatible with his earlier portrayal of 
Venus.  Whereas the goddess of the proem is described as the source of all good (nec sine te 
quicquam dias in luminis oras / exoritur neque fit laetum neque amabile quicquam, 1.22-23) 
before turning into a figure of benign withdrawal at 1.44-49, Lucretius now describes the 
tyrannical nature of religio, represented as oppressing humanity from on high, and religio’s 
overthrow by an unnamed Greek traditionally identified as Epicurus (1.62-79):97 
 Humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret 
 in terris oppressa gravi sub religione, 
 quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat 
 horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, 65 
 primum Graius homo mortalis tollere contra 
 est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra, 
 quem neque fama deum nec fulmina nec minitanti 
 murmure compressit caelum, sed eo magis acrem 
 inritat animi virtutem, effringere ut arta 70 
 naturae primus portarum claustra cupiret. 
 ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra 
 processit longe flammantia moenia mundi 
 atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque, 
 unde refert nobis victor quid possit oriri, 75 
 quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique 
 quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens. 
 quare religio pedibus subiecta vicissim 
 obteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo. 
                                                          
97For a second-time reader, this Greek is of course Epicurus, and I identify him as such in the 
discussion that follows, but this is not necessarily the case for a first-time reader, as Edelstein 
1940 has argued.  Trépanier 2007 makes a strong case for reading the Graius homo, at least 
in part, as Empedocles. 
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The scene is described in terms likening Epicurus’ actions to a gigantomachic assault.98  
Stress is placed on the contrast between the celestial position of religio and the (initially) 
earthbound Epicurus; Lucretius states specifically that human life lay on the earth (in terris, 
63) while religio pressed down from the sky (a caeli regionibus, 64) and this local 
association is emphasized by the etymological implications of humana (62) and homo (66), 
both derived from humus already in antiquity.99  This imagery is reinforced as Epicurus 
mimics the giants’ actions, ascending to heaven in a strikingly martial fashion (cf. 
effringere...portarum claustra, 70-71; vis...pervicit, 72; refert...victor, 75).100  Ultimately, 
Epicurus goes even further than the giants, accomplishing what they could not by supplanting 
religio’s place (78-79).   
  The interplay between this passage and the Venus proem is particularly effective due 
to the anthropomorphic depiction of religio; the reader is led to think not of the abstract 
concept but of the traditional Olympian gods, including Venus herself, and thus forced to 
judge the passages against one another.  In so doing, the contrast provides its own resolution, 
as the reader may view Venus (particularly as described at 1.44-49) as the “true” nature of 
divinity and religio as a stand-in for the false conceptions of popular religion.  Thus 
Lucretius is able to operate on two levels, presenting his philosophy as both based on an 
emulation of the (real) gods and as an assault on the gods of religio.  Yet despite the change 
of tone from the Venus proem, this victory in its own way accomplishes the same result as 
the earlier passage, as again humanity is likened (now more explicitly) to the gods (nos 
                                                          
98Cf. Gale 1994, 192-193. 
 
99Cf. Herescu 1948, 66-67. 
 
100For more on the martial imagery of the passage, see Buchheit 1971. 
 59 
exaequat victoria caelo, 79).  Here the means is more straightforwardly philosophical, as the 
ultimate cause of our ascent is the knowledge brought back by Epicurus from his “flight of 
the mind”: what can occur, what cannot, and the limits of all things (75-77). 
Nor is this elevation based on an understanding of the nature of things limited to 
Epicureans in the poem. In this regard, two non-Epicurean philosophers are paid particular 
attention:  Democritus, whose thought is described as holy (Democriti quod sancta viri 
sententia ponit, 3.372=5.622), and Empedocles, whose poetry came from “his divine breast” 
(carmina quin etiam divini pectoris eius / vociferantur et exponunt praeclara reperta, 1.731-
732) and who was the holiest thing to come from his island of Sicily (nil tamen hoc habuisse 
viro praeclarius in se / nec sanctum magis et mirum carumque videtur, 1.729-730).  Unlike 
the ideal students of book 3 discussed in this chapter’s opening, Lucretius’s use of divinizing 
adjectives in describing these two philosophers cannot be ascribed to any strong accordance 
with Epicurean doctrine.  Indeed, both claims occur in passages where Lucretius is refuting 
the earlier philosopher’s position; at 1.729-732, the poet is in the middle of his attack against 
Empedocles and others who adhered to the doctrine of four elements, while at 3.372 
Lucretius critiques Democritus’ account of the soul’s distribution in the body.101  
These philosophers can, however, be seen as important precursors to Epicurus’ 
thought and to Lucretius’ poetic project.  Democritus’ own atomism was regularly portrayed 
as a forerunner to Epicurus’ physical system in antiquity, and the juxtaposition of that 
                                                          
101The ultimate incorrectness of these philosophers’ doctrines may explain in part the limiting 
vocabulary used by Lucretius, who makes sure to stress the ultimately human nature of both.  
Thus while his sententia is sancta, Democritus himself is referred to emphatically as a vir; 
similar force is given to the contrast between Empedocles’ divine breast and his human 
origin (ut vix humana videatur stirpe creatus, 1.733).  However, this need not be ascribed to 
any hostility on Lucretius’ part; such limiting strategies are utilized even in the poet’s 
descriptions of Epicurus himself. 
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philosopher’s death with Epicurus’ in the catalogue of dead men that rounds off book 3 
(1024-1052; Democritus, 1039-1041; Epicurus, 1042-1044, linked by the repetition of ipse) 
suggests that Lucretius took a similar view.  Though Empedocles did not have so clear an 
influence on Epicurus’ philosophic program, regularly meeting with hostility from other 
Epicurean sources, his immense effect on Lucretius’ poem cannot be denied.102  These men 
are portrayed as they are not because they attained the godlike ataraxia that was the 
Epicurean ideal, then, but because they paved the way for that ideal to be attained by seeking 
explanations for the causes of things.103  This rationale is suggested further, with an 
important addendum, by Lucretius’ description of Empedocles’ fellows, who held beliefs 
similar to Empedocles’ regarding the elemental constitution of the world and in so doing 
acted “divinely” (divinitus, 1.736) and gave teachings “from the sanctuary of their heart, as it 
were, in a more holy way and with much surer reason than the Pythian oracle” (1.736-739): 
 ...multa bene ac divinitus invenientes 
 ex adyto tamquam cordis responsa dedere 
 sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam 
 Pythia quae tripodi a Phoebi lauroque profatur... 
The comparison with the oracle is particularly telling and clarifies Lucretius’ position on the 
“divinity” of these early philosophers.  They may be portrayed as divine, but only relatively 
so; by giving a more reasoned account of the true nature of things, these early philosophers 
are more divine than the fallacious proponents of religio without reaching the heights of 
Epicurus and his followers. 
                                                          
102See esp. Furley 1970; Sedley 1989. 
 
103This is especially likely if one accepts the contention of Edelstein 1940 that the Graius 
homo of the proem alludes to the pre-Socratics.  
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Lucretius later reuses lines 1.738-739 at 5.111-112 to refer to his own instruction.  
The context is appropriate, as Lucretius here argues explicitly against the proponents of 
religio by denying the divine nature of the celestial bodies.  Presenting the potential objection 
of his student, “restrained by religion” (religione refrenatus, 114), Lucretius feigns concern 
that the Epicureans will be viewed as giants overthrowing the gods and their natural order 
(5.113-121): 
 multa tibi expediam doctis solacia dictis, 
 religione refrenatus ne forte rearis 
 terras et solem et caelum, mare sidera lunam, 115 
 corpore divino debere aeterna manere, 
 proptereaque putes ritu par esse Gigantum 
 pendere eos poenas inmani pro scelere omnis 
 qui ratione sua disturbent moenia mundi 
 praeclarumque velint caeli restinguere solem, 120 
 inmortalia mortali sermone notantes... 
As has been noted by Volk and others, the comparison has a noteworthy pedigree in 
philosophical debate stretching back to Plato’s Sophist, wherein the Eleatic Stranger 
describes the debate between materialists and idealists as a gigantomachy (γιγαντομαχία τις, 
Pl. Soph. 246a5), likening the materialist philosophers to giants who “grab rocks and oaks 
and drag everything from heaven to earth” by referring everything back to matter (οἱ μὲν εἰς 
γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς 
περιλαμβάνοντες, 246a7-9).104  Lucretius here recalls these earlier claims only to rebut them.  
His will be no assault on the gods, as there is nothing divine about the celestial bodies under 
discussion; indeed, they serve rather as examples of entirely inanimate objects (5.122-125): 
 quae procul usque adeo divino a numine distent, 
 inque deum numero quae sint indigna videri, 
 notitiam potius praebere ut posse putentur 
                                                          
104Cf. Reiche 1971; Bignone 1973, 2.77-81; Clay 1997, 190-192; Volk 2001, 103ff. 
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 quid sit vitali motu sensuque remotum. 125 
Again the poet compares philosophical argument—in this case, his own Epicurean 
argument—to the claims of traditional religio (and here idealist philosophy as well) and 
portrays the philosophical argument as more divine on the basis of its greater claim to truth. 
 Yet there is a certain tension in Lucretius’ argument against the “gigantomachic” 
nature of his teachings, for despite his protests against such depictions, this characterization 
is in some ways supported by the poem itself.  After all, Lucretius himself uses 
gigantomachic imagery in the poem’s opening to depict the assault on religio by the Graius 
homo Epicurus (1.62-79).  Indeed, echoes of the earlier passage can be found in Lucretius’ 
denial here.  Both passages express concern for the student’s pious reticence, introduced with 
the identical phrasing ne forte rearis (1.80; 5.114).  Yet whereas in the latter passage, 
Lucretius’ opponents needlessly fear that the materialist “giants” will overthrow the walls of 
the world through their argument (ratione sua disturbent moenia mundi, 5.119), in the proem 
Epicurus himself is described as breaking down the gates of nature and proceeding beyond 
these very walls (moenia mundi, 1.73) with his mind (mente animoque, 1.74). Thus, while 
overtly distancing himself from accusations of “gigantomachy,” Lucretius at the same time 
implicitly reminds us of earlier associations between his own position and that of the giants.  
In arguing such a reading I do not mean to return to the bugbear of an “anti-Lucretius” 
undermining his espoused philosophical position.  Rather, the poet may be seen developing 
two levels of argument.  On one overt level, Lucretius argues that his claims would not lead 
to an upheaval of the natural order (unlike the supposed assault of the giants).  On an allusive 
secondary level, however, Lucretius continues a thematic development at work throughout 
the poem, for by implying a similarity between Epicureanism and these giants, Lucretius 
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again represents his system as one that seeks to challenge, and ultimately replace, the 
traditional gods of religio.  Thus in its hostility towards religio Lucretius’ Epicureanism may 
be likened to gigantomachy, while in its comprehension of the true nature of things it is near-
divine (5.111-112).  
It is worthwhile to return to the earlier passage, where Lucretius favorably compares 
his Greek predecessors to the Pythian oracle.  Whereas Lucretius follows his own 
comparison to the oracle with an overt denial of the philosophical gigantomachy envisioned 
by Plato (5.113-125), in the earlier passage Lucretius immediately turns to denounce the 
mess these philosophers’ philosophical system would have made of the world and announces 
that this led to their downfall (principiis tamen in rerum fecere ruinas / et graviter magni 
magno cecidere ibi casu, 1.740-741).  When read against the corresponding passage in book 
5, it is difficult not to see a recurrence of the “intellectual gigantomachy” motif in this 
passage, here voiced by Lucretius himself; though even they are “holier than the oracle,” 
these philosophers and their untenable systems, says the poet, are the real giants, destroying 
the world in their folly.105 
 
Allusive Argumentation  
 The “deification” of the wise man seen in Lucretius’ treatment of Epicurus in his 
proem and suggested in his mentions of Empedocles and Democritus takes subtler forms in 
the poem as well, as can be seen in the proem to the second book.  Opening the book with a 
priamel, Lucretius declares that, though it is pleasurable to watch another toil at sea or a 
                                                          
105Cf. Campbell 2014, 36-37, who notes the comparison but takes a less antagonistic reading 
than I. 
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battle from afar, nothing is more pleasurable than looking down on human life from the 
heights of learning (2.1-13):106 
 suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis, 
 e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem; 
 non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas, 
 sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est. 
 suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri 5 
 per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli. 
 sed nil dulcius est bene quam munita tenere 
 edita doctrina sapientum templa serena, 
 despicere unde queas alios passimque videre 
 errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae, 10 
 certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate, 
 noctes atque dies niti praestante labore 
 ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri. 
On a surface reading, the lines serve to contrast the wise man with the man of action.  The 
contrast is already operative in the first six lines, where the distressed sailors and soldiers are 
opposed to the tranquil observer enjoying the reminder of the evils he lacks, and initially the 
reader may be led to identify this observer with the Epicurean wise man.  Yet the final 
member of the priamel forces us to adjust our assumptions, for while that observer’s 
experience is sweet, it is ultimately surpassed (sed nil dulcius est, 7) by the vision of the 
figure inhabiting the edita...sapientum templa (8), who is able to look down upon all the 
range of human error, and who can truly be identified as wise (doctrina, sapientum, 8). 
 In this way, Lucretius actually sets up two comparisons: one between the observers of 
lines 1-6 and “men of action” and another between those observers and the ideal figure 
introduced at line 7.  This could be viewed as a straightforward amplification of the basic 
comparison, serving simply to show the Epicurean sage as the “wisest of the wise.”  There is, 
                                                          
106For a metapoetic reading of these lines, see Roy 2013. 
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however, another reading possible, for the observers in lines 1-6 are depicted in terms 
reminiscent of the Homeric gods, able to watch the sailing and battles of heroes from afar.  
Indeed, such a spectacle could be considered a particular prerogative of the gods; after his 
observation of a battle from afar, Scipio is said to have remarked that only two before him 
had beheld a similar sight—Zeus and Poseidon at Troy.107  By making the comparison, then, 
Lucretius prefers the Epicurean sage not only to the “man of action” but even to the Homeric 
gods. 
A more sustained allusive argument that the successful Epicurean can achieve a “life 
like the gods” can be detected in the anthropology that forms the second half of DRN book 5.  
Throughout this section of the poem, Lucretius adapts the traditional mythological view of 
history to an account based in Epicurean natural science by explaining and correcting the 
errors and superstitious excesses of the earlier poets.  Thus, for example, Lucretius still 
begins his account of human history with a quasi-Golden Age (5.924-1010)108 when the earth 
provided food of its own accord and humanity was impervious to the elements and disease.  
Yet whereas for Hesiod this period was the result of the gods’ beneficence and a reflection of 
the golden race’s own moral qualities, Lucretius pointedly avoids such connections, instead 
arguing that humans were hardier owing to their creation from the earth (925-932), while 
                                                          
107See Fowler 2002, 45, who cites Appian 8.71: ὁ δὲ Σκιπίων ἐθεᾶτο τὴν μάχην ἀφ’ ὑψηλοῦ 
καθάπερ ἐκ θεάτρου. ἔλεγέ τε πολλάκις ὕστερον, ἀγῶσι συνενεχθεὶς ποικίλοις, οὔποτε ὧδε 
ἡσθῆναι· μόνον γὰρ ἔφη τόνδε τὸν πόνον ἄφροντις ἰδεῖν, μυριάδας ἀνδρῶν συνιούσας ἐς 
μάχην ἕνδεκα. ἔλεγέ τε σεμνύων δύο πρὸ αὑτοῦ τὴν τοιάνδε θέαν ἰδεῖν ἐν τῷ Τρωικῷ 
πολέμῳ, τὸν Δία ἀπὸ τῆς Ἴδης καὶ τὸν Ποσειδῶνα ἐκ Σαμοθρᾴκης... 
 
108Though prior to this passage Lucretius is quick to deny the possibility of an “actual” 
Golden Age containing such supernatural features as rivers of gold or giants (5.907-924). 
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crops grew abundantly owing to the world’s youth (937-945).109  Indeed, Lucretius plays up 
the equivalence in “quality of life” between this prehistoric race and the modern day, 
comparing primitive man’s death by animal violence with the casualties of modern war (988-
1010).  Despite some final moralizing on how luxury has replaced poverty as a source of 
death, the stress of this passage is on continuity rather than change. 
Traditionally, readers of the poem have seen a shift away from Lucretius’ “Golden 
Age” description at 1011, with the depiction of humanity’s development of familial ties, 
friendship, and “non-aggression pacts” (1011-1027):110 
 Inde casas postquam ac pellis ignemque pararunt, 
 et mulier coniuncta viro concessit in unum 
 ..................................................................... 
 cognita sunt, prolemque ex se videre creatam, 
 tum genus humanum primum mollescere coepit. 
 ignis enim curavit ut alsia corpora frigus 1015 
 non ita iam possent caeli sub tegmine ferre, 
 et Venus inminuit viris, puerique parentum 
 blanditiis facile ingenium fregere superbum. 
 tunc et amicitiem coeperunt iungere aventes 
 finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari, 1020 
 et pueros commendarunt muliebreque saeclum, 
 vocibus et gestu cum balbe significarent 
 imbecillorum esse aequum misererier omnis. 
 nec tamen omnimodis poterat concordia gigni, 
 sed bona magnaque pars servabat foedera caste; 1025 
 aut genus humanum iam tum foret omne peremptum, 
 nec potuisset adhuc perducere saecla propago. 
                                                          
109Grilli 1995, 22-23, notes that the polemic here is more specifically directed against Plato’s 
adaptation of the Hesiodic myth in the Statesman. 
 
110Cf. Bailey 1963, 1483: “With this paragraph Lucr. passes away from the haphazard life of 
primitive man to the various stages of civilization...” 
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Yet it is perhaps better to think of this passage as a change in model rather than a change in 
“age,” as much of Lucretius’ description of this initial human society is reminiscent of those 
fragments identified as Empedocles’ Golden Age, when the goddess Kypris ruled in peace 
and worship of martial gods had not yet begun.  Lucretius’ society is similarly united by 
Venus (here, as perhaps in Empedocles, the abstract force of love personified), who began to 
tame primitive man, causing him to develop emotional bonds with his children and prefer 
friendship to strife (1017-1020).111  Tellingly, it is only after his depiction of this initial social 
formation that Lucretius describes the invention of fire, despite the fact that fire is clearly 
known to these early individuals (1015); by delaying mention of this pivotal discovery with 
its inherent implications of Promethean theft and humanity’s fall (emphasized by the poet’s 
mention of the thunderbolt as fire’s celestial source in 5.1092), Lucretius can suggest a 
prelapsarian state for this society without tainting his account with overt myth.112 
This suggestion of a “fall” is further supported by Lucretius’ account of human 
development that follows upon his discussion of the discovery of fire.  Political life is 
introduced in the form of kings, along with the increased fear of violence (see arcem, 1108; 
praesidium, perfugium, 1109) and desire for luxury (1110-1116).  These kings are eventually 
replaced with magistrates and laws, which bring their own troubles—fear of punishment and 
the gods (1136-1240).  With the ensuing account of mankind’s discovery of metals (1241-
1296) and the development of warfare, Lucretius resumes his explicit references to Hesiod’s 
                                                          
111In Venus’ presence here a unity between this and the earlier “Golden Age” of Lucretius’ 
previous passage may be detected, as the goddess’ presence is noted there as well (et Venus 
in silvis iungebat corpora amantum, 962). 
 
112For a discussion of “Lucretius’ apparent violations of logic and chronology as elements of 
a thematic and imagistic organizing principle,” see Farrell 1994, 81. 
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system of metallic ages, recalling Hesiod’s sequence of gold-silver-bronze-iron in 1269-
1296113 and describing the transition from bronze usage to that of iron with an Hesiodic 
anaphora (aere solum terrae tractabant, aereque belli..., 1289; cf. τῶν δ’ ἦν χάλκεα μὲν 
τεύχεα, χάλκεοι δέ τε οἶκοι, / χαλκῷ δ’ εἰργάζοντο· μέλας δ’ οὐκ ἔσκε σίδηρος, Hes. WD 
150-151). 
What is important for our purposes is Lucretius’ inclusion, towards the end of this 
historical account, of the development of music (Lucr. DRN 5.1379-1411).  Here Lucretius 
explains that the model for human song was that of birds, while pipe-playing was discovered 
by hearing wind blow through reeds.  He then turns to the pleasure afforded by these 
inventions, depicting a springtime “picnic” where early humans relax in a traditional locus 
amoenus, accompanied by the “rustic muse” (agrestis enim tum musa vigebat, 1398).114  The 
scene is pleasant but simple; the participants are content with a sufficiency of food (cum 
satiate cibi, 1391) and need no great wealth for their pleasure (non magnis opibus iucunde 
corpora habebant, 1394).  In many ways, such a state may be considered a representation of 
the Epicurean good life.115  Indeed, much of this description is taken from a passage at the 
opening of book 2, where Lucretius commends such a state as sufficient to the demands of 
nature, and to be preferred by the Epicurean wise man in his templa serena (2.20-36; 2.29-
33≈5.1392-1396). 
                                                          
113Cf. Farrell 1994, 92 n. 26. 
 
114For the scene as locus amoenus, see most recently Morelli 2012, 459-467. 
 
115Cf. Armstrong 2014, 96, who compares the passage to Philodemus’ discussion of the gods’ 
intercourse and Horace’s noctes cenaeque deum (Sat. 2.6.65).  
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The passage also recalls the earlier “Golden Ages” of Lucretius’ historical account.  
The pleasures enjoyed by these rustics are openly compared to those experienced by the early 
earthborn humans (neque hilo / maiorem interea capiunt dulcedini’ fructum / quam silvestre 
genus capiebat terrigenarum, 5.1409-1411; cf. terram...matrem, 1402), while the genial 
social interaction (cf. tum ioca, tum sermo, tum dulces esse cachinni, 1397) may suggest the 
concordia of the first communities (1019-1027).  Even the renewed presence of Venus is 
implied by the setting’s description, which evokes the spring day of the poem’s opening with 
its emphasis on floral growth and, as noted above, the bold metaphor of a smiling landscape 
(tempestas ridebat, 5.1395; tibi rident aequora ponti, 1.8).116  Thus, by weaving strands of 
allusion together, Lucretius depicts his Epicurean ideal as a possible return to the Golden 
Age, adapting the strategy seen in the earlier Greek poets to again portray Epicurean success 
as a life like the gods. 
 
Epicurus 
 Lucretius’ most explicit claims of divinization are reserved for Epicurus himself.  In 
my discussion of the proem I have already argued that the “flight of the mind” of 1.62-79 
points in this direction by presenting Epicurus in a successful gigantomachic assault against 
the heavens.  Lucretius returns to the philosopher again in the introduction to book 3, where 
Lucretius portrays his desire to emulate Epicurus while acknowledging the philosopher’s 
superiority, as Lucretius himself is dependent on Epicurus’ teachings, which are “golden” 
                                                          
116Morelli 2012, 460-461, notes that Lucretius alters his pastoral models by situating his 
locus amoenus in a spring setting instead of the summer.  Such a variation would make the 
poet’s connection between this passage and Venus’ spring arrival (or even the spring setting 
of the gods’ abodes in the proem to book 3) all the stronger. 
 70 
and “most worthy of eternal life” (omnia nos itidem depascimur aurea dicta, / aurea, 
perpetua semper dignissima vita, 3.12-13).  One may detect a suggestion of a god-like state 
in the reference to immortality, though Lucretius is careful to avoid pressing the point to an 
unphilosophical end; it is the philosopher’s writings, not his corporeal form, which are 
worthy of immortality.117  The suggestion is in turn reinforced by the following lines, 
wherein Lucretius expands upon his debt to Epicurus, explaining that “as soon as your [i.e. 
Epicurus’] reason begins to expound on the nature of things as it arises from your divine 
mind, the mind’s horrors withdraw, the walls of the world recede, I see matter conducted 
through all the void” (nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari / naturam rerum, divina mente 
coortam, / diffugiunt animi terrores, moenia mundi / discedunt, totum video per inane geri 
res, 3.14-16). 
 It is important to note exactly how the divine terminology is at work throughout this 
passage.  For while it is implied rather strongly that Epicurus is himself a divine figure, this 
divinity is specifically associated with Epicurus’ intellect—in particular, of course, with his 
philosophical thought.118  Thus it is his mind that is described as divina for properly 
expounding upon the nature of things and giving the true account of the abodes of the gods 
and the non-existence of Acheron (3.14-30), while his teachings on these very matters, his 
aurea dicta, are what Lucretius actually declares as worthy of eternal life.119  This 
                                                          
117For immortality as one of the two attributes required of the gods in Epicurean philosophy, 
see D.L. 10.123. 
 
118A similar point is made by Edirisinghe 2010, 118ff. 
 
119The frequent tension between Epicurus’ god-like status and ultimate mortality in the DRN 
is exemplified by Lucretius’ use of the perfect verb fuit at 5.8: deus ille fuit... 
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formulation is in keeping with our earlier discussion of Lucretius’ treatment of the pre-
Socratics; it is his insight into the true nature of existence that makes Epicurus divine. 
 This connection is reiterated in the introduction to book 5, where Lucretius openly 
declares Epicurus a god (5.7-12): 
 nam si, ut ipsa petit maiestas cognita rerum, 
 dicendum est, deus ille fuit, deus, inclute Memmi, 
 qui princeps vitae rationem invenit eam quae 
 nunc appellatur sapientia, quique per artem 10 
 fluctibus e tantis vitam tantisque tenebris 
 in tam tranquillo et tam clara luce locavit. 
Here Epicurus’ discovery of the nature of things (maiestas cognita rerum, 7; cf. rationem 
invenit, 9) is extolled, just as with Lucretius’ treatment of the pre-Socratics.  In addition—
and in contrast to the depiction of those earlier philosophers—Lucretius describes the 
ataraxia arising from this discovery (10-12).  This is of course the defining characteristic of 
Epicurus’ divinities and the primary characteristic presented as godlike by Epicurus in the 
Letter to Menoeceus discussed above (οὐδέποτε οὔθ’ ὕπαρ οὔτ’ ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσεις 
δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, D.L. 10.135).  By asserting Epicurus’ divine status as a result of his 
ataractic nature here, Lucretius is following standard Epicurean doctrine.  By including it 
over and above the criteria for which the pre-Socratics were represented as partially divine 
earlier in the poem, however, Lucretius emphasizes Epicurus’ greatest accomplishment. 
The characterization of Epicurean divinity seen so far may be described as 
ontological or “absolute” divinity.120  That is, the successful Epicurean student (or Epicurus 
                                                          
120For a contrast between this and “relative” divinity, see esp. Gradel 2002, 1-53.  Focusing 
on the practice of emperor worship, Gradel argues for the predominance of a “relative” 
notion of divinity in the ancient world by which “[h]onours bestowed on a man (or god) by 
other men defined relative status, and the power structure between the two parties involved.  
The highest honours—divine worship—expressed the maximum status gap and the absolute 
power wielded by the person worshipped over his worshipper” (52).  “Absolute” divinity, by 
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himself) is not here likened to a god because of his power status vis-à-vis other mortals or 
honors received from them but solely owing to his internal state of mind (as befits an entity 
who is in no way affected by external stimuli, like the gods described at 1.44-49).  Yet this is 
not the only form that Lucretius’ “deification” of Epicurus can take.  As Monica Gale has 
discussed in her 1994 monograph, elements of Euhemerism (in a broad sense, not restricted 
by Euhemerus’ specific teachings) can also be detected in the praise of Epicurus which opens 
book 5 of the DRN.121  Even before lauding Epicurus for his own achievement of ataraxia, 
Lucretius stresses Epicurus’ role as benefactor to the human race, praising the philosopher 
not only for his discoveries themselves but for the fact that he shared them with all humanity 
(qui talia nobis / pectore parta suo quaesitaque praemia liquit, 5.4-5).  This leads into a 
discussion of other supposed benefactors, such as Ceres and Liber, who discovered grain and 
wine, culminating with the monster-slayer Hercules (5.13-42).  As Lucretius argues, these 
figures’ supposed beneficences are of little value compared to those of Epicurus; while it is 
entirely possible to live without wine or grain (15-16), and countless beasts do in fact still 
remain on the earth (39-42), it is impossible to live well without Epicurus’ teachings, and for 
this reason he rightly seems like a god to us (at bene non poterat sine puro pectore vivi; / quo 
magis hic merito nobis deus esse videtur, 18-19; cf. 49-51). 
Here can be seen a much more relational, rather than absolute, portrayal of divinity, 
as Epicurus’ status as god is predicated entirely on his superior position to, and interaction 
with, the rest of humanity.  This relational aspect is emphasized by the dative nobis in line 
                                                          
contrast, presupposes a divinity considered divine on its own merits, and not because of its 
status relative to a worshipper. 
 
121Gale 1994, 75-80. Cf. Erler 2002, who wants to see this not as a case of Euhemerist 
rhetoric, but a furthering of the ὁμοίωσις θεῷ trope. 
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5.19; Epicurus seems like a god to us because of his teachings.  This statement too finds 
parallels in actual Epicurean practice, as Epicureans often performed sacrifices to their 
deceased master—a practice frequently cited by critics of the school, who argued it flew in 
the face of the school’s own teachings.  Despite these critiques, there is an internal 
consistency to such practice.  It will be remembered that Epicurean practice encouraged 
contemplation of the gods as models of behavior, and it seems such contemplation could 
extend to the “god-like” Epicurean sage; in his 32nd Vatican Saying, the philosopher claims 
“reverence of the wise man is a great good for the worshipper” (Ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ σεβασμὸς 
ἀγαθὸν μέγα τῷ σεβομένῳ ἐστί). 
Though both the ontological and relational aspects of Epicurus’ divinization have 
long been recognized, the ontological aspect has traditionally been viewed as primary; thus 
Gale, while noting the beneficent role of Epicurus in the poem, argues that “it was above all 
his own achievement of ataraxia, and only secondarily the fact that he enabled others to 
achieve it, which earned him the title of deus.”122  Yet this interpretation seems to stick too 
strictly to philosophical doctrine without taking the poem itself into account, as in every 
passage where Epicurus is portrayed as divine, the ultimate focus is on the philosopher’s 
beneficence to mankind.  In the culmination to his argument for Epicurus’ superiority in 
book 5 (discussed above), Lucretius argues that Epicurus deserves to be counted in the 
number of the gods especially because he gave discourses (dicta) on the gods and on nature 
(nonne decebit / hunc hominem numero divom dignarier esse? / cum bene praesertim multa 
ac divinitus ipsis / immortalibu’ de divis dare dicta suerit / atque omnem rerum naturam 
                                                          
122Gale 1994, 79 (emphasis Gale’s). Cf. Erler 2002, 177. 
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pandere dictis, 5.50-54).  The emphasis is not solely on Epicurus’ discovery of these facts 
(though this is praised as well), but on his communication of them.   
This focus on the connection between Epicurus’ so-called divinity and his role as 
teacher is present yet again in the proem to book 6 of the poem.  Indeed, the opening claim 
that “Athens first gave grain-bearing produce to wretched mortals” (6.1-2) directly recalls the 
Euhemeristic proem to the preceding book, wherein Epicurus was favorably compared to 
Ceres and her gift of agriculture (5.14).  So too does the claim at 6.7-8 that on account of 
Epicurus’ “divine discoveries, his fame is borne to heaven” (cuius et extincti propter divina 
reperta / divolgata vetus iam ad caelum gloria fertur), mirroring as it does the Euhemerist 
position that renown on earth may lead to divine status.123  Of course, it could be argued that 
the focus here is instead on Epicurus’ unique beatitude and that his reperta are divine 
because of the ataraxia which they provided for Epicurus himself.  Certainly the philosopher 
is contrasted with the mass of humanity; with the detachment which is recurrent throughout 
the poem,124 Epicurus is portrayed as removed from human life, able to view the incongruity 
between man’s anxieties and his affluence (6.9-23).  Yet the ultimate cause of Epicurus’ 
divolgata gloria would seem to be his instruction.  As Lucretius explains it, Epicurus’ 
renown has reached heaven because (nam, 6.9) he understood that humanity’s ills were really 
psychological and therefore (igitur) he “purged their hearts with true-spoken words,” 
“explained what the highest good to which we all tend was,” and “showed the way…by 
which we could head straight to it” (6.24-28): 
                                                          
123Note that in the very act of calling Epicurus’ teachings divine Lucretius stresses his 
mortality (extincti); in no way should we confuse the argument to suppose that Lucretius 
presents Epicurus as an actual immortal god. 
 
124Cf. De Lacy 1964 [repr. in Gale 2007]. 
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 veridicis igitur purgavit pectora dictis 
 et finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris 25 
 exposuitque bonum summum quo tendimus omnes 
 quid foret, atque viam monstravit, tramite parvo 
 qua possemus ad id recto contendere cursu.   
Here I would argue that the priority of Lucretius’ presentation is actually opposite that argued 
by Gale; Epicurus is first divine because of his teachings and only secondly due to his own 
ataraxia (though, of course, this contributes to the former as well). 
In the proem to book 3 as well, it is Epicurus’ teachings (dicta, 12) that are golden 
and worthy of eternal life (3.11-12).  Explaining this claim, Lucretius describes the benefit to 
himself which the philosopher’s teachings have caused: “for125 as soon as your [i.e. 
Epicurus’] reason begins to expound on the nature of things as it arises from your divine 
mind, the mind’s horrors withdraw, the walls of the world recede, I see matter conducted 
through all the void” (nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari / naturam rerum, divina mente 
coortam, / diffugiunt animi terrores, moenia mundi / discedunt, totum video per inane geri 
res, 3.14-16).  The result is that a divine pleasure (divina voluptas) overcomes the poet 
because nature has been revealed to him by Epicurus (his ibi me rebus quaedam divina 
voluptas / percipit atque horror, quod sic natura tua vi / tam manifesta patens ex omni parte 
retecta est, 3.28-30).  Again, Epicurus’ “divinity” is inherently connected with his ability to 
share his teachings with others.   
This aspect of the divinization of Epicurus has important consequences for the poem.  
After all, the vision that comes to Lucretius after Epicurus’ teachings cause the moenia 
mundi to recede is that of the gods and their abodes (apparet divum numen sedesque quietae, 
                                                          
125The introductory nam serves to indicate the clause’s function as an explanation for 
Lucretius’ praise of Epicurus’ aurea dicta. 
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3.18), making the student Lucretius here much like the quasi-divine Epicurus of the proem, 
whose assault on religio led him to pass beyond “the flaming walls of the world” 
(flammantia moenia mundi, 1.73).  This elevation of the student may be suggested further by 
the experience of divina voluptas, a loaded term which associates the notion of divinity with 
the voluptas that in the poem’s opening line stands, in part, for the pleasure that is the 
Epicurean's ideal. Through the divine teachings of Epicurus, Lucretius himself (and so the 
Epicurean student—or Lucretian reader—as well) can reach the god-like state which is the 
school’s telos.  
This emphasis on Epicurus’ divine state and his ability to bestow that divinity to 
others can be detected in the most famous depiction of Epicurus in the De Rerum Natura, the 
so-called “flight of the mind” discussed above (1.62-79). Though Epicurus is not presented 
as a god explicitly here (indeed, his humanity is stressed by the appellation of Graius homo), 
he is portrayed as equal to the gods.  And again, as in the proems to book three and six, the 
ultimate effect of this portrayal is to emphasize not only Epicurus’ individual achievement, 
but its meaning for humanity.  Effectively, Epicurus acts as humanity’s champion, fighting 
against the tyrant religio (humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret / in terris oppressa 
gravi sub religione, 1.62-3).  This fight leads him to traverse beyond the walls of the world 
where he discovers what can and cannot come to be before reporting this information back to 
us (unde refert nobis victor quid possit oriri, / quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique / 
quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens, 1.75-8). Through Epicurus’ victory, we are 
all made equal to heaven (nos exaequat victoria caelo, 1.79). 
Intertextual allusions found in the passage serve to further this argument that 
Epicurus’ divinization leads to the divinization of the student.  In addition to the overt 
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gigantomachic imagery on display, Lucretius also makes allusion here to Empedocles’ 
cosmic cycle.  Narrating Epicurus’ “flight of the mind,” Lucretius describes how the force of 
Epicurus’ mind was victorious and “proceeded far beyond the flaming walls of the world and 
wandered the unbound universe in thought and mind” (1.72-74): 
 ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra 
 processit longe flammantia moenia mundi 
 atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque... 
Based on these lines, as well as the reference to Epicurus as an anonymous Graius homo, 
Furley has seen in the passage an allusion to Empedocles fr. DK 129, where the earlier poet 
describes an anonymous individual (τις...ἀνήρ), traditionally identified with Pythagoras, who 
similarly saw the whole of existence through the power of his mind:126 
 ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς, 
 ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον. 
 παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων· 
 ὁππότε γὰρ πάσῃσιν ὀρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσιν, 
 ῥεῖ’ ὅ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον, 
 καί τε δέκ’ ἀνθρώπων καί τ’ εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν. 
Certainly there are similarities between the two passages, yet as Trépanier has rightly noted, 
Lucretius’ description may refer more closely to another passage from Empedocles, in which 
the Sicilian describes the nature of the gods (DK 134):127 
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρομέῃ κεφαλῇ κατὰ γυῖα κέκασται, 
 οὐ μὲν ἀπὸ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι ἀίσσουσι, 
 οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν’, οὐ μήδεα λαχνήεντα, 
 ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον, 
                                                          
126Furley 1970, 61-2. 
 
127Trépanier 2007, 272.  Our source for the passage, Ammonius, states that the passage is 
specifically a description of the god Apollo, but that Empedocles talked about the divine in 
general in the same way (Ammonius, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 249.3-
5): ἐπήγαγε προηγουμένως μὲν περὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, περὶ οὗ ἦν αὐτῷ προσεχῶς ὁ λόγος, κατὰ δὲ 
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ θείου παντὸς ἁπλῶς ἀποφαινόμενος... 
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 φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταίσσουσα θοῇσιν. 
Here we have a literal flight of the mind, as Empedocles’ divinity, conceived of solely as 
mind isolated from the trappings of the body, darts through the universe (κόσμον ἅπαντα; cf. 
omne immensum, DRN 1.74) with its “swift thoughts.”  The passage is actually a better fit for 
Lucretius’ depiction of Epicurus than the intertext argued by Furley, as it maintains a similar 
focus on spatial movement in both passages that is lost in a comparison to the Pythagoras 
passage with its focus on expanded temporal knowledge.  If DK 134 is taken as the primary 
text to which Lucretius here refers, the poet would be comparing Epicurus not only to the 
wise man Pythagoras but to an Empedoclean god. 
Pressing the point further, we may note that lines 2-3 of the passage describing the 
holy phren are transmitted to us in a slightly different form by another source, who tells us 
that Empedocles described the Sphairos, discussed briefly in the previous chapter, with these 
lines.128  Given Empedocles’ predilection for recycling his verses, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that he describes these two forms of divinity in a similar manner.  Yet this similarity opens 
the possibility that Lucretius, or a Lucretian reader, may identify the description of the holy 
phren with that of the Sphairos. Should this be the case, Lucretius’ text could compare 
Epicurus not only to a standard Empedoclean divinity, of the type that a person could become 
after enough successful transmigrations, but to the Sphairos itself. 
This is not so large a cognitive leap as it may seem.  As has been well documented by 
Furley and Sedley, among others, the proem to the DRN is rife with allusions to Empedocles’ 
                                                          
128Hippolytus, Refutatio 7.29.13: καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ἰδέας, ὁποία τίς ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῆς 
φιλίας κοσμουμένη, λέγει τοιοῦτόν τινα τρόπον· 
 οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ νώτοιο δύο κλάδοι ἀίσσονται, 
 οὐ πόδες, οὐ θοὰ γοῦν’, οὐ μήδεα γεννήεντα (=DK 29.1-2) 
 ἀλλὰ σφαῖρος ἔην... 
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work, to the extent that Sedley has argued for the use of Lucretius’ proem to reconstruct the 
proem of Empedocles’ On Nature.129  Furthermore, Lucretius himself has already established 
a connection between his philosophical program and Empedocles’ Philia in the figure of 
Venus, the voluptas of gods and men, who is routinely conflated with Philia in Empedocles’ 
poetry and who, in a nod to Empedoclean cosmology as well as Homeric myth, has already 
been portrayed by Lucretius as the peaceful force uniquely able to overcome the martial god 
of Strife.130  Indeed, this particular point of Empedocles’ system is recast in the depiction of 
Epicurus’ battle with religio, leading to a further allusion that ensures the likelihood of a 
comparison between Epicurus and the sphairos, as Lucretius draws on the Homeric depiction 
of Strife (Il. 4.440-445; see esp. 443: οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξε κάρη καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ βαίνει) to depict 
religio, representing her as a giant figure, looming over mortals with her head in the heavens 
(quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat / horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, DRN 
1.64-65).131  This portrayal of Epicurus’ foe religio in the guise of Empedoclean Strife again 
encourages the reader to associate Epicurus with Strife’s counterpart, Philia—an 
encouragement that is confirmed with the intertextual reference to the Sphairos discussed 
above.  Drawing on the previous chapter’s discussion of Empedocles’ cosmology, we may 
recall that in that system the period of Philia’s dominance consists of universal unification 
into the divine Sphairos.  Again, the implication is made that Epicurus’ divinity will lead to 
the divinity of all.  Or as Lucretius puts it: nos exaequat victoria caelo (DRN 1.79). 
                                                          
129See Furley 1970; Sedley 1998, ch. 1.  For a critique of Sedley’s reconstruction, see 
Trépanier 2004, 38-44, who nevertheless emphasizes the close interplay between Lucretius 
and Empedocles. 
 
130Cf. Furley 1970, 57-60. 
 
131Cf. Summers 1995, 54-55. 
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Lucretius’ statements directly following his account of the sacrifice of Iphigenia 
provide one more example of humanity’s ultimate ability to achieve the same state as 
Epicurus through the philosopher’s teachings.  Here Lucretius acknowledges that the student 
may one day attempt to abandon Epicurus’ teachings due to the “horrifying words of 
priests/poets” (vatum / terriloquis...dictis, 1.102-3), who create fictions to disturb people’s 
lives by positing eternal torments in death.  According to the poet, were men to see that there 
is a certain limit to their troubles (si certam finem esse viderent / aerumnarum homines, 107-
108), these fictions would have no effect, and men could oppose religious institutions and the 
threats of vates (aliqua ratione valerent / religionibus atque minis obsistere vatum, 108-109).  
In its diction, the act here described is quite similar to Epicurus’ “flight of the mind” earlier 
in book 1; there Epicurus too opposes (obsistere contra, 67) religio, with the result that he 
learns the limits of nature (75-77).  Here we have the same process in reverse; by learning the 
certam finem taught by the philosopher, humanity too can oppose religio just as Epicurus 
has. 
This focus on the benevolent aspect of Epicurus’ divine state has two further 
implications that should be drawn out.  The first concerns Lucretian parallels to the 
authoritative gods of earlier didactic.  As mentioned above, though Venus occupies the same 
proemial position in the DRN as Zeus and the Muses do in Hesiod’s Works and Days or 
Aratus’ Phaenomena, she does not occupy the same role.  For Hesiod and especially for 
Aratus, these gods serve as guarantors of their expressed knowledge. Hesiod declares himself 
to be “speaking forth the mind of Zeus” with the aid of the Muses, much as Aratus recounts 
the signs already placed in the heavens by Zeus.  Venus, though invoked by Lucretius to be 
his “ally” (1.24), is not the source of his material in the same way; she may provide the 
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peaceful conditions for Memmius’ education or grant the poem its charm 
(aeternum...leporem, 1.28), and may even govern the poem’s subject matter (rerum naturam 
sola gubernas, 1.21), but she does not grant knowledge of that subject matter to the poet.  
This is instead the task of Epicurus, whose signs Lucretius will follow and expound (inque 
tuis nunc / ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signa, 3.3-4) much as Aratus follows the signs 
of his Muses (ἐμοί γε μὲν ἀστέρας εἰπεῖν / ᾗ θέμις εὐχομένῳ τεκμήρατε πᾶσαν ἀοιδήν, Arat. 
Phaen. 17-18), and whose mental achievements (naturam rerum, divina mente coortam, 
DRN 3.14) he explains just as Hesiod does the mind of Zeus. 
At the same time, this focus on Epicurus’ benevolence serves to adapt Lucretius’ 
argument to his Roman context. Earlier scholars have noted how Lucretius’ depiction of 
Epicurus in the proem to book 5 corresponds to contemporary interest in Euhemerism, 
popularized in Rome by an Ennian work on the subject.132  The doctrine was especially 
agreeable to the Stoics, who found it compatible with their own belief in the divinizing power 
of virtue. Indeed, Lucretius’ comparison of Epicurus to the deified Hercules in the book’s 
opening has been viewed as a directed attack on the Stoics, as the hero was regularly utilized 
by that school as an exemplar of the wise man.133  By showing Epicurus to be superior to the 
hero specifically as regards benefactions to humanity, Lucretius proves the superiority of 
Epicurus on the Stoics’ own terms. 
                                                          
132See Gale 1994, 75-80. 
 
133See Pigeaud 1972, 154-162, and Packman 1976, who argues that Lucretius, by comparing 
Epicurus with the Stoic Hercules, shows Epicurus to be the more beneficent figure in the 
Stoics’ own terms as put forth by Cicero in his various dialogues.  See also the allegorization 
of Heracles’ deeds in Heraclitus (Hom. Quaest. 33), wherein Heracles’ various labors are 
represented as symbolic of mental feats similar to those for which Lucretius praises Epicurus.  
It is tempting to see here Lucretius draining a more traditional allegory of its symbolic 
content and transferring it to Epicurus. 
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Such appropriation need not be directed against the Stoics alone.  In a recent book on 
deification in Cicero’s writings, Cole has made a compelling case that Cicero’s discussions 
of deification in his works form part of a larger context of “experimentation” with 
divinization taking place in the later years of the Republic.  For Cicero, divinization becomes 
the reward of the ideal statesman, earned as a result of civic accomplishments.134  For the 
Epicurean, on the other hand, such political involvement was generally to be shunned—an 
attitude for which the school received frequent criticism from adversaries, including Cicero 
himself.  By focusing on the public benefit gained by Epicurus’ discoveries, Lucretius is able 
to accomplish much the same feat as he does in his comparison of Epicurus to the Stoic 
Hercules, showing the philosopher as better than the statesman on the statesman’s own 
terms.135 
 
 
The Gods of Religio   
 As discussed above, Lucretius’ ever-present distinction between the gods of religio 
and his Epicurean gods allows him to take a variety of positions over the course of the poem 
                                                          
134See Cole 2013, 16: “Cicero’s experimental modality makes for a lack of doctrinal 
precision that leaves room for the ongoing adaptation of his ideas.  There is, however, one 
critical constant running through Cicero’s manifold experimentation: he invariably premises 
divinization on moral responsibility and civic accomplishment.  This concept was not 
commonplace at Rome when Cicero arrived on the scene, but it started to become more 
prevalent after he left.” 
 
135This recasting of Epicurus in Roman terms can be seen at work elsewhere in the poem.  As 
Buchheit 1971 has shown, the opening’s flight of the mind depicts Epicurus in part as a 
Roman triumphator (itself a position where human and divine are conflated), while Cox 
1971, 7, sees the Epicurus of book 3’s proem presented as a Roman father. For more on 
Lucretius’ use of “propagandistic strategies” to dispose his Roman audience favorably to 
Epicureanism, see Schrijvers 2007, esp. 54-67. 
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by representing the wise man variously as a pious suppliant, a godlike sage, or a 
gigantomachic iconoclast.  In this section I take a look at another important result of this 
distinction, for by shifting between these perspectives, the poet is able to present not only the 
successful Epicurean as godlike, but the non-Epicurean as well.  Yet, as shall be seen, this 
likeness takes a dramatically different form, for while the Epicurean models himself on the 
example of the true Epicurean gods, the non-Epicurean is shown to be an exemplar for the 
gods of religio.136 
 Throughout the poem, Lucretius forges a connection between the non-Epicurean life, 
regularly conceived as the life of the politician or general, and the worship of the traditional 
gods.  Indeed, this connection is forcefully made in the poem’s first description of religious 
activity, the sacrifice of Iphianassa at Aulis (1.84-101).  The participants in the sacrifice are 
specifically identified by their political status; her slayers are the ductores Danaum delecti 
(86) while the spectating crowd are identified as civis (91).  Agamemnon’s privileging of his 
political status is most clearly shown, as Lucretius juxtaposes his titles of rex and pater to 
stress his impiety (94).  The result of the act is performed likewise for political gain: to obtain 
a propitious departure for the Greek fleet (exitus ut classi felix faustusque daretur, 100). 
 Again at the beginning of book 3 the extremities of political misconduct are tied to an 
addiction to religion.  Here Lucretius speaks of “exiles from their homeland and the sight of 
                                                          
136In certain respects, my argument here is similar to that of Long and Sedley 1987, 146, who 
argue that for Epicurus “a person’s conception of the divine nature is both a measure and a 
cause of his own state of moral health.”  For Long and Sedley, however, this is part of a 
larger argument meant to prove that the Epicurean gods are nothing more than thought-
constructs—a much-debated claim whose most recent arguments for and against can be 
found in Sedley 2011 and Konstan 2011.  While the position is compelling, it is not 
necessary for my argument—given his view of the gods and the “deified” wise man, 
Epicurus clearly sees it as an accepted psychological fact that our thoughts on the gods 
condition our own behavior (as does Lucretius, cf. 6.72-79). 
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men, tainted by a foul charge” who nevertheless embrace religion all the more fervently 
(3.48-54): 
 extorres idem patria longeque fugati 
 conspectu ex hominum, foedati crimine turpi, 
 omnibus aerumnis adfecti denique vivunt, 50 
 et quocumque tamen miseri venere parentant 
 et nigras mactant pecudes et manibu’ divis 
 inferias mittunt multoque in rebus acerbis 
 acrius advertunt animos ad religionem. 
The poet does not specify the nature of the crimen in these lines, but given the state of the 
republic at the time of the poem’s composition and Lucretius’ own remarks on the matter in 
the Venus proem, the reader is surely led to think of political motivations.137  This impulse is 
reinforced by the following passage, where Lucretius explains that greed and desire lead men 
to transcend the bounds of justice in their quest for power (3.59-64).138 
The gods of religio, in turn, are represented as the culmination of such passions—
tyrannical figures who have obtained the power at which their worshippers grasp.139  The 
point is clearly made in the beginning of book 6, where Lucretius explains that ignorance of 
meteorological causes makes humans fearful and leads them to attribute these causes to the 
rule of the gods (6.50-55).  This attribution is presented in political terms; these frightened 
individuals hand over affairs to the imperium and regnum of the gods (ignorantia causarum 
                                                          
137Cf. Fowler 1989, 136: “[Lucretius’ reader] would surely think here of an exiled politician, 
since a political trial is by far the likeliest reason for a Roman to go into exile” (emphasis 
Fowler’s). 
 
138Line 3.62 and the first half of 3.63 (noctes atque dies niti praestante labore / ad summas 
emergere opes) are repeated from the description at 2.12-13 of those erring mortals that the 
sage looks down on from the heights of wisdom. 
 
139See Castner 2003, 161-168, for an analysis of the thematic connection Lucretius develops 
between tyranny and the thunderbolt. 
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conferre deorum / cogit ad imperium res et concedere regnum, 6.54-55).140  The language 
specifically recalls Lucretius’ earlier discussion of the first kings, who strove for excessive 
power and came to ruin—a tale that shows how much better it is to obtain tranquillity than to 
rule (ut satius multo iam sit parere quietum / quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere, 
5.1129-1130).141  Mortals are presented as slaves in comparison, prostrate in the manner of a 
proskynesis (animos humilis, depressos...ad terram, 6.52, 53).142  The metaphor is pressed 
even further in the following lines, as the gods are referred to as “stern masters” (dominos 
acris adsciscunt, 6.63).143 
For the Epicurean poet, this resemblance between the gods of religio and tyrants is 
natural and predicated on the fear of death.  As Lucretius tells us, man’s own desires for 
power and wealth are founded on this fear (3.59-64); poverty seems too close to death itself, 
and for this reason must be avoided (3.65-67): 
 turpis enim ferme contemptus et acris egestas 65 
 semota ab dulci vita stabilique videtur 
 et quasi iam leti portas cunctarier ante... 
Discussing the origins of belief in the gods, Lucretius shows that this connection—between 
power and immortality on the one hand and poverty and death on the other—led to the 
                                                          
140Cf. Godwin 1991 ad loc., who comments on the charged valence of regnum for a 
republican Roman. 
 
141Most editors move lines 5.1131-1132 ahead of line 1127, making the lines quoted 1129-
1130, but these lines may be numbered differently in some editions. 
 
142The language here directly recalls that of religio’s oppression in the proem to book 1 
(humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret / in terris oppressa gravi sub religione, 1.62-63); 
this characterization of religio is by no means new here, only at its most explicit. 
 
143The connection is by no means limited to this passage; see, e.g., DRN 2.1090-1092, where 
an understanding of natural law enables the student to see nature “freed from proud masters” 
(dominis privata superbis, 1091). 
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attribution of power and immortality to the gods.  According to the poet, early humans saw 
visions of the gods, unchanging in form and mighty in strength (5.1169-1174).  Assuming 
that anything so powerful could not be destroyed, humans then attributed eternal life to the 
gods (1175-1178).  From there they attributed supreme blessedness on the basis of their 
immortality (1179-1182). 
 This last assumption on the part of these early humans suggests that there is, in fact, 
little difference between the goals of the Epicurean sage and the unenlightened worshipper.  
Both attempt to reach a life of the greatest happiness, and both see the gods as examples to be 
followed to achieve this goal.  Lucretius points out the hopeful aims of those who strive for 
power when describing early rulers, who wanted to be illustrious and powerful to ensure the 
stability of their fortunes and to carry out a peaceful life (5.1120-1122): 
 at claros homines voluerunt se atque potentes, 1120 
 ut fundamento stabili fortuna maneret 
 et placidam possent opulenti degere vitam. 
In these rulers’ goal of a peaceful life, an attempt to match the peaceful existence of the gods 
can already be detected, much as the line-ending phrase degere vitam recalls the successful 
Epicurean who will lead a life worthy of the gods (dignam dis degere vitam, 3.322).144  The 
described outcome of these rulers’ attempts invites comparison between these different 
figures. In a now familiar trope, Lucretius portrays the rulers as gigantic figures, who aimed 
at the highest position only to be struck down by the thunderbolt and removed to Tartarus 
(5.1123-1126):145 
                                                          
144Cf. Bailey 1963 ad 5.1122: “placida vita is the Epicurean life of ἀταραξία...” 
 
145Fish 2011, 82-87, argues that Lucretius here presents an extreme view of the standard 
Epicurean position that otherwise allowed for the occasional possibility of safety in positions 
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 nequiquam, quoniam ad summum succedere honorem 
 certantes iter infestum fecere viai, 
 et tamen e summo, quasi fulmen, deicit ictos 1125 
 invidia interdum contemptim in Tartara taetra... 
In presenting these men in the same gigantomachic terms as those elsewhere used of 
Epicurus and his school, Lucretius shows that the goal for all these figures—a godlike 
status—is identical.  Yet whereas Epicurus (and thus his—and Lucretius’—students) were 
able to succeed at attaining this goal through their understanding of the true nature of things, 
these tyrants in their ignorance suffered the same failure as the giants.146  
 
Conclusion 
Over the course of the De Rerum Natura, then, Lucretius builds on the tradition of 
student divinization already established by the Greek poets.  This is influenced in part by the 
philosophical framework in which he is writing, but cannot be explained entirely by this 
framework; particularly in passages where he turns to Golden Age imagery, or draws 
comparisons between the wise man and the Homeric or Epicurean gods, Lucretius shows 
himself to be working in a poetic tradition as much as a philosophical one.  Further, while his 
most esteemed exemplar of knowledge-based divinity is his master Epicurus, even this 
portrayal serves to reinforce the potential divinity of the student; above all, Epicurus is a god 
because he has allowed us all to be. 
  
                                                          
of power, but this seems unlikely; for the Epicurean, a position that is only occasionally safe 
would still be a position full of mental turmoil, and so should be rejected for that reason. 
 
146In this respect, these tyrants are similar to the pre-Socratics of book 1, who suffer a similar 
gigantomachic failure. 
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Chapter 3: Vergil’s Georgics 
 
From the lofty philosophy of Epicurean physics, we move to the earthy rusticity of 
Vergil’s Georgics.  Despite the heavy debt it owes to the De Rerum Natura, Vergil’s poem is 
in many respects a corrective to the earlier work.  Whereas Lucretius had sought to dispel the 
fears of mankind by banishing the gods and commending a withdrawal from worldly 
concerns, Vergil reverses these efforts, producing a text that is deeply rooted in religious and 
political ideology.  Ironically, as shall be seen, this provides a point of contact for the two 
poets.  For Vergil, as for Lucretius, there is a close connection between the political life and 
the “life of the gods” of traditional religion.  Yet whereas Lucretius sees in this connection an 
indication of the ultimate undesirability of both lifestyles, Vergil reasserts the primacy of the 
political life, even while moving it outside the reach of his student. 
This two-pronged strategy utilized by Vergil, which asserts a divinizing strategy 
while denying its applicability to the majority of his readers, points to a larger discrepancy 
between the poet and his Epicurean predecessor, centered not on differences of ideology but 
in how ideology is even portrayed.  For modern readers, Lucretius is an idealized version of 
the didactic poet, who fashions his text for the singular purpose of communicating a body of 
knowledge to his student; that is, Lucretius really “means” it when he articulates the elements
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of Epicurean physics.147  In large part, this is a view encouraged by the text itself; Lucretius 
rarely allows dissenting viewpoints inside his poem, and those that occur are invariably 
refuted.  In this respect, the De Rerum Natura is a relatively straightforward text, and a 
reader questioned as to the poem’s meaning would have little trouble answering with a quick 
synopsis of Epicurean thought. 
Such is not the case with the Georgics.  Indeed, the polyvalence of the text has 
become a commonplace of scholarship on the poem.  Opinions as to even the most basic 
outlook of the work, traditionally evaluated in terms of relative “optimism” and “pessimism,” 
have run the gamut between these two poles, leading scholars to call the very terms of the 
debate into question and to examine instead the ways in which the poem itself encourages 
this multiplicity of readings.148  This in turn has led to salubrious discussion of the “dialogic” 
nature of the text, and the ways in which divergent or even conflicting viewpoints are 
                                                          
147See, e.g., Effe 1977, 77-78, who makes Lucretius the exemplar of his “sachbezogen” form 
of didactic, in which the surface message and the true meaning of the work are one: 
“Angesichts der strikten, funktionalen Ausrichtung der poetischen Mittel auf den zu 
lehrenden Gegenstand und der Identität von dargestelltem Stoff und Thema erweist sich das 
Lehrgedicht des Lukrez als Repräsentant des ‘sachbezogenen’ Typs.  Indem Stoff und Thema 
als Objekt tatsächlicher und direkter Didaktik zusammenfallen, wird der kompliziert 
strukturierte, vielschichtige Komplex der hellenistischen Lehrdichtung eines Arat und 
Nikander durch eine von stärkstem persönlichen Engagement getragene, direkt appellierende, 
einschichtige Form abgelöst, die unmittelbar auf die Anfänge didaktischer Dichtung 
zurückzugreifen scheint.”  Cf. Martindale 2005, 185: “One can readily imagine the 
indignation of Lucretius if he had been told that his arguments for the mortality of the soul 
were simply ‘pseudo-statements’. It seems obvious that he writes to persuade his reader to 
embrace his version of philosophical truth.” 
 
148See, e.g., Ross 1987, 8, who, while taking a largely pessimistic view of the poem, 
compares Vergilian poetry to music, which “is expressive, but...can make no statements.” For 
a brief bibliography of recent approaches to the issue, see Kronenberg 2009, 13 n.54, who 
likewise argues for “the dialogic and polyphonic nature of Virgil’s text” (14). Nelis 2013 
sees this oscillation as a result of the historical “periodization” of the work, encouraging a 
transition between pre- and post-Actium perspectives.  
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sustained over the course of the work.149  Unlike the De Rerum Natura, there is no 
“authorized” way to make final sense of the Georgics as a whole; as Perkell argues, “the 
ambiguities that readers have always recognized are not problems to be solved, but rather 
may be perceived as the poem’s deepest meaning.”150 
As such, it must be emphasized that any reading of the poem, including the one 
offered here, deals necessarily with contingencies, and will be most productive when 
examining the potential questions raised and answers afforded by various readings of the 
texts.  Here too I am led by the poem itself, which encourages the possibility for divergent 
readings through its multiplicity of addressees.  While Vergil first addresses his poetic 
subject matter to Maecenas (1.2), as he will do at the opening of each subsequent book (2.41, 
3.41, 4.2), the poet’s patron seems unlikely to be the primary student of the poet’s 
instruction, as Memmius is portrayed to be in the De Rerum Natura.  Even leaving to one 
side historical considerations as to the likeliness of Maecenas’ involvement in agricultural 
affairs, Vergil seems to emphasize his patron’s uninvolvement with the technical matters of 
his instruction by relegating mention of Maecenas to the less technical proems of his work.151  
Nor can the Caesar invoked in the proem be the poet’s primary pupil, despite the important 
arguments made for Octavian’s status as an indirect student of the poem, meant to receive 
                                                          
149As Batstone 1997, 133-134 notes, this polyphony can be found in one of Vergil’s key 
source texts for the Georgics, Varro’s dialogic Res Rusticae.  Van Noorden 2015, 51-65, sees 
this multiplicity of voices present already in Hesiod. 
 
150Perkell 1989, 17. 
 
151Cf. Schiesaro 1993, 134: “L’invocazione agli dei e poi a Cesare separa in modo netto la 
citazione iniziale di Mecenate dall’inizio della narrazione vera e propria.  A differenza del De 
rerum natura, dove il tu del verso 50 si riferisce naturalmente a Memmio, nominato anche 
poco prima (al v. 42), le Georgiche danno avvio alla trattazione del primo argomento senza 
più traccia di un destinatario privilegiato.” 
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advice on the nature of rule;152 called on to aid Vergil in his endeavor and take pity on those 
farmers “ignorant of the way” (1.40-42), Octavian would seem to have no need of further 
agricultural instruction.  The ostensible students of the poem would seem then to be these 
farmers themselves, although they are never addressed as such over the course of the poem.  
Vergil’s reader is thus left with an array of potential addressees, an abundance of possible 
viewpoints—and a corresponding lack of definitive answers.153 
In what follows, I focus my examination on the effects of Vergil’s didaxis on this last 
group in particular, while still keeping an eye open to the potential responses of other 
addressees.  As such, I first examine the opening invocation and assumed deification of 
Octavian, attempting to uncover what the princeps’ divine status means both for him and for 
the agricultural student.  From here, I turn to a more direct investigation of this student, 
looking at the potential rewards for knowledge as they are depicted in both the makarismos 
and rustic “Golden Age” that conclude book 2 and the devastation of the plague that ends 
book 3, and focusing particularly on the ways in which Vergil uses conflicting intertextual 
references to complicate this depiction.  I conclude, as does the poem, with the fourth book’s 
tale of Aristaeus and Orpheus, wherein Vergil provides a potential exemplar for the 
successful student and suggests a correspondence between instruction and initiation. 
 
 
                                                          
152On the political education of Octavian in the Georgics, see Hardie 2004 and esp. Nappa 
2005. 
 
153Cf. Schiesaro 1993, 135: “In realtà i destinatari delle Georgiche sono tutti questi—Cesare 
Mecenate gli agricolae—e non solo questi.  Il testo si rivolge a un pubblico più vasto e meno 
definito, e la moltiplicazione interna dei riferimenti segnala la polivalenza intrinseca del 
messaggio georgico, ne garantisce un valore che trascende la specializzazione tecnica.” 
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The Invocation to Octavian   
While a certain correspondence with the praise poetry of the Hellenistic period can be 
detected in the opening invocation to Augustus, my discussion here will largely avoid this 
aspect.154  Instead, I focus on those parts of the proem that diverge from this background, 
seeking to uncover the features of Augustus’ divinization that are unique to Vergil’s 
treatment here and his self-positioning within the didactic genre.  A useful entry point for this 
purpose will be Vergil’s dialogue in the Georgics with Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura.  
Lucretius’ influence on the Georgics is well-established; though recent scholarship has 
located the strongest Lucretian influence in books 2 and 3,155 reference to the earlier poet can 
be detected in the opening invocation of the Georgics.156  This reference is most strongly felt 
through aspects of Vergil’s diction that recall Lucretius’ own opening invocation to Venus: 
in particular, the participial use of the verb labi with a form of caelum in relation to celestial 
movements (lumina, labentem caelo quae ducitis annum, Geo. 1.6; caeli subter labentia 
signa, DRN 1.2) and Vergil’s reuse of the adjective alma to refer to an invoked goddess 
(Liber et alma Ceres, Geo. 1.7; alma Venus, DRN 1.2).157  These allusions serve to introduce, 
and are reinforced by, another allusion made in Vergil’s choice of the first two gods he 
names, Liber and Ceres, who are called upon specifically for their gifts to humanity, wine 
                                                          
154For Vergil’s use of Hellenistic praise poetry in the invocation and elsewhere in the 
Georgics, see esp. Cadili 2002, 17-91. 
 
155See Farrell 1991, 188: “Despite an important Lucretian presence in Book 1, even a cursory 
glance shows clearly that the most obvious and extensive allusions to De Rerum Natura 
occur in Georgics 2 and 3.” 
 
156For a thoughtful and extended comparison of the proems of Vergil and Lucretius, see Gale 
2000, 24-31. 
 
157Cf. Nethercut 1973, 41. 
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and grain (Geo. 1.7-9).  The same pair are discussed at the opening of Lucretius’ fifth book, 
as the poet argues for Epicurus’ divinity by demonstrating that his beneficence to humanity is 
greater than that of these gods, who provided for physical needs instead of spiritual needs 
(DRN 5.13-21).   
As discussed in the previous chapter, much of Lucretius’ argument in that passage is 
founded on Euhemeristic claims, and Vergil’s allusion here may put us on the lookout for a 
similar argument in his proem.  In a sense, this is exactly what we get, as the gods invoked 
are mentioned almost uniformly in conjunction with the discoveries by which they have 
benefitted humanity.158  Indeed, Triptolemus is identified solely by his discovery of the 
curved plow (Geo. 1.19), while Aristaeus, described obliquely as a cultor nemorum, is said in 
some accounts to have been worshipped precisely because of his discoveries concerning bees 
(cf. Serv. Auct. ad loc.).  Even the more “established” gods such as Minerva and Neptune are 
here presented predominantly as protoi heuretai—Minerva as the inventrix oleae (1.18-19), 
Neptune for his creation of the horse (1.12-14)—suggesting that they too are worshipped 
primarily for their benefits to humanity.159  This approach to the gods of the invocation has 
strong implications for the deification of Augustus that forms the second half of the 
invocation, for it suggests that he too will be made a god primarily for his good works.  This 
is already indicated in Vergil’s enumeration of the possible roles Augustus may fulfil as a 
guarantor of crops (1.25-28) or protector of sailors (1.29-31), but the Euhemeristic element is 
perhaps most pronounced in the invocation’s final request of Augustus to grant an easy 
                                                          
158Though Wissowa 1917, 94, notes that this breaks down somewhat, particularly in the cases 
of Pan, Silvanus, the Fauns and Dryads, and (oddly) Aristaeus. 
 
159Cf. Frentz 1967, 6; Nappa 2005, 27.   
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course and take pity on those farmers “ignorant of the way” (da facilem cursum atque 
audacibus adnue coeptis, / ignarosque viae mecum miseratus agrestis..., 1.40-41).  In effect, 
Augustus is asked to perform the very feat that granted godhood to figures like Aristaeus and 
Triptolemus; it is in his fulfillment of his benefaction that he can become a god according to 
the parameters established by the proem.160 
It is this nebulous state that is negotiated throughout the poem.161  It may help to 
explain the futurity of Vergil’s statements in the beginning of book 3, where the poet claims 
that he will erect a temple for Augustus (in medio mihi Caesar erit templumque tenebit, 
3.16).  It can also explain the use of the iterative verb adfectat for Augustus’ move towards 
Olympus at the end of the poem; though in some ways Augustus has already assumed the 
role of a god, casting thunderbolts at the Euphrates and giving laws to subjected peoples 
(Caesar dum magnus ad altum / fulminat Euphraten bello victorque volentis / per populos 
dat iura viamque adfectat Olympo, 4.560-562), the final phrase viamque adfectat Olympo 
suggests the process of his deification is not yet complete—there is still some way to go 
before the princeps achieves Olympus. 
 This discussion of the end of book 4 can be taken further.  Here the near-divine 
Augustus is contrasted with the poet Vergil, who concludes the poem by referring to his 
leisurely singing and quoting the first line of his earlier Eclogues (4.563-566):162 
                                                          
160In this, one could even see a suggested double meaning to the futurity of Augustus’ 
deification.  More than just a statement of the princeps’ current mortal status, it may also 
indicate that Octavian has not yet accomplished the works that will grant him godhood. 
 
161Cf. Nelis 2013, 246, who argues that “[t]he poem as a whole is underpinned by this 
narrative of apotheosis...”  
 
162For the connection between Georgics and Eclogues established by this self-reference, see 
esp. Cadili 2002, 26-34. 
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 illo Vergilium me tempore dulcis alebat 
 Parthenope studiis florentem ignobilis oti, 
 carmina qui lusi pastorum audaxque iuventa, 565 
 Tityre, te patulae cecini sub tegmine fagi. 
In so doing, Vergil recalls the context of the first Eclogue and Tityrus’ own leisurely singing, 
granted by the beneficence of an unnamed iuvenis whom Tityrus will henceforth worship like 
a god (O Meliboee, deus nobis haec otia fecit. / namque erit ille mihi semper deus..., Ecl. 1.6-
7).163  It was already a common reading strategy in antiquity to see the characters of Vergil 
and Octavian latent in the first Eclogue, but even if one does not want to read such 
straightforward identifications into the poem, Vergil himself, through the reference made in 
the Georgics’ sphragis, presents at least an equivalence between the relationship of Tityrus 
and the iuvenis on the one hand and himself and Octavian on the other.164  Again, then, 
Octavian is portrayed as a god on account of his benefactions—more specifically, the actions 
that allow others a life of peace and leisure.165  In this, then, Vergil constructs a ring structure 
referring back to the opening of the poem, and the similar criteria for Octavian’s deification 
there. 
                                                          
163The Eclogues passage in turn contains reference to Lucretius’ deification of Epicurus 
(dicendum est, deus ille fuit, deus, inclute Memmi, DRN 5.8), further supporting the 
connection between Lucretius’ Epicurus and Vergil’s Octavian. Vergil would again refer to 
the Lucretian line in the fifth Eclogue while describing the apotheosis of the shepherd 
Daphnis (ipsa sonant arbusta: ‘deus, deus ille, Menalca,’ Ecl. 5.64). 
 
164This equivalence is strengthened by Vergil’s reference to Octavian as iuvenis at the close 
of the first Georgic (hunc saltem everso iuvenem succurrere saeclo / ne prohibete, Geo. 
1.500-501). 
 
165Though the portrayal of Octavian and Vergil at the close of the fourth book may be further 
complicated by its positioning immediately after the epyllion of Aristaeus and Orpheus, 
discussed in more detail below. In particular, one may wonder what it means that Octavian’s 
victories allow for Vergil’s Neapolitan idleness at the poem’s close, while Aristaeus’ actions 
lead to Orpheus’ downfall, or that the poet Orpheus can, in his own way, limit or qualify 
Aristaeus’ success. 
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 Returning to Vergil’s reuse of Lucretius in the proem of the Georgics, we may note 
that this focus on benefaction as the chief criterion for deification encourages an implicit 
comparison between Octavian and the Lucretian Epicurus.  At the same time, Octavian’s role 
as subject of the Georgics’ opening invocation, as well as his role in providing the leisurely 
atmosphere required for Vergil’s composition, instead portray the princeps as a figure 
equivalent to Lucretius’ Venus, asked to provide the peace necessary for Lucretius’ poetry 
and Memmius’ instruction.  Vergil thus unites the two guiding forces of the De Rerum 
Natura into the singular person of Octavian, presenting him as the ultimate source of 
inspiration for the work as a whole.  Unlike Venus and Epicurus, however, Octavian has little 
connection to the content of the poem or its implied students, other than the pity he is asked 
to show to the farmers (1.41).  That is, Octavian is not responsible for revealing the content 
of the poem, as Epicurus is, nor does he serve as an exemplar for the student to imitate, as do 
both Epicurus and Venus.  Whereas the figures of Lucretius’ poem provide a means by which 
the student may achieve a divine state, Vergil here offers no corresponding lesson; in the 
deification of Octavian, the reader is shown a path applicable to the princeps alone. 
 
The Agricultural Life and the Golden Age 
 While such instruction on the path to divinity may be useful for Octavian as he 
embarks on his post-Actium pursuits, this emphasis on deification through benefaction will 
be much less pertinent to those farmers that are the ostensible recipients of Vergil’s 
agricultural instruction.  To these students, Vergil offers a different paradigm—the “life like 
the gods” of the Golden Age, presented in the laus ruris (2.458-540) that concludes book 2.  
Reference to the Myth of the Ages has already occurred in the Georgics, in the so-called 
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“Aetiology of Labor” at 1.118-159.  There Vergil had traced humanity’s change in condition, 
from a communistic Golden Age in which farming did not yet exist (1.125) and the earth 
provided in abundance (1.127), to the present Iron Age of Jupiter’s reign, in which humanity 
must toil for its existence and contend with scarcity (1.145-146).  The aetiology effectively 
sets the stage for the remainder of the Georgics, providing an explanation for the necessity of 
Vergil’s agricultural knowledge in much the same way as the Myth of the Ages does for 
Hesiod’s instruction.  As a result, the laus ruris of book 2 provides something of a shock, as 
Vergil depicts a modern agricultural existence composed from a mosaic of Golden Age 
tropes.  Here strife is absent (procul discordibus armis, 2.459) while the earth pours out its 
bounty with ease (fundit humo facilem victum iustissima tellus, 460; cf. ipsa volentia rura / 
sponte tulere sua, 500-501).  There is no need for gold or bronze (nec varios inhiant pulchra 
testudine postis / inlusasque auro vestis Ephyreiaque aera, 463-464) nor is wool stained with 
dye (alba neque Assyrio fucatur lana veneno, 465).166  The presence of wild animals and the 
hardiness of the youth (illic saltus ac lustra ferarum / et patiens operum exiguoque adsueta 
iuventus, 471-472), while seemingly incongruous with the traditional depictions of the “soft” 
Golden Age discussed elsewhere, do recall the “hard” Golden Age depicted by poets such as 
Lucretius (DRN 5.925-987).167  At the end of the passage, Vergil makes the comparison 
explicit, informing the reader that “this was the life golden Saturn lived on earth” (aureus  
                                                          
166Compare the wool of the renewed Golden Age in Eclogue 4.42 (nec varios discet mentiri 
lana colores), where dye is absent, however, due partly to the self-dying nature of the sheep 
(43-45)(!). 
 
167Ovid would later rephrase 2.472 in his description of the hardy humans created by 
Deucalion: inde genus durum sumus experiensque laborum, Met. 1.414). 
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hanc vitam in terris Saturnus agebat, 2.538).168  Despite the historicizing nature of these 
references, however, Vergil quickly reiterates that this is in fact a contemporaneous life, 
taking place in the Iron Age; adapting a feature from Aratus’ Myth of the Ages (Ph. 100-136) 
discussed in chapter 1, Vergil informs us that Justice has departed from here as from 
everywhere else (extrema per illos / Iustitia excedens terris vestigia fecit, Geo. 2.473-474), 
though her lingering presence in the country prior to her departure suggests the way in which 
the farmer’s life straddles the distance between golden and iron worlds.   
This intermediary nature of contemporary country life is crucial to Vergil’s depiction 
here, and may be fruitfully compared with the strategies taken by our Greek models in 
presenting a possible “life like the gods” to their students.  Drawing on a theme common 
among Roman agricultural writers, Vergil in this passage emphasizes the Golden Age 
conditions of the country through contrast with the decadence and decay of city life.169  In 
this contrast of two contemporary states, I would argue one may be reminded also of the 
contrast between Just and Unjust Cities in Hesiod’s Works and Days, where the moral virtue 
of the preferred state is again set against the disastrous excesses of its counterpart.  Indeed, 
Vergil uses many of the same tropes as Hesiod.  Both poets emphasize the abundance 
afforded to their preferred state; in the Just City the land provides abundant livelihood (τοῖσι 
φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν βίον, WD 232) as does the farmer’s countryside in the Georgics (Geo. 
                                                          
168The transferred epithet plays on Saturn’s rule during the Golden Age. 
 
169Nearest to Vergil’s own time, Varro makes the comparison in the opening of the third 
book of his Res Rusticae, a passage which certainly influenced Vergil’s own work.  For 
Varro’s direct comparison of the rural life to the Golden Age, see, e.g., RR 3.1.5: nec sine 
causa terram eandem appellabant matrem et Cererem, et qui eam colerent, piam et utilem 
agere vitam credebant atque eos solos reliquos esse ex stirpe Saturni regis.  For this contrast 
in the related genre of satire, see Braund 1989. 
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2.460; 500-501; 516-522).  In both poems, particular stress is placed on the divergent social 
conditions of the two societies compared.  Thus, just as the citizens of the Just City live in 
peace, spared from war by Zeus (WD 228-229), so too is the farmer exempt from political 
and martial strife (Geo. 2.495-498; cf. 459), while the Unjust City and Vergil’s city are 
wracked by violence and war (WD 245-246; Geo. 2.495-498; 503-504; 510-511).  The 
domestic conditions of the Just City and country life are no less secure, as the chastity of the 
household is assured (τίκτουσιν δὲ γυναῖκες ἐοικότα τέκνα γονεῦσιν, WD 235; casta 
pudicitiam servat domus, Geo. 2.524).  In an earlier chapter, I have discussed the rhetorical 
role played by Hesiod’s depiction of the Just City in his instruction.  Vergil’s idyllic 
representation of the countryside performs much the same purpose.  Following in the 
tradition of Hesiod and Aratus by presenting the subject of his instruction as the basis for a 
quasi-Golden Age existence, the poet implies that his didaxis will grant his students a life 
like the gods. 
This implication is strengthened by further intertextual associations in Vergil’s 
comparison of the farmer’s life to that of the philosopher in the famed makarismos of 2.490-
494:170 
 felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas 490 
 atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum 
 subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari: 
 fortunatus et ille deos qui novit agrestis 
 Panaque Silvanumque senem Nymphasque sorores. 
                                                          
170Cf. Fenik 1962, 75-77, who sees in the laus ruris intertextual engagement with the proem 
of DRN book 2, where Lucretius contrasts the philosophical life with that of the “man of 
action” (and, as discussed in the previous chapter, implies that the philosophical life is akin 
to that of the gods). 
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Here and in the passage leading up to it (2.475-489), Vergil seems to contrast two distinct 
forms of poetry—the philosophical didactic of poets such as Lucretius and Empedocles, and 
his own agricultural, even bucolic, didactic.171  Certainly the subject matter of the two forms 
is contrasted, as is the outlook of their respective students; while the felix of 2.490-492 is 
described in terms chosen to recall Lucretius’ Epicurus, who trampled religio underfoot 
(religio pedibus subiecta, DRN 1.78; cf. subiecit pedibus, Geo. 2.492), the fortunatus is 
identified by his knowledge of the traditional gods.  Even the poet’s esteem for the two (sub-) 
genres is shown to differ.  Utilizing a form of recusatio, Vergil first expresses his desire to 
sing of natural philosophy (2.475-482) and takes the rural life as his subject only when the 
“cold blood about his heart” (484) prevents him from loftier song (2.483-489).  Yet even 
with these contrasts concerning the type of knowledge offered by Vergil and his 
philosophical predecessors, I would argue the makarismos ultimately stresses the similarity 
in the results of this knowledge.172  Vergil immediately follows the makarismos with an 
extended description of the ills from which the fortunatus is free (2.495-512):173 
 illum non populi fasces, non purpura regum 495 
 flexit et infidos agitans discordia fratres, 
 aut coniurato descendens Dacus ab Histro, 
 non res Romanae perituraque regna; neque ille 
 aut doluit miserans inopem aut invidit habenti. 
                                                          
171Pace Mynors 1990 ad 2.494, who sees in the fortunatus a reference to bucolic as opposed 
to didactic poetry.  Clay 1976, 238-240, however, sees the makarismos as a distinction not 
between types of poetry at all, but between philosophy and poetry. 
 
172On the conflation of felix and fortunatus, cf. Schiesaro 1997, 85; Morgan 1999, 147-148; 
Nappa 2005, 106; Kronenberg 2009, 139-142.  Contra Gale 2000, 8-11, who sees the conflict 
between these two figures as “a dilemma which lies at the heart of the poem in both a literal 
and a figurative sense” (11). 
 
173I identify the fortunatus here with the farmer, as does, e.g., Volk 2002, 142-144, but this is 
not always how the passage is read; see Clay 1976, 241, who does, however, see a similarity 
between the life of the fortunatus and the felix. 
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 quos rami fructus, quos ipsa volentia rura 500 
 sponte tulere sua, carpsit, nec ferrea iura 
 insanumque forum aut populi tabularia vidit. 
 sollicitant alii remis freta caeca, ruuntque 
 in ferrum, penetrant aulas et limina regum; 
 hic petit excidiis urbem miserosque penatis, 505 
 ut gemma bibat et Sarrano dormiat ostro; 
 condit opes alius defossoque incubat auro; 
 hic stupet attonitus rostris, hunc plausus hiantem 
 per cuneos geminatus enim plebisque patrumque 
 corripuit; gaudent perfusi sanguine fratrum, 510 
 exsilioque domos et dulcia limina mutant 
 atque alio patriam quaerunt sub sole iacentem. 
  
The life avoided by Vergil’s fortunatus is portrayed in a manner reminiscent of the opening 
of DRN book 3 (3.31-93), wherein Lucretius describes the lengths to which the fear of death 
drives men.174  Vergil’s non-fortunatus is defined by two primary characteristics, his desire 
for political involvement (Geo. 2.495-499; 508-510) and his greed (2.503-507); these same 
characteristics are, for Lucretius, the result of the fear of death (denique avarities et honorum 
caeca cupido...non minimam partem mortis formidine aluntur, DRN 3.59, 64).  For both 
poets, these passions ultimately lead to treason (hic petit excidiis urbem miserosque penatis, 
Geo. 2.505; nam iam saepe homines patriam carosque parentis / prodiderunt, DRN 3.85-86), 
exile (exsilioque domos et dulcia limina mutant / atque alio patriam quaerunt sub sole 
iacentem, Geo. 2.511-512; extorres idem patria longeque fugati / conspectu ex hominum, 
foedati crimine turpi, DRN 3.49-50), and fratricide (gaudent perfusi sanguine fratrum, Geo. 
2.510; crudeles gaudent in tristi funere fratris, DRN 3.72). 
 As Lucretius’ depiction here is based on a characterization of the fear of death, one 
might expect that Vergil would use this passage in a discussion of his Lucretian felix, whose 
                                                          
174Cf. Fenik 1962, 77. 
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victory over the fear of death does indeed hint at the Lucretian discussion (compare metus 
omnis...strepitumque Acherontis, Geo. 2.491-492 and metus ille...Acheruntis, DRN 3.37).  By 
recalling the passage instead in his extended portrayal of the fortunatus, Vergil effectively 
unites the two figures of his makarismos, portraying both the religion-spurning felix and the 
pious fortunatus as attaining the accomplishments of the Lucretian student and his 
philosophical version of the “life like the gods.” 
 This conflation is continued in Vergil’s depiction of the rural life of the fortunatus 
farmer (Geo. 2.513-531): 
 agricola incurvo terram dimovit aratro: 
 hic anni labor, hinc patriam parvosque nepotes 
 sustinet, hinc armenta boum meritosque iuvencos. 515 
 nec requies, quin aut pomis exuberet annus 
 aut fetu pecorum aut Cerealis mergite culmi, 
 proventuque oneret sulcos atque horrea vincat. 
 venit hiems: teritur Sicyonia baca trapetis, 
 glande sues laeti redeunt, dant arbuta silvae; 520 
 et varios ponit fetus autumnus, et alte 
 mitis in apricis coquitur vindemia saxis. 
 interea dulces pendent circum oscula nati, 
 casta pudicitiam servat domus, ubera vaccae 
 lactea demittunt, pinguesque in gramine laeto 525 
 inter se adversis luctantur cornibus haedi. 
 ipse dies agitat festos fususque per herbam, 
 ignis ubi in medio et socii cratera coronant, 
 te libans, Lenaee, vocat pecorisque magistris 
 velocis iaculi certamina ponit in ulmo, 530 
 corporaque agresti nudant praedura palaestra... 
I have already cited portions of these lines, with their focus on agricultural abundance and 
domestic harmony, in discussing Vergil’s allusions to the imagery of the Golden Age and 
Hesiod’s Just City.  These lines contain further references to the Epicurean good life as 
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portrayed by Lucretius.175  A Lucretian context will have already been suggested to the 
reader by the depiction of the felix and the negative portrayal of city life.  This context is 
reinforced by the opening anaphora of hic and hinc in lines 514-515, which recalls a similar 
anaphora in the spring-like hieros gamos of DRN 1.250-261, itself a Lucretian rewriting of 
the Golden Age motif:176 
 Postremo pereunt imbres, ubi eos pater aether 250 
 in gremium matris terrai praecipitavit; 
 at nitidae surgunt fruges ramique virescunt 
 arboribus, crescunt ipsae fetuque gravantur; 
 hinc alitur porro nostrum genus atque ferarum; 
 hinc laetas urbes pueris florere videmus 255 
 frondiferasque novis avibus canere undique silvas; 
 hinc fessae pecudes pingui per pabula laeta 
 corpora deponunt, et candens lacteus umor 
 uberibus manat distentis; hinc nova proles 
 artubus infirmis teneras lasciva per herbas 260 
 ludit lacte mero mentes perculsa novellas. 
As in our Vergilian passage, there is a focus here on agricultural and familial abundance 
(hinc laetas urbes pueris...hinc fessae pecudes, DRN 1.255-257; hinc patriam parvosque 
nepotes / sustinet, hinc armenta boum meritosque iuvencos, Geo. 2.514-515), while fertility 
is further pronounced in the repeated imagery of mothers’ milk (DRN 1.258-261; Geo. 2.524-
525). 
 The Lucretian referent is altered somewhat with Vergil’s depiction of goats 
competing with one another in gramine laeto (2.525).  Here Vergil’s use of the adjective 
laetus recalls the term’s repeated use in Lucretius’ pabula laeta and the idyllic associations 
                                                          
175For more connections between the laus ruris here and portions of Lucretius’ DRN, 
including bk. 2, see Thomas 2007, 97-98. 
 
176On the use of “allusive anaphora” in Latin poetry, see Wills 1996, 354-362. 
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of life under Venus, while the full phrase in gramine laeto echoes the in gramine molli (DRN 
5.1392; 2.29) used by Lucretius in his depiction of the quasi-Golden Age “picnics” enjoyed 
by early humanity and his Epicurean students (DRN 5.1390-1404; 2.29-33).  This echo is 
followed by Vergil’s own depiction of such gatherings, where his farmers spread out on the 
grass and engage in festival competitions (Geo. 2.527-531).  Assimilating his farmer to the 
picnickers of Lucretius, Vergil further likens his didaxis to Lucretius’, and presents the 
farming life as Lucretius’ “life like the gods.” 
 This presentation of the rustic life as a Golden Age or god-like is not simple or 
univocal, however.  Much has been made of Vergil’s “lies” in sections such as the laus ruris, 
wherein the poet’s excessively positive portrayal is at odds with his presentation elsewhere in 
the poem.177  This sort of intratextual contradiction has been well-covered, and I limit my 
discussion of the trend here.  Instead, I prefer to look at some examples of “intertextual 
contradiction,” where the poet’s relationship with other texts serves to undercut the 
ostensible purpose of his text.  This may be detected, for example, in Vergil’s description of 
the farmer’s domestic life at Geo. 2.523: interea dulces pendent circum oscula nati. The line 
is based on a line of Lucretius’ (...nec dulces occurrent oscula nati, DRN 3.895), and it would 
at first seem tempting to see this Vergilian borrowing as another instance of comparison 
between his and Lucretius’ students.  The context of the Lucretian original would indicate 
otherwise, however, as the line occurs in a passage (DRN 3.894-899) representing not the 
state of the Epicurean student, but the worries of a non-Epicurean frightened of death and 
foreseeing the loss of his family.  Lucretius’ response to this claim, of course, is that the dead 
have no desire for such things (nec tibi earum / iam desiderium rerum super insidet una, 
                                                          
177See esp. Ross 1987, 109-128 and Thomas 1988 ad 2.458-540. 
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DRN 3.900-901).  Thus in the same extended passage, Vergil establishes comparison 
between his fortunatus and both the Lucretian felix that has overcome the fear of death and a 
Lucretian exemplar of that same fear, undercutting his presentation of the successful georgic 
student. 
 This dissonance between Vergil’s portrayal and its Lucretian comparanda may be 
detected further in the contrast between the countryside gathering of the Georgics and its 
model.  Indeed, Vergil immediately indicates the non-Lucretian nature of his gathering by 
situating it in the context of a Bacchic festival (Geo. 2.527-529).  Thus, while Lucretius’ 
shepherds crown themselves with floral garlands (tum caput atque umeros plexis redimire 
coronis, DRN. 5.1399), Vergil’s farmers crown their wine vessels (socii cratera coronant, 
Geo. 2.528), which may lead a mindful reader to recall the wine-filled gatherings described 
immediately prior to the laus ruris (Geo. 2.455-457):178 
 Bacchus et ad culpam causas dedit; ille furentis 
 Centauros leto domuit, Rhoecumque Pholumque 
 et magno Hylaeum Lapithis cratere minantem. 
The potential for violence indicated by the Bacchic context is in turn reinforced by the 
competitive activities in which the farmers engage.  Lucretius’ focus in the proto-Epicurean 
“picnic” of DRN 5.1390-1404 is on the role of music in the life of early man and its pacifying 
effects; as such, the harmonious social interaction of the community is emphasized (tum ioca, 
tum sermo, tum dulces esse cachinni / consuerant; agrestis enim tum musa vigebat, DRN 
5.1397-1398).  In contrast, Vergil’s farmers involve themselves solely in antagonistic 
sporting activities (velocis iaculi certamina ponit in ulmo, / corporaque agresti nudant 
                                                          
178Smith 2007, 74, claims that Vergil “restores the wine bowl’s reputation by the fact that it is 
here used appropriately,” but this seems an especially optimistic reading, especially given the 
other hints of strife in the passage.  
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praedura palaestra, Geo. 2.529-530).179  Again, the poet shows potential contradictions 
between the farmer-student and the tranquil Epicurean student (or even his own earlier 
portrayal of the peaceful farmer!).180 
This potential for discord is fully realized in the subsequent comparison of this life to 
that of the early Romans (2.532-540):181 
 hanc olim veteres vitam coluere Sabini, 
 hanc Remus et frater; sic fortis Etruria crevit 
 scilicet et rerum facta est pulcherrima Roma, 
 septemque una sibi muro circumdedit arces. 535 
 ante etiam sceptrum Dictaei regis et ante 
 impia quam caesis gens est epulata iuvencis, 
 aureus hanc vitam in terris Saturnus agebat; 
 necdum etiam audierant inflari classica, necdum 
 impositos duris crepitare incudibus ensis. 540 
Critics have long noted the suppressed allusion to Romulus’ act of founding fratricide (and 
the civil wars it foreboded) in Vergil’s reference to Remus et frater here.182  One could also 
                                                          
179Even their animals aggressively contest with one another: pingues in gramine laeto / inter 
se adversis luctantur cornibus haedi, Geo. 2.525-526.  One could, of course, read this as the 
“good Strife” of Hesiod, which drives individuals to competition, but there would then still 
be contradictions between the Vergilian farmer, who elsewhere does not envy his successful 
neighbor (neque...invidit habenti, 2.498-499) and the Hesiodic individual who heeds good 
Strife (cf. ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων / εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ’· ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν, 
Hes. WD 23-24). 
 
180We may also note a case of atemporal intertextuality here.  Vergil would later reuse the 
phrase fususque per herbam, here used of the festive farmer, at Aeneid 9.164, fusique per 
herbam, where the phrase is again used of rustics drinking wine in a field, but in an explicitly 
belligerent context—the Rutulian siege of the Trojan camp. 
 
181In the development here from athletic competition to civil war, one could see a suggestion 
of the two Strifes of Hesiod’s Works and Days.  Yet whereas in that poem the two are 
completely distinct, Vergil here elides the two. 
 
182See, e.g., Ross 1987, 127: “Remus and his unnamed brother must suggest the ultimate 
fratricide attending Rome’s foundation: there was no escaping the association when, as 
Suetonius reports, the honorific Romulus was suggested in 27 B.C. for Octavian (Augustus 
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see a reference to the foreign wars on which Rome was founded in the juxtaposition of 
Roman growth (rerum facta est pulcherrima Roma, 2.534) with the peoples she conquered 
and assimilated (Sabini, 532; fortis Etruria, 533); the reference is reinforced by mention of 
Rome’s defensive fortifications (septemque una sibi muro circumdedit arces, 535).  As with 
the discrepancies between the portrayal of the Vergilian student and Lucretius’ philosophical 
student, these reminders of Rome’s violent history serve to problematize the success of 
Vergil’s student.  Previously, the reader had been told that the fortunatus farmer’s life was 
free from such strife (2.495-498): 
 illum non populi fasces, non purpura regum 
 flexit et infidos agitans discordia fratres, 
 aut coniurato descendens Dacus ab Histro, 
 non res Romanae perituraque regna...   
If it is now found that the Roman “Golden Age” was already filled with this violent discord, 
is there any actual distinction between this idealized past and the present day?  Is the farmer’s 
life really any different than that of the city-dweller?   
 This blurring of boundaries continues in Vergil’s claim that “this was the life golden 
Saturn lived, before the rule of the Dictaean king, before an impious race feasted on 
slaughtered cattle” (536-538).  For of course Vergil has already told us in his first book that 
no farming, idyllic or otherwise, took place before the rule of Jupiter, “the Dictaean king” 
(ante Iovem nulli subigebant arva coloni, 1.125).  Thus the very life that the poet attributes in 
book 2 to the Golden Age could exist only after the foundation of Jupiter’s Iron Age rule.183  
Similarly, we may note the contradiction inherent in the farmer’s similarity to those 
                                                          
was the far safer alternative), and no mention of the twins in Augustan verse is without 
suggestion of civil war.” 
 
183Cf. Ross 1987, 127-128. 
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individuals who lived “before an impious race fed on slaughtered cattle,” as the farmer of 
Vergil’s poem is throughout encouraged to acts of piety of which animal sacrifice is a central 
part.  Thus the poet speaks of the “happy victim” (felix...hostia, Geo. 1.345) involved in the 
rites to Ceres in book 1, the cooking of goat meat in the Bacchic festival of book 2 (et ductus 
cornu stabit sacer hircus ad aram / pinguiaque in veribus torrebimus exta colurnis, 2.396-7), 
his own sacrifice in Octavian’s honor at the opening of book 3 (iam nunc sollemnis ducere 
pompas / ad delubra iuvat caesosque videre iuvencos, 3.22-3), and the farmer Aristaeus’ 
propitiatory sacrifices at the finale of book 4 (4.534-553).184  In such a context, the 
comparison of the farmer to such a lifestyle would seem doubly inappropriate, both in 
connecting the farmer to a period devoid of sacrifice and in characterizing such activity as 
impious. 
In examining the finale of book 2, then, I would propose two major conclusions.  
First, Vergil makes use of his predecessors’ depictions of successful students to characterize 
his own successful student, adapting the “lives of the gods” afforded by Golden Age imagery 
and Epicurean ataraxia to his own ends and so utilizing a rhetorical strategy shown to be a 
generic feature of didactic poetry.  Indeed, the nature of this characterization as a rhetorical 
commonplace is emphasized by Vergil’s failure to match form and content here.  Whereas 
                                                          
184The question of whether the feasting that concludes book 2 and Aristaeus’ propitiatory acts 
can properly be termed “sacrifice” have been the subject of debate; see Habinek 1990 and 
Thomas 1991.  Dyson 1996, 279, is perhaps correct in arguing that Vergil “leaves the words 
indeterminate, allowing them to be colored by their context here and elsewhere in the poem,” 
but also notes that Vergil’s phrase for the slaughtered cattle here, caesi iuvenci, is used by the 
poet to refer to sacrifice in almost all other instances.  Indeed, this is the case at the opening 
to the next book of the poem, where Vergil claims he will sacrifice cattle to Octavian (iam 
nunc sollemnis ducere pompas / ad delubra iuvat caesosque videre iuvencos, 3.22-23).  
Dyson further notes the only other use of the phrase in the poem is in reference to the 
bougonia at 4.284. 
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Hesiod’s precepts on justice directly support the morality necessary for life in the Just City, 
and Lucretius’ lessons on Epicurean physics allow for the freedom from fear that grants 
tranquillity, there is no such straightforward connection between Vergil’s agricultural 
precepts and the life portrayed at the book’s close.  The farmer’s absence from the strife of 
city life is presented as the ultimate guarantor of his blessed state, but this is nowhere taught 
by the poet.185  This divide between form and content, along with the “intertextual 
contradictions” discussed above, leads to a second conclusion: Vergil ultimately 
problematizes the ability of his student to reach a “godlike” state, thus suggesting the 
potential for didactic failure. 
   
The Golden Age Inverted 
The potential failure of Vergil’s didactic project is raised anew in the depiction of the 
plague that ends book 3 (3.478-566).  As at the close of book 2, one may detect a return to 
some “Golden Age” conditions, but here the portrayal is one of grim irony.  Thus the wolf, 
sent by Jupiter to ravage flocks at the onset of the Iron Age (1.130), finally ceases from its 
plunder as it is overcome by disease (non lupus insidias explorat ovilia circum / nec gregibus 
nocturnus obambulat: acrior illum / cura domat, 3.537-539).186  The venomous snake, 
another product of the Iron Age (1.129) and absent from the idealized Italian countryside of 
                                                          
185See Perkell 1989, 43-44, who contrasts the farmer here with the Epicurean, as the farmer’s 
“happiness” is brought about by ignorance instead of any actual knowledge. Cf. Thomas 
2007, 72, who claims that “[t]he poem is full of meaning, but devoid of didactic 
functionality.” 
 
186In addition to the “godlike” conditions of the Golden Age, the abeyance of wolves occurs 
as well in the divinization of Daphnis in the fifth Eclogue: (nec lupus insidias pecori, nec 
retia cervis / ulla dolum meditantur: amat bonus otia Daphnis, Ecl. 5.60-61). 
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book 2 (2.154-155), meets a similar end, dying just as it will in the Golden Age of Vergil’s 
fourth Eclogue (interit et curvis frustra defensa latebris / vipera et attoniti squamis 
astantibus hydri, 3.544-545; occidet et serpens, Ecl. 4.24).  Violence towards animals ceases 
as well; the Iron Age ars of hunting (Geo. 1.139-140) is now absent, as prey animals wander 
among the houses and dogs of their former hunters (3.539-540), while fishing is rendered 
irrelevant by the abundance of (dead) marine animals that wash up on the shore (3.541-
543).187  Indeed, the division between human and animal, already blurred over the course of 
the third book, is completely elided as people in the absence of livestock work the earth with 
their own bodies, eventually using their hands to break the soil and hitching themselves to 
ploughshares (3.534-536):188 
 ergo aegre rastris terram rimantur, et ipsis 
 unguibus infodiunt fruges, montisque per altos 
 contenta cervice trahunt stridentia plaustra. 
As human civilization is overcome by the plague, all the advances made through the advent 
of the Iron Age disappear.  Artes, the Iron Age’s defining feature (1.145), no longer serve 
their purpose, instead doing harm, and the figures of rationality Chiron and Melampus 
withdraw, replaced by the frenzied forces of Hades (3.549-553): 
 quaesitaeque nocent artes; cessere magistri, 
 Phillyrides Chiron Amythaoniusque Melampus. 
 saevit et in lucem Stygiis emissa tenebris 
 pallida Tisiphone Morbos agit ante Metumque... 
                                                          
187The detail is out of place, as Noricum is landlocked.  By including these lines, Vergil 
universalizes the extent of the disease and further emphasizes the divergence from traditional 
“Iron Age” life. 
 
188In this animalistic portrayal of humanity, one may see a suggestion of the “hard” Golden 
Age described by Lucretius, as compared to the “soft” version otherwise described by Vergil. 
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In such scenes Vergil inverts the values normally associated with the Golden Age, and 
suggests the potential dangers inherent in such an existence. 
Not only does the poet show in this passage the folly of longing for a “Golden Age” 
existence, but also the inadequacy of those lives earlier lauded at the conclusion to book 2.  
Throughout the plague scene, the farmer’s inability to counter the disease in any meaningful 
way is shown.  A first attempt is made through religious ritual (3.486-493). This is exactly in 
keeping with the poet’s instruction up to this point; the student is told in the first book to 
“honor the gods foremost” (in primis venerare deos, 1.338) as a way to deal with another 
destructive force, storms.  Despite the worshippers’ frequent attempts (saepe, 3.486), 
however, the instruction is of no use, as the victims die of illness before they can be 
sacrificed, or provide entrails unsuitable for offering.  The subsequent list of recognizable 
plague symptoms in horses (3.498-508) emphasizes the failure of didaxis by providing a 
parody of the poet’s earlier instruction.  Presented as a list of features to examine, the passage 
recalls the earlier catalogue of features observable in well-bred horses (3.75-88).  Yet unlike 
the earlier passage, this list of symptoms is ultimately unhelpful for the farmer, informing 
him only that his once-valuable horses (victor equus, 3.499) are going to die. 
 Any attempts to acquire knowledge of the disease are shown to be fruitless.  At one 
point, the poet appears to offer hope of a cure, informing the reader that the administration of 
wine seemed to aid the afflicted horses (profuit inserto latices infundere cornu / Lenaeos; ea 
visa salus morientibus una, 3.509-510).  This immediately proves fruitless, as the cure leads 
to a more violent end (3.511-514): 
 mox erat hoc ipsum exitio, furiisque refecti 
 ardebant, ipsique suos iam morte sub aegra 
 (di meliora piis, erroremque hostibus illum!) 
 discissos nudis laniabant dentibus artus. 
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Ultimately even the knowledge and artes acquired by the mythical teachers Chiron and 
Melampus are shown to fail (quaesitaeque nocent artes; cessere magistri, / Phillyrides 
Chiron Amythaoniusque Melampus, 3.549-550). 
The inability of the poet’s agricultural knowledge in the face of the plague is most 
emphatically displayed in the death of the plow-ox at 3.515-530.  Here Vergil describes a 
plow-ox dying in the very act of agricultural toil (ecce autem duro fumans sub vomere taurus 
/ concidit, 3.515-516), forcing the farmer to abandon his own work (it tristis arator...atque 
opere in medio defixa reliquit aratra, 3.517, 519).  The shade, fields, and streams of the 
idyllic rustic landscape, presented as an essential feature of the farmer’s blessed existence at 
the close to book 2 (2.467-471), lose their grandeur, unable to provide relief to the dying 
animal (3.520-522): 
 non umbrae altorum nemorum, non mollia possunt 520 
 prata movere animum, non qui per saxa volutus 
 purior electro campum petit amnis... 
Ultimately, the validity of the very qualities that characterize the farmer (and the poet’s 
instruction) is called into question, as the poet asks what good are labor, good works,189 or 
plowing in such a situation (quid labor aut benefacta iuvant? quid vomere terras / invertisse 
gravis?, 3.525-526). 
 This is not only a failure of agricultural knowledge, however.  As in book 2, Vergil 
here closely associates the farmer’s lifestyle with that of the philosopher, presenting the 
plow-ox’s simple existence in terms reminiscent of Epicurean moderation (3.526-530):190 
                             ...atqui non Massica Bacchi 
                                                          
189We may note that the derogation of benefacta here serves to undermine not only the 
achievements of the farmer, but those of Augustus as well. 
 
190See especially the contrast between necessary and unnecessary pleasures at DRN 2.16-36. 
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 munera, non illis epulae nocuere repostae: 
 frondibus et victu pascuntur simplicis herbae, 
 pocula sunt fontes liquidi atque exercita cursu 
 flumina, nec somnos abrumpit cura salubris. 530 
Yet whereas the comparison between farmer and philosopher in book 2 served to denote the 
success of the agricultural life and its possible similitude to the Epicurean “life like the 
gods,” here the comparison marks the failure of both forms of knowledge; neither the toil of 
the farmer nor the abstinence of the philosopher can save the plow-ox from death by disease. 
 The reader is left, then, with the “dialogic” argument seen throughout the poem, 
wherein contradictory passages can be used to show the ambivalence of the poet’s world and 
gods.  Certainly, a reader could recognize these oppositions and come to the conclusion that 
those positive depictions of agricultural life and the Golden Age are “lies,” shown as such by 
the pessimistic portions of the poem.  A return to Vergil’s Hesiodic model may provide a 
more nuanced reading, however.  Just as in the Works and Days the student’s efforts are not 
the sufficient cause of the Just City, but require as well the right action of the entire 
community and the will of the gods, so too is the success of the Vergilian student shown to 
be contingent;191 in the presence of a Tisiphone, human knowledge alone is not enough 
(3.549-553).  Thus Vergil tempers Lucretius’ optimism in the power of reason with an 
understanding of Hesiodic contingency, and shows the limits of human agency in achieving a 
“life like the gods.” 
 
 
 
                                                          
191For this contingency to the successful use of knowledge elsewhere in the poem, see 
Schiesaro 1997, 68-80. 
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The Education of Aristaeus 
 One final example of the interconnection between knowledge and divinity can be 
detected in the story of Aristaeus that concludes the poem as a whole.  Already invoked as a 
god in the poem’s opening through Vergil’s periphrastic reference to the farmer from Cea 
(1.14-15) and so listed among other protoi heuretai, Aristaeus is again introduced in book 4 
by his status as a benefactor, to which his divinity is explicitly linked as Vergil asks what god 
introduced the knowledge of bougonia (quis deus hanc, Musae, quis nobis extudit artem?, 
4.315).  Taken this way, Aristaeus may be seen as an exemplum of the benefactor god that 
Octavian is encouraged to become, both in the opening invocation and at the poem’s end.  As 
such, his godhood would seem to be independent of the poet’s knowledge, and in some ways 
prior to it; just as the poet relies on Octavian to provide the conditions necessary for his 
composition (cf. 1.40-42, 4.559-566), so too does he rely on Aristaeus’ discovery for the 
ultimate knowledge of bougonia. 
 Yet Vergil is quick to complicate this simple understanding of Aristaeus’ divinity 
with his initial description (4.317-332):192 
 pastor Aristaeus fugiens Peneia Tempe, 
 amissis, ut fama, apibus morboque fameque, 
 tristis ad extremi sacrum caput astitit amnis 
 multa querens, atque hac adfatus voce parentem: 320 
 “mater, Cyrene mater, quae gurgitis huius 
 ima tenes, quid me praeclara stirpe deorum 
 (si modo, quem perhibes, pater est Thymbraeus Apollo) 
 invisum fatis genuisti? aut quo tibi nostri 
 pulsus amor? quid me caelum sperare iubebas? 325 
 en etiam hunc ipsum vitae mortalis honorem, 
 quem mihi vix frugum et pecudum custodia sollers 
                                                          
192This complication may occur even sooner, as Vergil’s second question to the Muses (unde 
nova ingressus hominum experientia cepit?, 4.316) points to a gradual discovery resulting 
from human ingenuity rather than the sudden revelation of a divine benefactor. 
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 omnia temptanti extuderat, te matre relinquo. 
 quin age et ipsa manu felicis erue silvas, 
 fer stabulis inimicum ignem atque interfice messis, 330 
 ure sata et validam in vitis molire bipennem, 
 tanta meae si te ceperunt taedia laudis.” 
Here Aristaeus is very much concerned with the question of his own divinity.  Having lost 
his bees to disease and malnutrition (4.318), the farmer expresses doubt at his potential 
deification (quid me caelum sperare iubebas?, 4.325) and even at Cyrene’s claims regarding 
his divine parentage (4.322-324).  Now, Aristaeus believes, he has lost even the honors 
befitting mortals (4.326).193  For Aristaeus, then, the reclamation of his bees is the 
prerequisite for his reclaimed divinity; having lost his hive, previously described as immortal 
by the poet (at genus immortale manet, multosque per annos / stat fortuna domus, 4.208-209; 
omnia, nec morti esse locum, sed viva volare / sideris in numerum atque alto succedere 
caelo, 4.226-227), he fears for his own state.  Of course, these doubts are ultimately 
assuaged, as Aristaeus’ eventual success and discovery of bougonia restore bees to him and 
thus assure his own divinity.  Yet in accomplishing this task, Aristaeus shows a path to 
divinity different from that of simple benefaction, as he does not come to his discovery on his 
own, but rather is shown the way by his two instructors, Cyrene and Proteus. 
 These two figures are portrayed in terms that closely liken them to the didactic 
poet.194  Indeed, Proteus is styled a vates from his introduction (4.387, 392, 450), a term 
appropriate for his role as seer but also for an inspired poet; the line between these two roles 
is further blurred by the claim that he knows what is, was, and will be (quae sint, quae 
                                                          
193Aristaeus’ doubts are reinforced by the intertextual allusion at work in these lines, 
referring back to Achilles’ laments to his mother Thetis.  As with that hero, Aristaeus here 
has a possibility of either immortal renown or mortal obscurity. 
 
194Cf. Schiesaro 1997, 67-68. 
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fuerint, quae mox ventura trahantur, 4.393)—a line recalling the knowledge of both the 
Homeric seer Calchas (ὃς ᾔδη τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, Il. 1.70) and the 
Hesiodic Muses (εἴρουσαι τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, Th. 38), as well as that of 
the Muse-inspired Hesiod himself (ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, Th. 32).  His 
role as a didactic poet is indicated by the terms used to describe his speech: he will give 
praecepta (Geo. 4.398) and he will explain the morbi causam (4.397) just as our poet does 
(possum multa tibi veterum praecepta referre, 1.176; morborum quoque te causas et signa 
docebo, 3.440).  Proteus is even appropriate as an agricultural didactic poet, being a 
shepherd himself (4.394-395; 433-436).  Cyrene, while nowhere portrayed as a poet herself 
(though an attentive listener to poetry, 333-349), is similarly presented as an instructor, 
providing praecepta to Aristaeus throughout his quest (deum praecepta, 448; matris 
praecepta, 548).195 
 At the same time, Aristaeus is portrayed as an ideal student, quick to carry out his 
instruction to the letter.  His exactness is denoted by Vergil’s heavy repetition of passages; 
Cyrene’s detailed explanation of the proper manner to bind Proteus (396-414) is closely 
followed by Vergil’s description of the event (437-450),196 while the account of Aristaeus’ 
final propitiation borrows whole lines from his mother’s instructions (quattuor eximios 
praestanti corpore tauros...delige, et intacta totidem cervice iuvencas, 538, 540 ≈ quattuor 
                                                          
195Schiesaro 1997, 65 notes “the intriguing analogy between the role and behavior of Cyrene 
in her dealings with Aristaeus and those of the georgic poet who instructs the farmer in the 
rest of the poem.” 
 
196Cf. the complain of Wender 1969, 428: “We expect an adventure at this point, but 
Cyrene’s complete instructions anticipate the action to such a degree that by the time we 
reach it, the binding of Proteus has become less a thrilling test of courage for Aristaeus than a 
rather unpleasant ritual to be endured.” 
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eximios praestanti corpore tauros / ducit et intacta totidem cervice iuvencas, 550-551; post, 
ubi nona suos Aurora ostenderit ortus, / inferias Orphei Lethaea papavera mittes / et nigram 
mactabis ovem, lucumque revises, 543-545 ≈ post, ubi nona suos Aurora induxerat ortus, / 
inferias Orphei mittit, lucumque revisit, 552-553). 
 Aristaeus’ role as a successful student is emphasized by the failure of Orpheus, who 
loses Eurydice for the second time precisely because he fails to heed the injunction of 
Proserpina (4.487).197  Viewed from any other perspective, his error here is no different from 
Aristaeus’; just as Aristaeus’ eros leads to the death of Eurydice and loss of his bees, so too 
do Orpheus’ eros and fatal backward glance lead to Eurydice’s second death.  Indeed, in 
other respects, Orpheus’ error is portrayed as less of a wrongdoing than Aristaeus’.  Whereas 
Proteus charges Aristaeus with magna commissa (454), Orpheus is portrayed as pitiable 
(miserabilis Orpheus, 454)198 and later, worthy of forgiveness (ignoscenda quidem, scirent si 
ignoscere Manes, 489).  Even Eurydice denies responsibility to the poet, presenting herself 
and her lover both as victims (quis et me...miseram et te perdidit, Orpheu, / quis tantus furor, 
494-495).  Aristaeus, meanwhile, shows no concern over his actions, other than their effects 
                                                          
197Chomarat 1974, 201, sees the distinction as a matter almost of timing; though Aristaeus’ 
crime is more severe, it is performed prior to his “initiation,” while Orpheus, already 
“initiated” and violating an expressed prohibition of the gods, is lost. Cf. Conte 1986, 133-
134. 
 
198The contrast between the two may be felt even more strongly, depending on one’s reading 
of the text (454-456): magna luis commissa: tibi has miserabilis Orpheus / haudquaquam ob 
meritum poenas, ni fata resistant, / suscitat... Thomas 1988 ad 4.455 prefers to see the 
adverbial phrase haudquaquam ob meritum as modifying poenas: “penalties which you have 
by no means deserved [because you did not intend Eurydice’s death].”  Yet he notes the 
possibility for the phrase to be read in relation to miserabilis: “Orpheus, wretched by no 
means according to his deserts.”  Although Thomas ultimately rejects this latter option as 
“somewhat harsh grammatically,” such a reading is possible, especially given the otherwise 
sympathetic portrayal of Orpheus in relation to Aristaeus. 
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on his bees.  It is telling that in the lines describing his ultimate expiation (549-553), which 
otherwise adhere so closely to his mother’s instruction, there is no mention of the sacrifice to 
Eurydice prescribed by Cyrene (placatam Eurydicen vitula venerabere caesa, 547); only 
Orpheus and the Nymphs, presented by Proteus and Cyrene respectively as the instigators of 
the bees’ death (453-456; 532-534), receive their due.  Despite these discrepancies, Aristaeus 
is successful where Orpheus fails, and he does so through his ability to heed the words of his 
divine instructors. 
 In this respect, then, Aristaeus may be seen as an exemplar for the agricultural student 
of the poem.199  If it is above all by following the instructions of the vates Proteus and 
Cyrene that Aristaeus is able to reclaim his bees and a path to divinity, then this will also be 
the best option for our student; by following the instructions of the vatic Vergil, which 
include ritual actions such as those performed by Aristaeus, the student too can reach a form 
of divinity.  Indeed, in Aristaeus’ status at the end of the poem there is a similarity to the 
figures of the makarismos at 2.490-494, themselves potential models for a “life like the 
gods.”  Through the tale of Proteus, Aristaeus achieves a knowledge of the causae rerum 
recalling that of the felix, while Cyrene’s instruction provides knowledge of the rustic gods, 
particularly the Nymphas sorores (2.494) that are also the subject of the fortunatus’ 
knowledge.  Again, there is a discrepancy in these two sorts of knowledge, for while 
Aristaeus learns the causae of his plight from Proteus, he is unable to understand them on his 
own, responding only with fear (timentem, 4.530).  The interpretation of Cyrene is required 
                                                          
199Morgan 1999, 50-101, argues that Aristaeus’ binding of Proteus represents the forceful 
ordering of chaos, and sees in this a similarity to the renewed order brought by Augustus’ 
victories; on a somewhat humbler level, however, we might compare this to the farmer’s 
victories over the natural world.   
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to make this knowledge of any use, and it is that interpretation that leads to the ritual 
instruction the goddess provides.200  Aristaeus’ success, then, is not predicated on the 
comprehension achieved by the philosophic felix, but on close adherence to the precepts 
offered by a divine interpreter.201 
This focus on proper action over true understanding may serve to advance another 
theme running throughout the Aristaeus epyllion, that of initiation.  Chomarat and Morgan, 
among others, have shown that several features of the passage are reminiscent of initiation 
into mystery rites.202  Indeed, the theme is suggested in the very introduction to the bougonia 
passage.  Here Vergil portrays the practice as an inherently Egyptian act, locating its roots in 
the Nile delta (4.285-294)—this despite the fact that its creator is an Arcadian 
(Arcadii...inventa magistri, 4.283) and the events that lead to its creation take place in Thrace 
and Macedonia.  One may thus wonder at the inclusion of Egypt here.  Yet Vergil’s 
association of the bees’ resurrection from the corpse of a bull harmonizes well with the 
ideology associated with the Nile, whose recurring flood provided sustenance for agriculture 
in the otherwise barren land of Egypt.  As Morgan argues, this flood was itself an integral 
part of the mysteries of Serapis, Isis, and Osiris, from whose body the Nile originated.203  
                                                          
200Cf. Schiesaro 1997, 67-68. 
 
201This line of thought can be compared with the makarismos in the Works and Days as well, 
wherein Hesiod declares “best is the man who will know all by himself, but good too is the 
man that obeys another speaking well” (οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτῷ πάντα νοήσει... 
ἐσθλὸς δ’ αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται, 293, 295). 
 
202Chomarat 1974; Morgan 1999, 141-149. Cf. Campbell 1982.  For mystery elements in the 
Georgics more generally, see esp. Scazzoso 1956 and Hardie 2002 with further bib. 
 
203Morgan 1999, 141-143. Chomarat 1974, 186-189, discusses the importance of the Nile 
here as well. 
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Tying his own tale of regeneration to that linked to these gods, Vergil may hint at a mystical 
framework for his account. 
The connection is furthered by the inserted narrative of Orpheus, traditionally 
regarded as the inventor of mystery rites and frequently linked to the mysteries at Eleusis 
(e.g. Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ’ ὑμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ’ ἀπέχεσθαι, Aristoph. Frogs 1032; 
cf. Ps.-Dem. 25.11, Eurip. Rh. 943-944).204  Indeed, connection between mystery rituals, 
Orpheus, and Egypt is made by Diodorus Siculus.  Writing shortly before Vergil, Diodorus 
asserts the claim made by Egyptian priests that Orpheus obtained most of his mystic rites 
from them (Diod. Sic. 1.96):205 
Ὀρφέα μὲν γὰρ τῶν μυστικῶν τελετῶν τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν 
ἑαυτοῦ πλάνην ὀργιαζόμενα καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου μυθοποιίαν 
ἀπενέγκασθαι. τὴν μὲν γὰρ Ὀσίριδος τελετὴν τῇ Διονύσου τὴν 
αὐτὴν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τῆς Ἴσιδος τῇ τῆς Δήμητρος ὁμοιοτάτην 
ὑπάρχειν, τῶν ὀνομάτων μόνον ἐνηλλαγμένων. 
 
Further connections may be made.  Indeed, the very presence of bees in this account may hint 
at mystery aspects.206  Writing a later allegoresis on the Homeric cavern of the nymphs in 
Odyssey 14, Porphyry claimed that bees were a common symbol for the soul (Porph. De ant. 
nym. 18-19)—a connection likely known to Vergil, who would later compare the souls of the 
dead in the underworld to a buzzing crowd of bees (Aen. 6.703-709).  In the same passage, 
Porphyry uses this connection to explain the name given to Demeter’s initiates, themselves 
referred to as bees: καὶ τὰς Δήμητρος ἱερείας ὡς τῆς χθονίας θεᾶς μύστιδας μελίσσας οἱ 
                                                          
204For our collection of sources on the classical portrayal of Orpheus, see esp. Linforth 1941. 
For discussion of recent Orphic scholarship, see now Edmonds 2013. 
 
205For discussion of the passage, see Linforth 1941, 190-192. 
 
206Cf. Chomarat 1974, 189; Morgan 1999, 144. 
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παλαιοὶ ἐκάλουν αὐτήν τε τὴν Κόρην Μελιτώδη, Porph. De ant. nym. 18).  Vergil’s use of 
the Proteus narrative in this section may contribute further to this initiatory theme.  As Farrell 
has shown at length, Vergil’s use of the Proteus myth here is heavily influenced by that tale’s 
reinterpretation by Homeric commentators, who believed the tale to be an allegorical veil 
used by Homer to conceal philosophical truth.207  In speaking of this hidden meaning, 
Heraclitus the allegorist, writing in the century after Vergil, actually describes such 
interpretation as initiation (εἶθ’ ἡ πολυπρόσωπος εἰς ἅπαντα ἃ βούλεται Πρωτέως 
μεταμόρφωσις ποιητικοὶ καὶ τεράστιοι μῦθοι δοκοῦσιν, εἰ μή τις οὐρανίῳ ψυχῇ τὰς 
ὀλυμπίους Ὁμήρου τελετὰς ἱεροφαντήσειε, Heracl. All. 64.4).  
Thus the Aristaeus epyllion may be seen to be rife with initiatory imagery.  In this 
case, it is not unreasonable to see in Aristaeus the role of initiate granted him by Chomarat, 
who emphasizes the ritualistic nature of Aristaeus’ actions: the katabatic journey to the 
Nymphs’ abode, the focus on propriety (fas illi limina divum / tangere, Geo. 4.358-359), the 
prayer and triple libation that introduce Cyrene’s instruction (4.380-385).208  It is worth 
noting as well that the aetiological tale Proteus tells Aristaeus shares many structural 
similarities with the aetiological myth of the Eleusinian Mysteries, best known to us from the 
Homeric Hymn to Demeter—in both, the act of rape leads to a girl’s abduction to the 
underworld (Eurydice/Persephone), a grief-stricken loved one attempts a rescue 
(Orpheus/Demeter), and the rescue ultimately fails due to the neglect of an arbitrary rule 
(prohibition from eating/prohibition from looking back).  Even should one choose not to see 
a one-to-one correspondence between Aristaeus and initiate, however, I would argue that the 
                                                          
207Farrell 1991, 253-272; cf. Morgan 1999, 61-101. 
 
208Chomarat 1974, 191-192. 
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passage establishes elements of an initiatory theme that serve to mark this closing section of 
the poem as revelatory in some way. 
All of this serves to color Aristaeus’ actions, so that when his tale ends with his 
proper ritual conduct, it is easy for the reader to see him in the guise of a successful initiate, 
led by the hierophant Cyrene.  So too, the agricultural student may be seen as an initiate of 
sorts, instructed by the poet rather than Cyrene, and the poem at times encourages us to do 
so, as at the depiction of the farmer’s arma, where several agricultural implements are 
likened to the accoutrement of mystery religion (Geo. 1.160-175).209  Thus repeated allusion 
to Eleusis is made; the wagon is described as belonging to the “Eleusinian mother” (tardaque 
Eleusinae matris volventia plaustra, 1.163), while obscure reference is made to the 
“equipment of Celeus” (virgea praeterea Celei vilisque supellex, 1.165), the Eleusinian king 
who hosted Demeter.  Similarly the winnowing-fan is associated with the god Iacchus, and 
specifically described as suitable for a mystes or initiate (mystica vannus Iacchi, 1.166). 
What this initiatory aspect means for the student, however, is not entirely clear, as the 
benefits resulting from initiation vary in our sources.210  Guarantees of both mortal prosperity 
and privileged status in the afterlife were often made.  Thus already in the Homeric Hymn to 
Demeter it is said that the uninitiated receive a different fate after death than the initiated, but 
also that those loved by Demeter and the other goddesses will become happy and wealthy 
(HH Dem. 480-482, 486-489): 
 ὄλβιος ὃς τάδ’ ὄπωπεν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων· 
 ὃς δ’ ἀτελὴς ἱερῶν, ὅς τ’ ἄμμορος, οὔ ποθ’ ὁμοίων 
                                                          
209Cf. Scazzoso 1956, 10-11; Hardie 2002, 178-179. 
 
210Thus, for example, Clinton 2003, 55, notes that mystery cult “holds forth a promise of 
prosperity in this life and usually also in the afterlife” (emphasis mine), while Burkert 1987, 
12-29, focuses on the psychological results of initiation practices. 
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 αἶσαν ἔχει φθίμενός περ ὑπὸ ζόφῳ εὐρώεντι... 
  ...μέγ’ ὄλβιος ὅν τιν’ ἐκεῖναι 
 προφρονέως φίλωνται ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων· 
 αἶψα δέ οἱ πέμπουσιν ἐφέστιον ἐς μέγα δῶμα 
 Πλοῦτον, ὃς ἀνθρώποις ἄφενος θνητοῖσι δίδωσιν.  
Adeimantus in Plato’s Republic focuses on the expiatory effects of initiation, criticizing 
figures such as Orpheus for teaching rites that devalue justice by offering easy ways to avert 
punishment even after death (Plat. Rep. 364e-365a): 
βίβλων δὲ ὅμαδον παρέχονται Μουσαίου καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης τε 
καὶ Μουσῶν ἐκγόνων, ὥς φασι, καθ’ ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν, πείθοντες 
οὐ μόνον ἰδιώτας ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ 
ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσι μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσι 
δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἃς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἳ τῶν ἐκεῖ κακῶν  
ἀπολύουσιν ἡμᾶς, μὴ θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένει. 
Elsewhere in Plato, the posthumous rewards for initiation are again emphasized; here the 
initiated receive a status not only superior to the uninitiated, but amongst the gods (Plat. 
Phaedo 69c):211 
καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ 
φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν 
ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ 
δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ 
θεῶν οἰκήσει. 
 
There is thus a wide gamut of potential benefits accruing from initiatory ritual, and no clear 
way to discern which is to be assumed as “correct” for our text.  After all, each of these 
benefits is obtained by Aristaeus.  The final sacrifice he performs enables him to avert his 
punishment, assuaging the anger of the nymphs and restoring his bees; at the same time, one 
may presume, this contributes to his material prosperity.  In accomplishing the resurrection 
                                                          
211For the likelihood that the mysteries referred to are those at Eleusis, see Clinton 2003, 55-
56. 
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of his bees, Aristaeus achieves a control over death that may be compared to the “better 
portion” allotted to the initiate after death, and it also places Aristaeus, like the initiate 
described in the Phaedo, in the company of the gods. 
Yet while the evidence of the Phaedo passage combined with the knowledge of 
Aristaeus’ eventual deification may encourage us to see the poem’s initiatory imagery as 
another indication that Vergil’s georgic instruction is meant to lead to a divine state, this is 
nowhere confirmed by the text itself.  While it may be the case that the ritual performed by 
Aristaeus allows for his deification, we have seen that elsewhere the fact of his deification is 
attributed to his benefaction—his status as the inventor and instructor of the art of bougonia.  
His ritual actions and the knowledge they allow him may help him achieve this end, but they 
are not identical with this end.   
Vergil thus overdetermines the causation of Aristaeus’ divinity, presenting the reader 
with diverging possibilities.  Based on the rhetoric of protoi heuretai with which Vergil 
opens the poem as a whole and the Aristaeus epyllion itself, Aristaeus is now a god because 
of the benefactions he has made to humanity in his discovery of the bougonia.  Based on the 
initiatory imagery pervading the epyllion, in contrast, Aristaeus is divine because of his 
proper ritual conduct and obedience to the gods’ instructions.  In the former case, Aristaeus’ 
value as exemplar is limited to, perhaps, Augustus—the student would not need the didactic 
poem, but rather a discovery of his or her own.  In the latter, Aristaeus’ tale serves to show 
that adherence to the didactic poet’s precepts can lead to a divine state.  
By suggesting both possibilities while never explicitly linking Aristaeus’ ultimate 
divinization to any single cause, Vergil achieves much the same aporia that I have shown is 
essential to the makarismos of book 2 and the plague of book 3.  Indeed, one may think of 
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further complications raised by Vergil’s narrative: Would Aristaeus’ acts be so efficacious 
were his mother not a goddess herself?  If Aristaeus is to be viewed as an initiate, then why 
do the actions of Orpheus, the supposed founder of the mysteries, result in failure?  Again 
and again, the poet alludes to the divinizing potential of the knowledge he relates, only to 
suggest the ultimate futility of that same knowledge. 
 
Conclusion 
In the varying portrayals of divinization offered by Vergil over the course of the 
Georgics, the defining features of the genre are laid bare.  Juxtaposing the frameworks of 
deification used by his predecessors—the Golden Age of Hesiod and Aratus and the 
philosophical life extolled by Lucretius—Vergil emphasizes the centrality of the practice for 
his chosen genre while at the same time displaying its limitations.  As he shows his student 
an Italian Golden Age where strife is already present, or philosophy’s inability to prevent the 
tragedy of plague, the poet repeatedly problematizes the notion that any student may live a 
“life like the gods.”  Indeed, in conflating plague and Golden Age, he may cause us to 
question what a “life like the gods” even is.  With his concluding tale of Aristaeus and 
Orpheus, Vergil achieves much the same result, giving us hints, but no clear path, for how to 
become like a god.
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Chapter 4: Manilius 
 
The astrological poet Manilius has been less extensively studied than the other poets 
of this investigation, particularly in English-language scholarship, though this tide has begun 
to turn.  Recent works, particularly Volk’s monograph on Manilius’ intellectual background 
and a collection of essays edited by Volk and Green, have brought renewed interest to the 
poet.212  Nevertheless, it will be useful to begin the chapter with a brief overview of Manilius 
and his poem. 
Of the historical Manilius, next to nothing is known.  Pliny the Elder mentions a 
Manilius Antiochus, noted for his interest in astrology and said to have arrived as a slave on 
the same ship as a mime writer Publilius Lochius213 and the grammarian Staberius Eros (HN 
33.199): talemque Publilium Lochium, mimicae scaenae conditorem, et astrologiae 
consobrinum eius Manilium Antiochum, item grammaticae Staberium Erotem eadem nave 
advectos videre proavi.  Yet, given that the Publilius mentioned is generally assumed to be 
the mime author Publilius Syrus, and our knowledge that both he and Staberius Eros were 
active in the first half of the first century BCE, it is highly unlikely that this Manilius 
                                                          
212Volk 2009; Green and Volk 2011.  See now also Green 2014. 
 
213The name is given in different editions as Lochius or Antiochius, the latter an emendation 
based on the claim of kinship with Manilius Antiochus. 
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Antiochus could be the author of our Astronomica.214  Internal evidence allows us to give the 
poem a terminus post quem of 9 CE, as Manilius refers to the massacre of the Teutoburg 
Forest (externas modo per gentes ut, foedere rupto / cum fera ductorem rapuit Germania 
Varum / infecitque trium legionum sanguine campos, 1.898-900); the modo of line 898 would 
seem to indicate the event as a relatively recent affair, and the poem is typically dated to the 
second decade of the first century CE.  More certainty than this seems impossible to obtain, 
though not for lack of trying; the debate over the publication date of the Astronomica has 
long been a fiercely contested issue, due chiefly to the difficulty in determining to which 
Caesar, Augustus or Tiberius, Manilius dedicates his work.215  In the chapter that follows, I 
assume an identification of Manilius’ Caesar with Augustus, though the specific identity of 
Manilius’ dedicatee is relatively unimportant for my purposes. 
This uncertainty over Manilius’ identity has not extended to questions concerning his 
ideology; much like his fellow astronomical poet Aratus, Manilius has been consistently 
                                                          
214For discussion of the passage of Pliny and its use in identifying our Manilius, see Volk 
2009, 4-5, with further bibliography at 4 n.8.  For our evidence for the historical Manilius, 
see esp. Volk 2009, 1-6.  For an attempt to reconcile Pliny’s information with our knowledge 
concerning the date of the poem, see Scarcia, Flores, and Feraboli 1996, 1.xix-xxiii. 
 
215The debate is complicated further by an uncertainty over whether certain references to 
Augustus imply the princeps is living or dead.  For arguments concerning the identity of 
Manilius’ Caesar and the likely dating of the work, see Steele 1931, Flores 1960-1961 
(arguing for an Augustan date); Gebhardt 1961, Neuberg 1993, 243-257 (arguing for a 
Tiberian date).  Baldwin 1987 argues for a late date of 22 CE for the fifth book on the basis 
of a reference therein to a fire at the Theatre of Pompey.  Housman 1903-1930, 1.lxix-lxxii, 
argues for a piecemeal dating attributing the first two books to Augustus’ reign and at least 
the fourth book to Tiberius’, and is followed by Goold 1977, xii. Volk 2009, 137-161, gives a 
review of the passages discussing Caesar and argues for an all-Augustan date for at least 
books 1-4. Colborn 2013 gives an argument for the relative chronology of the poem as 
subsequent to Germanicus’ Aratea on the basis of a shared acrostic.   
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viewed as Stoic by scholars.216  Yet as with Aratus, there is little concrete evidence to support 
such an identification for Manilius; while Manilius often makes claims that resonate with 
Stoic ideology, this could be as much a result of the philosophical climate in Rome at the 
time as a sign of specific doctrinal allegiance on the part of the poet.  As Manilius, unlike his 
didactic predecessor Lucretius, makes no explicit claim of adherence to any philosophical 
system, and in fact frequently draws on more eclectic philosophical traditions (as will be 
discussed below), the present study remains agnostic on the question of Manilius’ Stoicism, 
allowing for the possibility but not requiring it.217 
What can be determined from analysis of Manilius’ text is his familiarity with his 
poetic predecessors, particularly Vergil and Lucretius.  In what follows, Manilius will be 
seen repeatedly engaging with the tradition as shaped by these earlier poets, and grappling 
with the same questions over the relationship between knowledge and divinity that I have 
delineated in their works.  As will be shown, Manilius follows his predecessors in depicting a 
divine status based on the instruction he offers, while adjusting his rhetoric to allow for his 
own vision of the divinity of the cosmos and the pervasive presence of god within it.  In the 
first section, I examine Manilius’ portrayal of the deified Augustus in the poem’s opening, 
comparing it in particular to Vergil’s invocation of the princeps in the proem to the Georgics.  
Subsequently, I turn to Manilius’ cultural history, discussing the poet’s manipulation of the 
now-familiar tropes of “intellectual gigantomachy” and the Golden Age and showing how he 
                                                          
216For bibliography, see Volk 2009, 226 n. 13, who notes, however, the isolated arguments of 
Lanson 1887, 29-53, and MacGregor 2005 against Manilius’ Stoicism. Volk 2009, 226-234, 
presents the case for Manilius’ Stoicism. 
 
217For a discussion of other potential influences perceptible in Manilius’ worldview, see esp. 
Volk 2009, 234-251. 
 129 
develops tensions within these tropes to his own ends.  I end with a discussion of the 
influence of Hermetic thought on the Astronomica and Manilius’ portrayal of the inherent 
divinity of humanity. 
 
Caesar deus ipse   
 As Vergil does in the Georgics, Manilius first introduces deification as the 
prerogative of Caesar (1.7-10):218 
 hunc mihi tu, Caesar, patriae princepsque paterque, 
 qui regis augustis parentem legibus orbem 
 concessumque patri mundum deus ipse mereris, 
 das animum viresque facis ad tanta canenda. 
Whereas Vergil’s poem is written at a time of transition and focuses on the possibility of 
Augustus’ deification, however, Manilius, writing over 30 years later, treats this deification 
as fact.  In Manilius’ invocation the concretization of certain features of the didactic 
invocation can be seen as well.  Thus, just like Lucretius’ Venus and Vergil’s Octavian, 
Manilius’ Augustus here is singled out for providing the conditions necessary for the 
composition of the poem (cf. Geo. 1.40-42; DRN 1.21-49).219  Chief among these conditions 
is the guarantee of peace; echoing Lucretius’ claim that composition is impossible in times of 
civil strife (DRN 1.40-41), Manilius informs us that his work is only possible in peacetime 
(hoc sub pace vacat tantum, Astr. 1.13).220 
                                                          
218Here assumed to be Augustus, see above. 
 
219Cf. Flores 1982, 114, who notes that we may also think of Aratus’ invocation to Zeus here. 
 
220This connection between poetry and peace was seen as a central feature of Hesiodic 
didactic in particular; cf. Koning 2010, 276-284. 
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At the same time, Manilius maintains a division between Caesar as guarantor of the 
conditions for his work and the god Mercury as discoverer of his poetic subject matter (tu 
princeps auctorque sacri, Cyllenie, tanti, 1.30).221  In so doing, he again follows the example 
of Lucretius in particular, who portrays Venus as the “guarantor” of his work while 
identifying Epicurus as the “inventor” of his subject.222  This allows him to make a rhetorical 
move similar to that of Vergil, who likewise portrayed Octavian in a manner recalling 
Lucretius’ Venus and thus compared the princeps to an Epicurean divinity.  Whereas Vergil 
had collapsed the distinction between “guarantor” and “inventor,” however, presenting 
Octavian as an Epicurus-like benefactor as well, Manilius reintroduces this separation; while 
Vergil’s Octavian may one day control even the countryside of his georgic poem (Geo. 1.26-
28), Manilius’ Caesar remains subject to the will of the heavens.223 
Other than such suggestions, and in contrast to the portayal of Octavian in the 
Georgics, there is little concern for the process of how one achieves divine status.  In 
Manilius’ description of Caesar’s “august laws” (augustis...legibus, 1.8), one may recall 
Vergil’s claim at the end of the Georgics that Octavian is making his way to Olympus while 
giving laws to his conquered peoples (Caesar dum magnus ad altum / fulminat Euphraten 
bello victorque volentis / per populos dat iura viamque adfectat Olympo, Geo. 4.560-562), 
and so see here a similar note of divinity based on benefaction, which would strengthen the 
parallel between Caesar here and the Lucretian Venus.  Yet the reference to the “world 
                                                          
221See Flores 1982, 115-117, on connections between Caesar and Mercury. 
 
222Flores 1982, 111-112, makes a similar connection. 
 
223Though echoes of the Lucretian distinction may still remain in the Georgics, albeit 
reversed; we may see the rustic gods of the proem, praised for their discoveries, as the 
“inventors” of Vergil’s subject, with Augustus occupying Venus’ role of guarantor of peace. 
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granted to [Caesar’s] father” (concessumque patri mundum) instead suggests a divinity of 
descent; as a divi filius (supposing our Caesar is here Augustus), so too is this Caesar a deus 
ipse.  Neither reference does more than hint at an answer, and the reader is left with little 
more than the fact of Caesar’s divinity. 
An answer may be supplied later in book 1, in Manilius’ discussion of the Milky Way 
(1.684-804).  Recounting various explanations for the presence of this celestial phenomenon, 
Manilius finally wonders whether the Milky Way may be the final abode for worthy souls 
after death (1.758-761): 
 an fortes animae dignataque nomina caelo  
 corporibus resoluta suis terraeque remissa 
 huc migrant ex orbe suumque habitantia caelum 760 
 aetherios vivunt annos mundoque fruuntur? 
The question is followed by a lengthy catalogue of potential celestial residents including the 
heroes of the Trojan War (1.762-770), Greeks famed for their wisdom (771-776), and Roman 
historical figures (777-804), “now the largest crowd,” which culminates with the figures of 
Augustus and Romulus (799-804): 
 ...descendit caelo caelumque replebit, 
 quod regit, Augustus, socio per signa Tonante, 800 
 cernit et in coetu divum magnumque Quirinum...224 
 altius aetherii quam candet circulus orbis. 
 illa deis sedes: haec illis, proxima divum 
 qui virtute sua similes fastigia tangunt. 
Such a conception has clear literary precedent in the Somnium Scipionis of Cicero’s De  
                                                          
224Housman 1903-1930 ad loc. supposes a dropped verse after this line: for discussion of the 
issues involved see also Volk 2009, 142-144. 
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Republica, wherein the orator posited such immortality as a reward for the political life.225  In 
Manilius’ version too, the overwhelming focus is on individuals who have provided service 
for the state; the list of wise Greeks begins with Solon and Lycurgus, for example, while 
even the Iliadic heroes are portrayed in their political role as kings (cf. reges, 765 and 
769).226 
 This focus would seem to encourage an understanding of divinity based on political 
benefaction, as suggested in the opening invocation to Augustus and discussed at length in 
previous chapters.  Yet Manilius complicates the issue with a feature not found in his 
Ciceronian model.  Though there is some uncertainty over the text, Manilius appears to posit 
two distinct abodes for the figures of his catalogue, as Augustus and Romulus seem to be 
located in a region above the Milky Way reserved for the gods (altius aetherii quam candet 
circulus orbis. / illa deis sedes, 1.802-803), while the other figures are in a location near to 
them, close to the gods on account of their similar virtue (haec illis, proxima divum /  qui 
virtute sua similes fastigia tangunt, 803-804).227  Thus, it seems that while political virtue can 
                                                          
225See Landolfi 1990, however, for the argument that Manilius’ passage is based on no single 
source, but draws from a lengthy literary tradition.  Volk 2009, 45, notes the idea was 
associated with Pythagoras.  For the role of the Somnium Scipionis in Cicero’s developing 
ideas on deification, see Cole 2013, 96-102.  On Manilius’ use of the Somnium Scipionis 
elsewhere in his poem, see Wilson 1985, 292-294. 
 
226Habinek 1989, 234-236, notes the similarity between the catalogue given by Cicero and 
the catalogue of the residents of Elysium given by Anchises at Aeneid 6.756-853, and 
remarks that Vergil’s catalogue is generally more inclusive than Cicero’s, which is focused 
on political accomplishments.  Remarkably, Manilius’ list here is even more exclusive than 
Cicero’s, for while Cicero allows for the inclusion of poets and philosophers (Cic. De rep. 
6.18.4: quod [i.e. the music of the spheres] docti homines nervis imitati atque cantibus 
aperuerunt sibi reditum in hunc locum, sicut alii qui praestantibus ingeniis in vita humana 
divina studia coluerunt), Manilius’ focus is almost exclusively on political figures; cf. 
Landolfi 1990, 92-95. 
 
227Cf. Landolfi 1990, 97; Volk 2009, 142. 
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obtain for an individual a state similar to that of the gods, only Augustus and Romulus are 
actually capable of becoming gods.  Manilius does not make explicit his reasoning for this 
division, but it is perhaps reasonable to connect this to the privileged status of Augustus and 
Romulus in Roman cult.  Unlike the other historical figures mentioned, these two would have 
received worship in state cult and as such could be considered gods.  Should such be the 
case, Manilius would not only be delineating a divinity based on benefaction, but a hierarchy 
within this system; good works are enough to attain a place near the gods, but recognition by 
the state is required for deification itself. 
 In discussing the deification of Octavian in Vergil’s Georgics, I have noted that the 
poet there presents a means of achieving divinity that is, for all practical purposes, 
unattainable by the ostensible student of his poem.  In the Astronomica, we may see much the 
same.  Presenting a near-divine status as the reward for preeminent statesmanship and 
divinity itself as an honor reserved for the state to bestow, Manilius emphasizes benefaction 
and political success as a means of divinization but gives no indication that such a means will 
be of use to his student; further, even should the student reach this point, they would be 
unlikely to attain the heights of Romulus and Augustus, and unable to do so without the 
intercession of the state.  As will be discussed in later sections, this does not mean that this 
Milky Way excursus has no implications for our student, however.  In portraying a celestial 
abode for these deceased statesmen, Manilius establishes a close relationship between the 
human soul and the mundus that he will develop over the course of his poem. Yet as with 
Vergil’s agricultural student, Manilius’ astrological student must ultimately find a path to 
divinity unlike that of the statesman. 
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The Iron Age Redeemed 
 Suggestions of this alternate route to divinity can already be detected in the passage 
following the opening invocation.  As in the invocation to Augustus, much of Manilius’ 
subsequent proem engages directly with the work of his didactic predecessors.  Indeed, in 
many respects the proem can be read as an anti-Lucretian rebuttal to the De Rerum Natura—
an understandable inclusion, as (even setting aside the question of Manilius’ Stoicism) the 
Epicurean’s casuist philosophy is completely at odds with the fatal machinations of Manilius’ 
astrological system.228  Thus, for example, Manilius refutes Lucretius’ claim that earlier 
generations of human beings had no fear at the daily setting of the sun (DRN 5.972-981), 
arguing instead that early humanity’s ignorance made it terrified of even such routine 
occurrences (Astr. 1.66-72).  More notable for our purposes is the divergent religious attitude 
of Manilius’ proem.  Whereas Lucretius spends much of his time in the DRN’s opening 
creating a divide between himself and religious practitioners, seeing the individuals known as 
vates as his chief intellectual rivals (tutemet a nobis iam quovis tempore, vatum / terriloquis 
victus dictis, desciscere quaeres, DRN 1.102-103), Manilius embraces religion, portraying 
his own subject matter as divine in the poem’s opening line (divinas artes, Astr. 1.1) and self-
identifying as a vates (1.23) performing a religious ritual (bina mihi positis lucent altaria 
flammis, / ad duo templa precor duplici circumdatus aestu / carminis et rerum, 1.20-22; cf. 
sacra ferens, 1.6). 
 This contrasting presentation of religious matters is particularly marked in Manilius’ 
address to Mercury, whom the poet claims as the founder of his craft (1.25-37): 
 Quem [sc. mundum] primum interius licuit cognoscere terris 25 
                                                          
228For Manilius in relation to Lucretius, see, e.g., Rösch 1911; Steele 1932, 324-331; Di 
Giovine 1978; Wilson 1985, 286-289; Abry 1999; Volk 2009, 192-196. 
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 munere caelestum.  quis enim condentibus illis 
 clepsisset furto mundum, quo cuncta reguntur? 
 quis foret humano conatus pectore tantum, 
 invitis ut dis cuperet deus ipse videri, 
 sublimis aperire vias imumque sub orbem, 32 
 et per inane suis parentia finibus astra? 
 tu princeps auctorque sacri, Cyllenie, tanti; 30 
 per te iam caelum interius, iam sidera nota 
 nominaque et cursus signorum, pondera, vires, 34 
 maior uti facies mundi foret, et veneranda 
 non species tantum sed et ipsa potentia rerum, 
 sentirentque deum gentes qua maximus esset. 
Manilius here polemically reworks Lucretius’ description of the founder of his own system, 
Epicurus, in the flight of the mind of DRN 1.62-79.229  The contrast between human and god, 
the claims of divine opposition, and the traversal of extraterrestrial spaces all serve to recall 
the Lucretian passage but are here presented as impossibilities through a series of rhetorical 
questions—what human could accomplish such a task?  In Manilius’ account, such revelation 
comes not from a human but from the gods themselves (munere caelestum, Astr. 1.26); in 
fact, this revelation cannot come from a human unless the gods permit.  Further, whereas 
Epicurus’ discoveries serve to overcome the gods of religio and substitute humanity in their 
place, Mercury’s knowledge does the opposite, actually increasing worship of the divine by 
magnifying the power of god (1.35-37).  All of this serves to portray an epistemology quite 
different from that of Manilius’ Lucretian model, presenting knowledge not as a means to 
rival the gods, but as a gift bestowed by (and thus relying on) those very gods. 
                                                          
229Cf. Flores 1982, 118; Wilson 1985, 287-288. 
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This new model of divinely-guided epistemology is reinforced in the following 
passage, wherein Manilius gives a historicizing explanation of astrology’s development to 
supplement the theological explanation (1.40-65): 230 
 et natura dedit vires seque ipsa reclusit 40 
 regalis animos primum dignata movere 
 proxima tangentis rerum fastigia caelo, 
 qui domuere feras gentes oriente sub ipso, 
 [quas secat Euphrates, in quas et Nilus abundat] 
 qua mundus redit et nigras super evolat urbes. 45 
 tum qui templa sacris coluerunt omne per aevum 
 delectique sacerdotes in publica vota 
 officio vinxere deum; quibus ipsa potentis 
 numinis accendit castam praesentia mentem, 
 inque deum deus ipse tulit patuitque ministris. 50 
 hi tantum movere decus primique per artem 
 sideribus videre vagis pendentia fata. 
 singula nam proprio signarunt tempora casu, 
 longa per assiduas complexi saecula curas: 
 nascendi quae cuique dies, quae vita fuisset, 55 
 in quas fortunae leges quaeque hora valeret, 
 quantaque quam parvi facerent discrimina motus. 
 postquam omnis caeli species, redeuntibus astris, 
 percepta, in proprias sedes, et reddita certis 
 fatorum ordinibus sua cuique potentia formae, 60 
 per varios usus artem experientia fecit 
 exemplo monstrante viam, speculataque longe 
 deprendit tacitis dominantia legibus astra 
 et totum aeterna mundum ratione moveri 
 fatorumque vices certis discernere signis. 65 
Even in this “historical” version, Manilius’ emphasis is on divine revelation.  The kings who 
first receive knowledge of the stars do so not out of any obvious investigation on their part, 
but because nature itself (regularly identified with god or the universe by Manilius) revealed 
                                                          
230On this passage, see Di Giovine 1978, 398-403; Marchi 1983, 9-10; Flammini 1990, 43-
48; Volk 2009, 68-72.  
 137 
itself to them.231  So too with the priests who obtain more systematic knowledge of the 
heavens.  Devotion to god, not inquiry into nature, guides their initial actions; only after the 
divine presence has inspired them do these men begin their study of the heavens.  Manilius’ 
subsequent description of astronomical investigation and the work these priests perform 
(1.53-65) does take on a more anthropocentric cast as inspiration gives way to empirical 
observation (per varios usus artem experientia fecit / exemplo monstrante viam, 1.61-62), yet 
even this serves to highlight the ultimate power of god, reflected in the rule of the stars and 
eternal reason (deprendit tacitis dominantia legibus astra / et totum aeterna mundum ratione 
moveri, 1.63-4). 
 Intertextual allusion to Vergil may strengthen the point.  Claiming that these priests 
were the first to perform such work by means of ars (hi tantum movere decus primique per 
artem / sideribus videre vagis pendentia fata, 1.51-52), Manilius echoes the so-called 
“theodicy” of Vergil’s Georgics, wherein Jupiter is the first to “move the fields” by means of 
ars (...pater ipse colendi / haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem / movit agros, 
Geo. 1.121-123) during the transition from Golden Age to Iron.  Manilius perhaps even 
“corrects” the passage; after all, it is highly unlikely that Jupiter himself is to be imagined 
working the land, and the Vergilian passage may be readily understood as a description of 
Jupiter’s compulsion of humanity to farming.  Realizing this, Manilius cuts out the middle 
step, making his priests the subjects of the action, but using the Vergilian context to indicate 
an ultimate divine impetus.232   
                                                          
231For discussion of these kings, and their usual identification with figures such as Zoroaster 
and Belus, see Volk 2009, 68-69. 
 
232Manilius’ lines depicting experience-driven progress (per varios usus artem experientia 
fecit / exemplo monstrante viam, 1.61-62) may perform a similar function, as they too recall 
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 Such use of intertextual reference can lead to problematic slippage, however.  For 
while this is perhaps the most likely reading of this passage, it is not the only way to read 
Manilius’ reference.  Instead, the reader may refuse to take the “middle step” and instead 
take Manilius’ priests as not only a direct grammatical substitution for Vergil’s Jupiter, but 
also a functional substitution—that is, one may see Manilius positing human agency in place 
of divine agency as the source of cultural development.  Of course, in this scenario, such a 
distinction is ultimately rather slight; after all, these priests are still subordinate to, and 
inspired by, their god.  Yet this change of focus would allow for the possibility of a more 
active role for humanity in Manilius’ account of development. 
Indeed, this sort of ideological slippage can be detected throughout the proem.  While 
no individual case may be seen as blatant enough to argue decisively for an antagonistic 
reading to the interaction between humans and gods in the proem, the aggregation of such 
incidences does indicate the potential for such a reading, and in this respect Manilius’ poem 
may express a polyvalence similar to that used by Vergil in the Georgics.  Thus, for example, 
Manilius’ description of his astrologer-priests includes the claim that these priests “bound 
god through their service” (officio vinxere deum, 1.48).  In the potential violence implicit in 
the verb vincire, one may see the suggestion of assault against the god;233 it is left to the 
reader to determine whether this is suitably mollified by the qualifying ablative officio. 
                                                          
the Vergilian “theodicy,” where Jupiter is said to make natural conditions more difficult so 
that humans may develop their crafts through experience (ut uarias usus meditando 
extunderet artis, Geo. 1.133). 
 
233Cf. Volk 2001, 108-113, and 2009, 257-258, for Manilius’ use of violent language here 
and elsewhere to describe scientific inquiry. 
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Following this discussion of the kings’ and priests’ astrological achievements, 
Manilius retrojects even further in time, describing humanity’s condition prior to the 
discovery of astrology and other civilizing arts in a cultural history (1.66-122)—by this time, 
a regular feature of the didactic genre.234  After emphasizing early humans’ fears arising from 
their ignorance of the celestial bodies’ movements (in a polemical allusion to Lucretius, 
discussed above), Manilius portrays early humanity in the stereotypical terms of the Golden 
Age, noting their lack of the traditional arts of farming (1.76), mining (76), and sailing (77-
78).  Manilius differs from his predecessors, however, in attaching no positive features to this 
period, either through Vergil’s intimations of an earlier fertility and ease of life or Lucretius’ 
contrasts with the moral failures of contemporary life, instead focusing solely on the 
ignorance of the age before turning to the gradual development of civilization (1.79-84): 
 sed cum longa dies acuit mortalia corda 
 et labor ingenium miseris dedit et sua quemque 
 advigilare sibi iussit fortuna premendo, 
 seducta in varias certarunt pectora curas 
 et, quodcumque sagax temptando repperit usus, 
 in commune bonum commentum laeta dederunt. 
Here too Manilius fills his discussion with references to Vergil’s earlier culture history.235  
Describing the role of time and harsh circumstance in the development of civilization (1.79-
80), Manilius again recalls Jupiter’s role in the transition from Golden to Iron Age (curis 
acuens mortalia corda, Geo. 1.123).  As with the earlier reference to the passage, any 
mention of Jupiter himself is suppressed by Manilius, and in this instance, there is no prior 
                                                          
234On Manilius’ culture history, see esp. Effe 1971; Romano 1979; Baldini Moscadi 1980a 
and 1980b; Flammini 1990, 49-61, and 1993. 
 
235For Manilius’ use of Vergil’s Georgics here, see esp. Effe 1971; cf., e.g., Habinek 2007, 
236-237. 
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mention of divinity as there was in the case of the astronomer-priests.  Instead, Manilius 
seems to deny divine causation for the event altogether, presenting the development of 
civilization instead as the natural result of historical forces coupled with human ingenuity.   
The mention of labor in this context adds to such an interpretation.  For Vergil, labor 
is the culmination and final product of the Iron Age transition, a necessary feature of survival 
in the world as conceived by Jupiter.  For Manilius, however, labor is an initial condition, 
representing not the culmination of an historical process as envisioned by Vergil but only the 
initial hardship suffered by early humanity.  As such, it, like the passage of time, here 
replaces Jupiter as the initial cause in the development of human society, and is seen not as a 
necessary end in itself but rather as something to be overcome through human invention.  
Indeed, Manilius himself points to this distinction; whereas in the Georgics, labor has 
overcome and pervaded all aspects of life (labor omnia vicit, Geo. 1.145), in the Astronomica 
this task is performed by human skill (omnia conando docilis sollertia vicit, Astr. 1.95). 
Taken as a whole, Manilius’ depiction of cultural development points to a view 
radically different from that of his predecessors, who typically portray the Iron Age as a 
marked deterioration of the human condition.236  Yet again, this change is signified through 
reference to Lucretius and Vergil.  In his claim that individuals provided for the common 
good as their abilities developed (in commune bonum commentum laeta dederunt, 1.84), 
Manilius directly echoes Lucretius, who in his rationalizing account of history denied the 
ability of early humanity to look to the common good (nec commune bonum poterant 
                                                          
236Cf. Romano 1979; Volk 2009, 248 n. 54: “Manilius’ entire history of civilization is 
unusual in presenting as positive a number of cultural practices...that in other ancient, 
especially Roman, treatments of the same topic are viewed as ambivalent, if not downright 
nefarious...”  See also Abry 2007, 11-13, who sees in Manilius’ account a rejection of the 
Aratean Myth of the Ages. 
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spectare, DRN 5.958).  At the same time, the Manilian claim also recalls the Vergilian 
description of the Golden Age, wherein unlike Lucretius’ early peoples, the residents of the 
Golden Age do work for the benefit of the community (in medium quaerebant, Geo. 1.127).  
In making this change, Manilius goes farther than Lucretius, whose denial of a Golden Age is 
based on the inherent continuity of the human condition, to invest his Iron Age with those 
positive features, such as social harmony and abundance, traditionally assigned to the earlier, 
happier age. 
Preference for the Iron Age is also evident in Manilius’ celebratory list of the artes 
discovered by humans.  Here there is neither the ambivalence of Lucretius’ history, in which 
intellectual development is balanced by the development of new vices, nor is there Vergil’s 
pessimism, in which new crafts are required to meet the increasing demands made by 
nature.237  Instead, Manilius sees these advances as a net gain, focusing solely on the new 
abilities allowed to humanity (1.85-95): 
 tunc et lingua suas accepit barbara leges, 85 
 et fera diversis exercita frugibus arva, 
 et vagus in caecum penetravit navita pontum 
 fecit et ignotis iter in commercia terris. 
 tum belli pacisque artes commenta vetustas; 
                                                          
237See Verg. Geo. 1.129-135, wherein Jupiter worsens conditions to induce humanity to 
develop artes: 
 ille [i.e. Jupiter] malum virus serpentibus addidit atris 
 praedarique lupos iussit pontumque moveri, 130 
 mellaque decussit foliis ignemque removit 
 et passim rivis currentia vina repressit, 
 ut varias usus meditando extunderet artis 
 paulatim, et sulcis frumenti quaereret herbam, 
 ut silicis venis abstrusum excuderet ignem. 135 
Similarly, the development of agriculture is a direct result of the earth’s failing bounty at 
Geo. 1.147-149: 
 prima Ceres ferro mortalis vertere terram 
 instituit, cum iam glandes atque arbuta sacrae 
 deficerent silvae et victum Dodona negaret. 
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 semper enim ex aliis alias proseminat usus. 90 
 ne vulgata canam, linguas didicere volucrum, 
 consultare fibras et rumpere vocibus angues, 
 sollicitare umbras imumque Acheronta movere, 
 in noctemque dies, in lucem vertere noctes. 
 omnia conando docilis sollertia vicit. 95 
The inferiority of the natural state is repeatedly emphasized by the negative valence of the 
adjectives Manilius uses—barbara, fera, caecum.  In contrast, where development could be 
seen in a negative light, as in the creation of war at 1.89, Manilius glosses over the fact, here 
closely joining that discovery to the more positive topic of peace. 
Manilius ends this portion of his list with the discovery of ornithomancy, extispicy, 
and magical acts including necromancy.  The combination is an odd one, as the political 
status of ornithomancy and extispicy—both means of divination explicitly endorsed by the 
Roman state religion—is at odds with the suspicion or even hostility traditionally felt 
towards other magical feats.238  By conflating these categories, Manilius appears to be 
attempting to grant magic the same status afforded to traditional means of divination, and this 
too may be seen in part as a response to Vergil.  Speaking of the Etruscan seer Asilas in 
Aeneid 10, Vergil lists the forms of divination in which he was proficient (Aen. 10.175-177): 
tertius ille hominum divumque interpres Asilas, / cui pecudum fibrae, caeli cui sidera parent 
/ et linguae volucrum et praesagi fulminis ignes.  As in the Manilian passage, Vergil here 
describes ornithomancy and extispicy, but by including the claim that the stars are intelligible 
to Asilas, Vergil suggests an early form of astrology as well.  Thus already in Vergil 
                                                          
238See Dickie 2002, 459-465.  Cf. Volk 2009, 247: “With the exception, perhaps, of the first 
two, which could pass as comparatively benign, all these practices involve breaking the laws 
of nature for the benefit of the acting human being and can properly be described as (black) 
magic.”  For a more positive appraisal of the magical acts described here, see Baldini 
Moscadi 1980a. 
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astrology is linked to other traditional forms of divination.  By alluding to this passage, 
Manilius reminds his readers of this association; further, by presenting knowledge of 
divination as prior to knowledge of astrology, Manilius perhaps suggests that astrology is a 
result of these earlier practices.239 
A similar Vergilian connection can be made between astrology and the more 
explicitly magical items in Manilius’ list.  Describing the ability to cause snakes to burst 
through speech, Manilius alludes to a passage from the Eclogues, wherein the shepherd 
Alphesiboeus describes the power of magical song, including its ability to rupture snakes and 
draw the moon from the sky (Ecl. 8.69-71): carmina vel caelo possunt deducere lunam / 
carminibus Circe socios mutavit Ulixi, / frigidus in pratis cantando rumpitur anguis.  Again, 
Manilius refers to a Vergilian passage wherein the cultural discovery he is describing is 
united with astrological phenomena, and it is likely this that leads to the conflation of more 
“orthodox” practices such as extispicy and ornithomancy with more magical activities.  Both, 
in the eyes of the poet, are directly related to astrology. 
 Manilius’ self-portrayal as a magician is discussed in greater detail below; here I 
content myself with one further note on the role of magic in Manilius’ cultural history.  
Referring to the discovery of necromancy (sollicitare umbras imumque Acheronta movere, 
Astr. 1.93), Manilius yet again draws from Vergil.  In book 7 of the Aeneid, Juno, wroth at 
                                                          
239Contra Dickie 2002, 451.  On the basis of lines 4.911-14, 
 huic in tanta fidem petimus, quam saepe volucres 
 accipiunt trepidaeque suo sub pectore fibrae. 
 an minus est sacris rationem ducere signis 
 quam pecudum mortes aviumque attendere cantus? 
Dickie argues that Manilius views extispicy and ornithomancy not as “forerunners of 
astrology, but inferior techniques for discovering the divine will....” Yet in the passage 
Manilius doesn’t denigrate these skills; he simply seeks that astrology be accorded the same 
esteem (in tanta) given to other forms of divination. 
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Aeneas’ arrival in Italy, seeks to halt his progress in any way she can.  Unable to receive aid 
from the Olympians, she turns to the denizens of the underworld instead: flectere si nequeo 
superos, Acheronta movebo (Aen. 7.312).  By recalling the words of Juno, Manilius 
illustrates two important points.  First, he suggests that, through magic, men can rival the 
deeds of the divine; while Juno can move Acheron, so too can a skilled magician.  Second, he 
reminds his readers that the gods’ powers are limited.  Immediately preceding her decision to 
seek infernal aid, Juno laments that her powers are insufficient for her task: quod si mea 
numina non sunt / magna satis... (7.310-11).  Indeed, she has actually been bested by a 
human: vincor ab Aenea (7.310).  For a reader familiar with Vergil (as Manilius seems to 
expect his reader to be), the poet’s discussion of magic here continues the problematic 
portrayal of humanity’s relationship with divinity hinted at throughout the proem. 
 This portrayal reaches a climax in the culmination of Manilius’ culture history, as 
humanity completes its discoveries with the development of natural philosophy and, finally, 
astrology (1.96-112).  Here Manilius explicitly evokes the theme of “intellectual 
gigantomachy,” familiar from our discussion of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura.240  Though 
Manilius has previously rejected the topos, denying that humans would strive with the divine 
in his attribution of astrological knowledge to Mercury (1.25-37), the poet here seems to 
reverse his stance, stating that this process of discovery had no limit until human ratio 
ascended to heaven and comprehended the nature of things (1.96-98): nec prius imposuit 
rebus finemque modumque / quam caelum ascendit ratio cepitque profundam / naturam 
rerum causis viditque quod usquam est.  Manilius does not stop there, but doubles down on 
this gigantomachic rhetoric, describing the comprehension of the thunderbolt’s natural causes 
                                                          
240See esp. Volk 2001, 100-114. 
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in Promethean terms; in his account, human reason stole Jove’s own thunderbolt and returned 
its constituent parts to their proper locales—the sound of thunder to the winds, fire to the 
clouds (1.104-105): eripuitque Iovi fulmen viresque tonandi / et sonitum ventis concessit, 
nubibus ignem.  With this final assault, the nature of the cosmos was revealed to humanity 
and the art of astrology developed (1.106-112): 
 quae postquam in proprias deduxit singula causas, 
 vicinam ex alto mundi cognoscere molem 
 intendit totumque animo comprendere caelum, 
 attribuitque suas formas, sua nomina signis, 
 quasque vices agerent certa sub sorte notavit 110 
 omniaque ad numen mundi faciemque moveri, 
 sideribus vario mutantibus ordine fata. 
A possible source for Manilius’ passage, Cicero’s De Natura Deorum 2.153, describes the 
same process of ratio reaching towards heaven.  Yet here the gigantomachic imagery of 
Manilius’ rendition is largely absent, as Cicero’s Balbus emphasizes the subsequent 
development of pietas, claiming that it is this that ultimately provides a godlike life to 
mortals:241 
quid vero? hominum ratio non in caelum usque penetravit?... quae 
[sc. celestial workings] contuens animus accedit ad cognitionem 
deorum, e qua oritur pietas, cui coniuncta iustitia reliquaeque 
virtutes, e quibus vita beata existit et similis deorum, nulla alia re 
nisi immortalitate, quae nihil ad bene vivendum pertinet, cedens  
caelestibus. 
The conception of investigation as assault in the Manilian passage would seem to be the 
poet’s innovation. 
 The aggressive imagery in this passage, coupled with the Promethean imagery of a 
fiery theft from Jupiter, may lead us to reconsider Manilius’ earlier rejection of divine 
                                                          
241For Manilius’ knowledge of Cicero and this passage, see Volk 2009, 230-234. 
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antagonism in his invocation of Mercury.  As discussed above, in this passage Manilius 
opens with a series of rhetorical questions seemingly designed to emphasize the gulf between 
humanity and the gods.  Who, asks Manilius, would have stolen the mundus from the gods 
had they intended to hide it? (1.26-29): 
    ...quis enim condentibus illis 
 clepsisset furto mundum, quo cuncta reguntur?  
 quis foret humano conatus pectore tantum, 
 invitis ut dis cuperet deus ipse videri... 
On our earlier reading of the passage, it was argued that the lines are, above all, a critical 
response to Lucretius’ portrayal of the Epicurean flight of the mind and his corresponding 
attack against religio.  The ablative absolute condentibus illis then serves the role of a 
protasis to a past contrafactual clause—if the gods had hidden the mundus, it would not have 
become intelligible to humans (but it is, so they didn’t hide it). 
 As Valvo has argued, however, there is another way to read this passage.  After all, 
the culture history that follows Manilius’ address to Mercury, with its emphasis on the 
ignorance and hardship that characterized humanity’s primitive state, would seem to imply 
that there was in fact a time when the gods kept such knowledge from humanity.  Should this 
be the case, there would then be no need to treat condentibus illis as contrafactual, but rather 
as a straightforward temporal phrase—who would have stolen the mundus when the gods 
were hiding it?242  The following address to Mercury (tu princeps auctorque sacri, Cyllenie, 
tanti, 1.30) would then be not an abrupt shift from the line of questioning that precedes, but 
                                                          
242Valvo 1978, 115: “Un tempo effettivamente gli dei nascosero i tesori che l’universo 
racchiudeva, non dando agli uomini la capacità comprendere: quel ‘condentibus illis’ del 
verso 26 prima citato, non indica un’ipotesi irreale, ma una situazione allora tristemente e 
crudelmente reale.”  Cf. Volk 2001, 109-110. 
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an answer to these questions: Mercury, in a role similar to that of the Hesiodic Prometheus, 
revealed to humanity the secrets hidden by the gods.243 
 The Promethean role assigned to Mercury on such a reading is not out of keeping 
with his portrayal elsewhere in Augustan poetry.  Valvo notes the parallel between the 
Manilian passage and a passage from Horace (Mercuri, facunde nepos Atlantis, / qui feros 
cultus hominum recentum / voce formasti catus..., Odes 1.10.1-3).244  Here too, Mercury is 
placed in the role of culture-bringer, and again there is a hint of disruptiveness; referring to 
Mercury’s familial ties with Atlas, Horace calls attention to the Titanic aspect of the god.  
Horace subsequently describes various areas of Mercury’s influence, including the god’s 
facility at theft (callidum quidquid placuit iocoso / condere furto, Odes 1.10.7-8); read back 
into the Manilian passage, this characterization of Mercury, familiar from his depiction in the 
Homeric Hymn, squares nicely with that individual who would have stolen the mundus 
(clepsisset furto mundum).245  Finally, Valvo draws comparisons between the optimistic view 
of Manilius’ culture history, instigated by Mercury, and Prometheus’ account of his own 
actions in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, seeing the same combination of dismay for human 
ignorance and pride in their ultimate attainment of knowledge in both works.246 
                                                          
243Such a reading would gain even more force on the reading of Flores 1982, 117-121, who 
argues that Hermes Trismegistos would have been seen as a human who became a god—thus 
responding also to Manilius’ question quis foret humano conatus pectore... 
 
244Valvo 1978, 121-123.  For another possible example of Manilius’ use of Horace, see 
Baldini Moscadi 1980b. 
 
245On clepsisset here, see also Flores 1982, 118-119.  
 
246Valvo 1978, 123-128. 
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 As Volk has rightly asserted in her discussion of Valvo’s argument, however, such a 
reading is hard to take as a “primary” reading of the passage.247  After all, there is little 
before the invocation to Mercury that would encourage a subversive first reading.  Further, as 
I have argued above, the clear polemic with Lucretius in this passage, aimed against the 
gigantomachic portrayal of Epicurus by the earlier poet, reinforces the “pious” interpretation 
of these lines, with the devout Manilius railing against those individuals who would dare 
stand against the will of the gods.  Even in the more overtly antagonistic passage that 
concludes the section, as Manilius portrays human ratio wresting the thunderbolt from 
Jupiter’s grasp, Manilius is unwilling to remove divinity entirely, or to portray humanity in 
absolute control; to the poet, all our victory over Jupiter grants us is the recognition that all 
things are controlled by the numen mundi (1.111).248 
 Thus there remains a fundamental tension in the worldview presented by the poet, as 
his source material is shown as both an assault on the gods and a gift from those same gods.  
In her own analysis of this tension, Volk has tended to attribute such inconsistencies to a 
failure on the part of Manilius, for whom the imagery afforded by these various portrayals is 
more important than ideological consistency.249  Leaving to one side the question of such 
consistency as a laudable or even achievable goal in a poetic undertaking, I would argue that 
such variances point less to the inconsistent mind of Manilius than to a fundamental tension 
within didactic poetry by Manilius’ time.  As seen in the previous chapters, such 
                                                          
247Volk 2001, 110. Cf. Volk 2009, 255-257. 
 
248This may be a reference to the Ciceronian passage quoted above, wherein Balbus claims 
that such investigation leads ad cognitionem deorum. 
 
249See Volk 2001, 113-4; 2002, 208 and passim; and 2009, 251-258. 
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“inconsistency” is a central feature of both Lucretius’ and Vergil’s didactic projects.  Thus 
Lucretius defends his chosen philosophy as an exemplar of true piety and attempts to refute 
charges of gigantomachic aggression, while at the same time presenting his hero Epicurus in 
terms directly recalling this gigantomachic aggression.  Vergil similarly presents internal 
contradictions, though these revolve not around the relative orthodoxy of his teachings but 
their very efficacy.  At one moment the student is told that the poet’s instruction will lead to 
a life similar to the philosopher’s and reminiscent of the Golden Age; at another, that neither 
farmer nor philosopher can withstand the desolation brought about by the plague.  It should 
come as no surprise, then, to see such inconsistencies in the Astronomica, and we would do 
well to examine them against the backdrop of generic precedent rather than as the failing of 
an incapable author.  Seeking to reconcile a pious attitude towards the gods with humanity’s 
potential to rival those same gods, Manilius may be seen operating fully within the didactic 
tradition. 
 
Hermetic Thought and the Divinity of Humanity 
 In addition to his use of the poetic tradition, Manilius also draws upon more esoteric 
forms of discourse in portraying the relationship between his student and the divine.  
Manilius’ surprisingly positive view of magic as presented in his anthropology has already 
been discussed, but this view can be detected from the poem’s outset, as the poet claims that 
his task is to draw down the stars and his craft (characterized as divine) through his song 
(1.1-6):   
 Carmine divinas artes et conscia fati 
 sidera diversos hominum variantia casus, 
 caelestis rationis opus, deducere mundo 
 aggredior primusque novis Helicona movere 
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 cantibus et viridi nutantis vertice silvas 
 hospita sacra ferens nulli memorata priorum. 
This opening act of drawing celestial bodies from the sky is taken from a Vergilian passage, 
Ecl. 8.69-71, also referred to by Manilius in his mention of magical acts at Astr. 1.91-95 and 
quoted in my discussion above.  The feat is a common one, often associated with Thessalian 
magicians and routinely included in lists of magical exempla.250  Manilius’ self-
characterization in such terms places the poet in a tradition of magician-poets, in which may 
be included mythical figures such as Orpheus along with historical poets like Empedocles.251   
 Manilius’ process of self-representation is furthered by his claim to “move Helicon 
with his song” and make its trees nod (1.4-5).  In a process by now familiar to us, the idea is 
borrowed in part from Vergil.  As Vergil tells us, Orpheus too had the power to move trees 
with his song (Orpheaque in medio posuit silvasque sequentis, Ecl. 3.46; cf. mulcentem tigris 
et agentem carmine quercus, Geo. 4.510), and the claim here is another indication of 
Manilius’ connections to the legendary poet.252 The claim also has generic significance.  In 
Silenus’ song in the sixth Eclogue, Vergil describes Linus’ gifting of pipes to Gallus; giving 
                                                          
250Flores 1982, 109-110, gives literary parallels.  See also Maltby 2002 on Tibullus 1.2.45-
46. 
 
251This method of self-representation emphasizes the contradictory aspects of Manilius’ 
poetry mentioned above; in the second book, Manilius will claim that it is nefas to draw 
down the mundus unwillingly, and the language used is similar enough to suggest an 
uncomfortable self-contradiction with Manilius’ own act here (quis neget esse nefas invitum 
prendere mundum / et velut in semet captum deducere in orbem, 2.127-128); cf. Volk 2001, 
92-100.  Manilius addresses the risk of such contradiction by stressing the unwillingness of 
the mundus in the forbidden version of this act, and claiming that in his own case the 
universe itself is calling him to his task.  The argument is similar to that in the “intellectual 
gigantomachy” of the culture history, where a seemingly impious act, wresting the 
thunderbolt from Jupiter, serves to show us the ultimate power of god. 
  
252 Cf. Wilson 1985, 289-290. 
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the pipes’ history, Linus explains that an “old Ascraean” once used them to lead ash trees 
down from the mountains (Ecl. 6.69-71):253 
 dixerit: ‘hos tibi dant calamos (en accipe) Musae, 
 Ascraeo quos ante seni, quibus ille solebat 
 cantando rigidas deducere montibus ornos. 
Combined with the reference to Helicon, the allusion to these lines shows Manilius 
positioning himself within the tradition of Hesiodic didactic.   
 The reference can be pressed further.  Silenus too, as he begins his song in the same 
Eclogue, is said by Vergil to cause the trees to nod (tum vero in numerum Faunosque 
ferasque videres / ludere, tum rigidas motare cacumina quercus, Ecl. 6.27-28).  The initial 
subject of Silenus’ song is the creation of the world, presented in terms that sound first 
Lucretian, then Empedoclean, and one may at first see this, too, as fitting within the didactic 
tradition (Ecl. 6.31-34): 
 Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta 
 semina terrarumque animaeque marisque fuissent 
 et liquidi simul ignis; ut his exordia primis 
 omnia, et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis... 
In this case, whether the reader identifies Manilius in his role as charmer of nature with 
Hesiod or with Silenus, Manilius’ self-representation as didactic poet would remain constant.  
                                                          
253These lines would have a magical resonance as well; cf. Verg. Aen. 4.487-493, where Dido 
gives a list of magical arts that includes the movement of trees from mountains: 
 haec se carminibus promittit solvere mentes 
 quas velit, ast aliis duras immittere curas, 
 sistere aquam fluviis et vertere sidera retro, 
 nocturnosque movet Manis: mugire videbis 490 
 sub pedibus terram et descendere montibus ornos. 
 testor, cara, deos et te, germana, tuumque 
 dulce caput, magicas invitam accingier artis. 
For the Aeneid passage and its relation to the Eclogue, see O’Hara 1993, 21-22. For Hesiod’s 
conflation with Orpheus in the Eclogues passage, see Ross 1975, 23-24, who perhaps goes 
too far in seeing ille as actually referring to Orpheus. 
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Silenus quickly moves on, however, to a more mythological discourse, recounting tales such 
as the creation of humanity, Saturn’s reign, and Prometheus’ theft and punishment (hinc 
lapides Pyrrhae iactos, Saturnia regna, / Caucasiasque refert volucris furtumque Promethei, 
Ecl. 6.41-42).  This combination of what may be called “scientific” and “mythological” 
discourses may also be seen in some ways as “Hesiodic,” but there is a closer parallel.  In the 
opening book of the Argonautica, Orpheus is said to perform a song strikingly similar to that 
of Silenus, starting with an Empedoclean description of creation (Ap. Rhod. Arg. 1.496-499): 
 Ἤειδεν δ’ ὡς γαῖα καὶ οὐρανὸς ἠδὲ θάλασσα, 
 τὸ πρὶν ἔτ’ ἀλλήλοισι μιῇ συναρηρότα μορφῇ, 
 νείκεος ἐξ ὀλοοῖο διέκριθεν ἀμφὶς ἕκαστα... 
Like Silenus’ song, Orpheus’ quickly turns to “mythological” matters, narrating the rise of 
Kronos and Rhea to the throne of Olympus and foreshadowing Jupiter’s victory over the 
Titans (Ap. Rhod. Arg. 1.503-511).254  Representing himself as a singer akin to Silenus, then, 
Manilius aligns himself with both Hesiod and Orpheus.  Thus Manilius compounds this issue 
of self-representation, portraying himself not simply as a didactic poet but as a didactic poet 
of a specific kind.  As with Vergil in the Georgics, Manilius identifies his didaxis with 
Orphic poetry, and in so doing, I would argue, allows for his poetry to be taken as initiatory. 
 Other elements in the poem’s opening serve to reinforce this initiatory aspect.  
Indeed, Manilius emphasizes the religious nature of his work, repeatedly portraying his poem 
as part of a holy rite.255  He even ties this into his Orphic self-representation; it is in the act of 
“moving the trees with his song” that he claims to be conducting sacred rites unknown to 
                                                          
254Cf. Ross 1975, 25-26. 
 
255For this mystical aspect in Manilius’ poetry, see Volk 2009, 211-215.  Cf. Flores 1982, 
110; Schrijvers 1983, 147-148. 
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earlier generations (hospita sacra ferens nulli memorata priorum, Astr. 1.6).  Shortly 
afterwards, he presents both his poetic composition and his instruction in terms of religious 
worship—it is to the altars of his song and his subject matter that he prays (bina mihi positis 
lucent altaria flammis, / ad duo templa precor duplici circumdatus aestu / carminis et 
rerum..., 1.20-22).  The “flight of the mind” that Manilius describes in this section, speaking 
of living in the heavens where he may study the stars, may also serve this purpose; as 
Landolfi has argued, the imagery has a long pedigree in literary references to initiation, 
recurring since the time of Parmenides.256 
 These initiatory features of the poem are involved in a broader strain of Manilian 
thought that has often been seen as Hermetic in origin.  The poet’s address to Mercury in his 
proem encourages such a connection; calling upon the god as the founder of astrology, 
Manilius appears to refer to the instantiation of the god known as Hermes Trismegistos—a 
syncretizing version of the Greek Hermes and the Egyptian god Thoth said to be the 
originator of the Hermetic corpus.  Certainly, several similarities have been detected between 
the ideas expressed in the Hermetic corpus and those of Manilius’ poem, and it is compelling 
to see in Manilius’ work a version of the revelatory outlook found in that corpus.257  
Ultimately, however, Manilius’ direct knowledge of Hermetism cannot be guaranteed; as 
Volk and others have noted, Hermetism is a conglomeration of various earlier thought-
systems, and it is perfectly feasible that Manilius is drawing from these earlier traditions 
                                                          
256See Landolfi 1999.  Cf. Volk 2009, 212. 
 
257See esp. Vallauri 1954 and Valvo 1956.  While the notion of a Hermetic tinge to Manilius’ 
thought has become common, there has been some pushback; Volk 2009, 234-239 gives an 
overview of the salient arguments with bibliography. 
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instead.258  What is important for our purposes are the portions of Manilian thought 
commonly seen as Hermetic and their implications for the poem—above all the focus on god 
as the primary object of knowledge, the necessity of this knowledge for the well-being of 
humanity, and the essential divinity of humanity. 
 As discussed previously, Manilius presents his poetic instruction as a form of 
religious worship.  Similarly, the object of that instruction is portrayed in quasi-religious 
terms.  Throughout the Astronomica, Manilius takes care to emphasize the heavens’ role as 
an exemplum of divine reason.  Already in the opening lines, Manilius describes his subject 
as such (caelestis rationis opus, 1.3) and this is reiterated in the poet’s address to Mercury; as 
Manilius explains it, Mercury taught humanity astrology so that they would “recognize god 
where he was greatest” (1.35-37): 
 maior uti facies mundi foret, et veneranda 35 
 non species tantum sed et ipsa potentia rerum, 
 sentirentque deum gentes qua maximus esset. 
In the course of the poem, Manilius expands on these claims, portraying the celestial sphere 
as not just the work of god, but as god itself.  Thus after remarking on the constancy of the 
heavens (1.474-481), the poet uses this immutability to argue that the universe is both 
controlled by god and is god (1.483-485):259 
 Ac mihi tam praesens ratio non ulla videtur, 
 qua pateat mundum divino numine verti 
 atque ipsum esse deum, nec forte coisse magistra... 485 
                                                          
258Volk 2009, 237. 
 
259Cf. 1.521-523: 
 idem semper erit quoniam semper fuit idem. 
 non alium videre patres aliumve nepotes 
 aspicient. deus est, qui non mutatur in aevo. 
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By the proem of the second book, Manilius overtly refers to the subject of his song as god.  
In a particularly Stoicizing passage, the poet claims that he will sing of “god, imbued in 
heaven and earth and sea, guiding the great mass by uniform agreement” (2.60-66): 
 namque canam tacita naturae mente potentem 60 
 infusumque deum caelo terrisque fretoque 
 ingentem aequali moderantem foedere molem, 
 totumque alterno consensu vivere mundum 
 et rationis agi motu, cum spiritus unus 
 per cunctas habitet partes atque irriget orbem 65 
 omnia pervolitans corpusque animale figuret. 
 Lest the student become alarmed at the magnitude of this undertaking, Manilius 
attempts to offer reassurances.  Even animals, ignorant as they are, observe the stars and 
recognize the change of the seasons (2.99-104).  Who, asks the poet, would then hesitate to 
link humanity with the heavens (quis dubitet post haec hominem coniungere caelo?, 2.105).  
Manilius then proceeds to enumerate the advantages that god has given humanity above and 
beyond mere animals, and ends with his boldest claim—that of god’s presence in man 
(2.106-108): 
 eximium natura dedit linguamque capaxque 
 ingenium volucremque animum, quem denique in unum 
 descendit deus atque habitat seque ipse requirit... 
Repeating his earlier statement that astrology was granted to humanity by the gods (quem [sc. 
mundum] primum interius licuit cognoscere terris / munere caelestum..., 1.25-26), Manilius 
explains that knowledge of heaven has been granted by heaven, and that the astrologer may 
discover god because he himself is part of the gods (2.115-116): 
 quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse, 
 et reperire deum, nisi qui pars ipse deorum est? 
 156 
Here Manilius makes his own variation to the rhetoric of divinization seen in his poetic 
predecessors; whereas earlier poets had made knowledge the prerequisite of divinity, 
Manilius turns the figure on its head, making the essential divinity of humanity proof of our 
ability to acquire knowledge.  In this, Manilius’ stance may be compared to that of 
Empedocles when expounding his physical system.  Just as no essential knowledge is needed 
for the divinity of Empedocles’ student, who is composed of immortal elements and will 
eventually become part of the divine Sphairos with the rest of the universe, so too for 
Manilius’ student divinity would seem to be taken as assumed, and unaffected by the poet’s 
instruction. 
 Yet Manilius suggests a slightly more nuanced relationship between knowledge and 
divinity later in his poem.  In the middle of his fourth book, Manilius explains the system of 
“decans,” a method by which zodiacal signs are assigned to portions of other signs to 
compound their influences (4.310-362).  Having described this complexity, the poet supposes 
a confused student, who responds in frustration at this complication (4.387-389):260 
 “Multum” inquis “tenuemque iubes me ferre laborem, 
 rursus et in magna mergis caligine mentem, 
 cernere cum facili lucem ratione viderer.” 
Attempting to assuage the student’s concern, Manilius explains that the task’s rewards are 
worth the difficulty, as the object of the student’s inquiry is god, and the ultimate goal is the 
ascent of heaven and mastery of the universe (4.390-393): 
                                                          
260Green 2014, 39-44, sees the student’s projected despondency here and near the end of 
book 4 as part of the larger didactic failure that Manilius inscribes into his poem.  While 
Green is certainly right to note the complexity this presumed frustration adds to the “didactic 
plot” of the poem, he neglects to treat the book’s finale, in which Manilius rebuffs the 
student’s complaints and makes some of his most forceful claims for the divinity of man, 
with anything more than a casual dismissal: “It goes without saying that the student will not 
share Manilius’ final assessment in the book...” (43). 
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 quod quaeris, deus est: conaris scandere caelum 390 
 fataque fatali genitus cognoscere lege 
 et transire tuum pectus mundoque potiri. 
 pro pretio labor est nec sunt immunia tanta... 
In a reuse of the “intellectual gigantomachy” trope used in the cultural history of book one, 
Manilius here presents the acquisition of knowledge in aggressive terms, as something 
approaching an assault on the heavens.  In so doing he also reasserts the necessity of 
knowledge in the acquisition of divinity; the student cannot achieve this pretium without first 
undergoing the requisite labor. 
This causal relationship can again be seen in the conclusion to the fourth book. 
Having described the potential effects of eclipses on the power of the zodiacal signs (4.818-
865), Manilius again presents the potential response of his student, overcome by the 
difficulty of the task, whose mind resists and whose fear “keeps him from heaven’s 
threshold” (4.866-868): 
 Sed quid tam tenui prodest ratione nitentem 
 scrutari mundum, si mens sua cuique repugnat 
 spemque timor tollit prohibetque a limine caeli? 
There is a key ambivalence in this final phrase.  One may read prohibetque a limine caeli 
figuratively to mean that fear keeps the student from practicing astrology, and thus 
approaching the “threshold of heaven”; the phrase may also be taken literally, to indicate that 
fear keeps the student from ascending to the heavens and thus becoming divine.  I would 
argue that both readings are valid, and, for Manilius, amount to the same thing: by blocking 
the student from studying astrology, fear would also prevent the student from the divine state.  
Here again Manilius presents a relationship between divinity and knowledge more akin to 
that seen in the other didactic poets, where the subject of the poet’s instruction provides the 
means by which the student achieves divinity. 
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 Manilius insists upon this relationship for the rest of the fourth book in an attempt to 
remove any remaining doubt from his student.  Displaying the same optimistic view of 
human progress as that seen in his cultural history, the poet explains that “now nature 
nowhere lies hidden; we have perceived everything...and approach the stars from which we 
were born” (4.883-885): 
 iam nusquam natura latet; pervidimus omnem 
 et capto potimur mundo nostrumque parentem 
 pars sua perspicimus genitique accedimus astris. 885 
The importance of knowledge’s role is here emphasized by the sequence of narration; though 
we may be born of the stars, it is only once humanity has investigated nature in its entirety 
that we may return to them.  Book 1 is echoed again twenty lines later, as Manilius once 
more redeploys the trope of “intellectual gigantomachy,” describing how humanity 
“victoriously raises its eyes to the stars and investigates Jupiter” (4.906-910): 
  ...victorque ad sidera mittit 
 sidereos oculos propiusque aspectat Olympum 
 inquiritque Iovem; nec sola fronte deorum 
 contentus manet, et caelum scrutatur in alvo 
 cognatumque sequens corpus se quaerit in astris. 910 
With the book’s closing words, Manilius reminds his student of the all-powerful force of 
ratio, promising that humans may witness the divine, as they are now creating gods 
themselves in the person of Augustus (4.932-935): 
  ...ratio omnia vincit. 
 ne dubites homini divinos credere visus, 
 iam facit ipse deos mittitque ad sidera numen, 
 maius et Augusto crescet sub principe caelum. 
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Conclusion   
In this concluding passage of book 4, Manilius ties together the disparate rhetorical 
threads he has used over the course of his poem: the potential transcendence of humanity, the 
divinizing power of ratio, and the apotheosis of Augustus.  As argued previously, the 
political apotheosis of Augustus described in book 1 cannot provide a perfect exemplum of 
how the student is to achieve divinity, but here Manilius uses the simple fact of the princeps’ 
apotheosis to argue for the same possibility for his student.  Through the ultimate power of 
ratio, idealized in the poet’s subject of astrology, humanity has been led from an ignorant 
Golden Age to equality with Jupiter himself.  While Augustus has shown that humanity can 
create its own gods, Manilius presents his instruction as the means by which the student can 
understand the divine, and in so doing, recognize his or her own divinity.
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Conclusion 
 
Over the course of this study, I have argued for a continuity in the didactic poetic 
discourse based on a conception of the divinizing power of knowledge.  This conception is 
found already in the genre’s foundational text, Hesiod’s Works and Days, wherein the poet 
compares the life of the Just City to that “life like the gods” enjoyed by the humans of the 
golden race, and would be developed by Hesiod’s poetic successors to advance their own 
forms of epistemologically-driven divinity.  In this development, the Hesiodic Myth of the 
Ages would play a central role; I have shown how each subsequent didactic poet shaped the 
myth to his own ends, from Lucretius’ portrayal of society’s suspiciously Epicurean 
beginnings, to Vergil’s rustic Golden Age located at the origins of the Roman state, to 
Manilius’ optimistic upheaval of the mythic order and his assertion of the superiority of the 
Iron Age.  Philosophical developments would also play their part.  While the similarity of 
Hesiod’s Just City and Golden Age allow for the suggestion of the student’s deification, only 
with the philosophical poem of Lucretius’ De rerum natura do we encounter a poet openly 
avowing the possibility of a student’s “life like the gods” and it is hard to imagine the 
pantheistic optimism of poets such as Aratus or Manilius without the prevalence of 
Stoicizing thought. 
   Recognition of the pervasiveness of this connection between knowledge and 
divinity in didactic poetry may suggest fruitful areas for further inquiry.  While the focus of 
this study has been the divinizing effect of knowledge on the student, one may also consider 
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what implications this connection has for the poet’s self-representation; if the acquisition of 
knowledge is enough for the attainment of deification, what is to be made of the poet as a 
purveyor of this knowledge?  In this connection, the poet’s sources may also be considered, 
from the Muse-granted inspiration of Hesiod, to Lucretius’ careful adherence to his master 
Epicurus’ precepts, to the autoptic empirical knowledge to which Vergil lays claim.  It is 
notable that in our first extant didactic poem lacking mention of the Muses, Nicander’s 
Theriaca, the poet in the opening lines suggests an equivalence between himself and Zeus.261 
Further inquiry may look to another branch of the didactic tradition represented by 
Callimachus’ Aetia and Ovid’s Fasti.  While the works of this study have been what may be 
called “systemic,” providing ideologically-driven methods by which the student may look at 
the world, this latter branch by contrast may be considered “scholastic,” focused more on the 
collection of information than the (overt) exposition of a particular worldview.262  As such, 
would the poet’s instruction be expected to have the same effect on the student?  Especially 
in the case of the Fasti, in which the poet’s information is presented as a direct conversation 
between himself and the gods, one would expect the interaction between knowledge and 
divinity to be of particular importance.  
For the present, however, I aim to have shown both the importance of knowledge-
driven deification in the didactic genre, and its role in the didactic discourse as a way to 
                                                          
261See Clauss 2006, 162-169. 
 
262Cf. the distinction of Harder 2007, 25-29, between “instructive” poetry of the former type 
and “informative” poetry of the latter. 
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engage with one’s poetic predecessors.  Certainly, Hesiod’s quasi-“life like the gods” of the 
Just City bears little resemblance to the transmigratory divinity offered by Empedocles, 
which itself differs greatly from the ataractic state of the Lucretian wise man or the 
recognition of an inherent divinity portrayed by Manilius.  Yet each of these poets can be 
seen self-consciously working within a shared tradition, portraying their new articulations on 
the divinizing role of knowledge in ways meant to recall their poetic predecessors.  This 
evocation of previous models can be used for recontextualization, as when Aratus refashions 
the Hesiodic Golden Age in an image more suitable to his optimistic outlook, or Lucretius 
offers two complementary “Golden Ages” to fit his philosophical needs—one a portrayal of 
“hard” primitivism, the other a simulacrum of the Epicurean good life.  It can also be used 
for refutation, as in Vergil’s Georgics, where the poet’s models are evoked to call the entire 
enterprise into question and foreground the contradictions and impossibilities inherent in this 
system of didactic divinization.  In the work of all of these poets, however, we can see a 
central preoccupation with the connection between knowledge and divinity, and the potential 
for the student to live “a life like the gods.” 
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